Muhamad ALI

Multiculturalism in Southeast Asia

2011-12-14T22:40:00.000-08:00

Multiculturalism in Southeast Asia
Muhamad Ali, Jakarta | Fri, 12/09/2011 10:25 AM
A | A | A |

The condition of being culturally diverse is neither uniquely modern nor Western, but as an approach, multiculturalism is quite a modern concept (born in mid-20th century). In Southeast Asia, multiculturalism has become constructed and contested in state and society.

Some refer to the pre-colonial time when cities were a pluralistic melting point of peoples from all over Southeast Asia, depicting the archipelago as one of the crossroads of world civilizations. During the colonial time, British scholar, J.S. Furnivall used “plural societies” to describe Southeast Asian societies, “two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit”.

The colonial policies of assimilation, segregation, transmigration, ethnic categorization, adat-recht (customary law) codification, politics of Islam and regulations have impacted on post-colonial multiculturalism. But networks of Islamic reformism, Hinduization, Buddhist Mahayani and later Theravada propagation, Christianization, Chinese migration and assimilation and other processes have shaped the way in which multiculturalism has taken different forms.

Some of the post-colonial legacies include the category of pribumi (indigenous) and non-pribumi (particularly, Chinese peranakan and totok). The indigenous peoples became masyarakat adat (cultural society), and their religions became “kepercayaan” (belief). Organizational plurality (Sarekat Islam, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and so forth) emerged in response to global Islam (including Wahhabism), but also to colonial politics and domestic conditions in Muslim societies.

Throughout the Old Order and the New Order, ideological and cultural rivalries developed. Pancasila, Bhineka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity), the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and the 1945 Constitution have become ties that bind Indonesian citizens across the multicultural spectrum. In terms of language, the use of the Indonesian national language and ethnic languages take turns in terms of priority and usage among some 300 ethnic groups.

In contemporary times, ethno-religious conflicts, religious radicalism and extremism, gender discrimination, globalized theories of clash of civilizations and Westernized assumptions of multiculturalism have become factors for thinking of multiculturalism as a problem, an approach or a solution. In Indonesia, the Free Aceh Movement and its colonial and New Order histories, made Aceh an autonomous region, along with its aspiration for the implementation of Islamic law of its own.

At the same time, regional autonomy gives rise to Islamic bylaws supported by few Islamist parties and secular politicians wanting people’s votes. The problem of Ahmadiyah didn’t exist until there was an Islamic revival involving the established ulema council (MUI) who sought to maintain orthodoxy in response to both internal and external threats, along with secularism, pluralism and liberalism.

The notion of heresy became popularized. The status of lesbians and homosexuals has become controversial too. Multiculturalism became an approach to address attitudes and policies deemed intolerant, discriminatory and unjust to the “marginalized”.

In Malaysia, multiculturalism as an approach and policy is also shaped by pre-colonial and colonial experiences. Ethnicity and religions are mixed (a Malay is one who professes Islam and behaves like a Malay). Islam is the state’s religion while ambiguously allowing religious freedom.

Political parties were constructed along ethnic lines. In response to the Malay-Chinese riots of 1969, The National Front conducted affirmative action through NEP (National Economic Plan) to equalize “backward Malays” so that they could catch up with the Chinese and other educated classes. Malays enjoy constitutional advantages over non-
Malay citizens.

At the same time, Islam remains revivalist, but the UMNO seeks to modernize its character (as in Islam Hadhari). Now the government is promoting OneMalaysia, but tensions remain between ethnicity, religion and citizenship. Progressive movements, such as Sisters in Islam, attempt to be critical of both UMNO and PAS Islamization projects. Others are critical of multiculturalism in the state. In Malaysia, multiculturalism is almost always framed along ethnic lines, with class, gender and religion sometimes present to complicate things.

In Singapore, multiculturalism is defined and promoted in the city-state through a decidedly secular constitution, although religious and communal factors have become increasingly realized by the predominantly Chinese ruling party. Languages (Malay, Chinese, Tamil, English) constitute the primary marker of multicultural policy. The state’s housing policy aims to mix all ethnic groups, but all these are brought into a wider “national, Singaporean culture”. The question “Chinese First” or “Singaporean First” comes to the fore.

The People Action’s Party (PAP)’s ruling prefers “ideological consensus” to boost economic pragmatism, through such policies as “the Religious Harmony Act” (1990), forbidding the use of religion for political ends with penalties for “extremism”, and later through the promotion of basic “Religious Knowledge” (RK) allowing citizens to choose (from seven religions).

These religious policies had the goal of creating interracial harmony. In later developments, realizing the unintended consequences of religious differences in the public sphere, the National Ideology Committee created “shared values”: nation above society, society above self.

Some argue that the shared values are Asian/Eastern values, in opposition to Western values, although such values remain capitalistic. The question remains a tension between individualism and communalism, between West and East, and between multiculturalism and national cohesion.

Thus, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are highly diverse nations, ethnically, linguistically, religiously, culturally, socially, and politically, but they are diverse in different ways and cope with diversity in different ways.

Multiculturalism is a new way of understanding culture. Culture is not static, so multiculturalism should not imply those diverse cultures are fixed. “Multiculturalism”, as William Connoly states, “embodies within itself a quarrel between the national protection of diverse cultural minorities in the same territory and the pluralization of multiple possibilities of being within and across states.”

There is tension between multiculturalism and universal humanism, between what Charles Taylor calls “Politics of Recognition”, emphasizing the unique identity of an individual or a group (against assimilation), and “Politics of Universalism”, emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens (no first-class no second-class citizens).

Does the belief that all human beings have dignity necessarily mean that particular cultural identities are suppressed or negated? Can people reconcile between shared values and particular values?

Empirical studies could be important to assess if multicultural discourses and practices are based on solid social premises, not faulty ones. Does support for ethnic diversity foster individual well-being and inter-ethnic cohesion or does it foster tension and conflict? Is multiculturalism understood as the imposition of some cultures on others? Can different peoples have a shared goal of multiculturalism? Is it for the sake of recognition of the diverse values and expressions for their own sake or for the enhancement of the quality of life and learning among all? Does multiculturalism reinforce racial superiority, religious supremacy, and ethno-triumphalism?

Strategies, structural and cultural, can be formulated in each country and they could learn from each other to see the best practices of multiculturalism, considering both commonalities and differences. Multiculturalism operates in both private and public spheres (family, the state, civil society, including NGOs, media and learning institutions).

Multiculturalism concerns how the self relates to others, real or imagined. As an approach, multiculturalism implies willingness to accept possible ways of being and becoming, regardless of ethnicity, race, sexuality, gender and religion, in efforts at creating respectful and critical societies.

Recent Publications per September 2011

2011-09-27T06:03:00.001-07:00

CURRENT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PUBLICATIONS

A. Book Chapters
1. Ali, M. 2011. The Internet, Cyber-Religion and Authority: The Case of the Indonesian Liberal Islam Network. Islam and Popular Culture in Indonesia and Malaysia. Editors: Andrew Weinstraub, Andrew Weinstraub, Andrew Weinstraub, Andrew Weinstraub, Andrew Weinstraub. Routledge. London. p.101-122. (Refereed, Invited)
2. Ali, M., Murodi , M. 2010. History (of Islam). Pengantar Studi Islam (Introduction to Islamic Studies). Editors: Prof.Mulyadhi Kartanegara, Prof.Mulyadhi Kartanegara, Prof.Mulyadhi Kartanegara. UIN Press. Jakarta. p.1-28. (Partially Refereed, Not Invited)
3. Ali, M. 2009. Kebebasan Beragama (Religious Freedom). Merayakan Kebebasan Beragama (Celebrating Religious Freedom). Editors: Elza Peldi Taher, Elza Peldi Taher, Elza Peldi Taher, Elza Peldi Taher, Elza Peldi Taher. Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace & KOMPAS. Jakarta. p.314-334. (Non-Refereed, Invited)
4. Ali, M. 2008. Islam i Sydostasien (Islam in Southeast Asia). Politikens Bog Om Islam. Editors: Jorgen Baek Simonsen, Jorgen Baek Simonsen, Jorgen Baek Simonsen, Jorgen Baek Simonsen, Jorgen Baek Simonsen. Politikens Forlag. Denmark. p.315-347. (Refereed, Invited)
5. Ali, M. 2007. Makna dan Tujuan Dialog Peradaban (The Meanings and Aims of Intercivilizational Dialogue). Muhammadiyah Progressif: Manifesto Pemikiran Kaum Muda (Progressive Muhammadiyah: The Thought of The Young Generation). Editors: Abdul Rahim al-Ghazali, Abdul Rahim al-Ghazali, Abdul Rahim al-Ghazali, Abdul Rahim al-Ghazali, Abdul Rahim al-Ghazali. Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah & Lembaga Studi Filsafat Islam. Jakarta. p.331-52. (Non-Refereed, Invited)
6. Ali, M. 2006. "Mengapa Membumikan Kemajemukan dan Kebebasan Beragama di Indonesia?” (Why Promoting Religious Pluralism and Freedom in Indonesia?). Bayang-Bayang Fanatisisme: Esai-esai untuk Mengenang Nurcholish Madjid (The Shadows of Fanaticism: Remembering Nurcholish Madjid). Editors: Abd Hakim, Abd Hakim, Yudi Latif, Yudi Latif, Abd Hakim, Abd Hakim, Abd Hakim, Yudi Latif, Yudi Latif, Yudi Latif. Paramadina University. Jakarta. p.244-81. (Non-Refereed, Invited)
7. Ali, M. 2006. "Gerakan Islam Moderat di Indonesia Kontemporer” (Moderate Islamic Movements in Indonesia). Gerakan & Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Kontemporer (The Islamic Movements and Ideas in Contemporary Indonesia). Editors: Rizal Sukma, Rizal Sukma, Clara Joewono, Clara Joewono, Rizal Sukma, Rizal Sukma, Rizal Sukma, Clara Joewono, Clara Joewono, Clara Joewono. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Jakarta. p.202-240. (Non-Refereed, Invited)
7-A. Ali, M. 2007. Moderate Islamic Movements in Contemporary Indonesia. Islamic Thought and Movements in Contemporary Indonesia. Editors: Rizal Sukma, Rizal Sukma, Clara Joewono, Clara Joewono. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Jakarta, Indonesia. p.195-236. (Refereed, Invited)
(Submitted)
1. Ali, M. Islamic Liberalism in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis. Liberal Islam in Indonesia. Editors: Haidar Bagir , Haidar Bagir , Muhammad Deden Ridwan, Muhammad Deden RidwanMizan. Bandung, Indonesia . Submitted to Editors on 09/25/2011. (Submitted 09/15/2011. 30 manuscript pages.) (Refereed, Invited)
2. Ali, M. Far from Mecca: Modern Islam in Southeast Asia. Islam in the Modern World. Editors: Ebrahim Moosa , Ebrahim Moosa , Jeffrey Kenney, Jeffrey KenneyRoutledge. Oxon, U.K. Submitted to Editors on . (Submitted 07/06/2011. 20 manuscript pages.) (Refereed, Invited)
B. Book Reviews
1. Ali, M. Information about the book that was reviewed: Perfection Makes Practice: Learning, Emotion, and the Recited Qur’an in Indonesia. Ed. 2004. Anna M. Gade. University of Hawaii Press: 348p. Information about the book review itself: Perfection Makes Practice: Learning, Emotion, and the Recited Qur'an in Indonesia. Published on 10/07/2006. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences. Vol. 23:3: p.86-91. (Refereed, Not Invited)
2. Ali, M. Information about the book that was reviewed: Jihad in Paradise: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia . Ed. 2004. Mike Millard. M.E. Sharpe, Inc: 155p. Information about the book review itself: Jihad in Paradise: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia. Published on 10/07/2006. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences. Vol. 23:3: p.100-103. (Refereed, Not Invited)
3. Ali, M. Information about the book that was reviewed: Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension. Ed. 2004. Giora Eliraz. Sussex Academic Press: 142p. Information about the book review itself: Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension. Published on 10/07/2005. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences. Vol. 22:3: p.136-139. (Refereed, Not Invited)
4. Ali, M. Information about the book that was reviewed: Malay Muslims: the History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia. Ed. 2002. Robert Day McAmis. William B. Eerdmans Publishing: 173p. Information about the book review itself: Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia. Published on 11/10/2003. Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 62:4: p.1130-1132. (Refereed, Not Invited)
C. Books
1. Ali, M. 2009. Bridging Islam and the West: An Indonesian View. Ushul Press, Faculty of Ushuluddin, the State Islamic University. Jakarta . 190p. (, Not Invited)
2. Ali, M. 2003. Teologi Pluralis-Multikultural: (Multicultural-Pluralist Theology). Penerbit Buku Kompas. Jakarta. 298p. (Refereed, Not Invited)
D. JournalArticles
1. Ali, M. 2011. Eclecticism of Modern Islam: Islam Hadhari in Malaysia. Studia Islamika. Vol. 18: 1 p.1-30. (Refereed, Not Invited)
2. Ali, M. 2010. Religion, Imperialism, and Resistance in the Nineteenth Century's Netherlands Indies and Spanish Philippines. Jurnal Kajian Wilayah (The Indonesian Journal of Area Studies). Vol. No. 1: No. 1 p.119-140. (Refereed, Not Invited)
3. Ali, M. 2010. "They are not All Alike": Indonesian Intellectuals Perception of Judaism and Jews. Indonesia and the Malay World. Vol. 38: 112 p.329-347. (Refereed, Not Invited)
4. Ali, M. 2007. "Categorizing Muslims in Postcolonial Indonesia". Moussons. Vol. 11: 2007 p.33-62. (Refereed, Not Invited)
5. Ali, M. 2007. Confrontation and Reconciliation: Muslim Voices of Maluku Conflict (1999-2002). Journal of Indonesian Islam. Vol. 1/2: 2007 p.379-402. (Refereed, Invited)
6. Ali, M. 2007. "Chinese Muslims in Indonesia: A Post-Diasporic Experience". Explorations. Vol. 7/2: 2007 p.1-22. (Refereed, Not Invited)
7. Ali, M. 2006. "Menengok Barat, Mengembangkan Tradisi Ilmiah di Indonesia" (Learning from the West, Developing Scientific Tradition in Indonesia). Mimbar Agama dan Budaya (Pulpit of Religion and Culture). Vol. 23/1: p.25-41. (Refereed, Not Invited)
8. Ali, M. 2006. "Transmission of Islamic Knowledge in Kelantan". The Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Vol. 79: 2 p.39-58. (Refereed, Not Invited)
9. Ali, M. 2005. "The Rise of the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia". American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences. Vol. 22:1: p.1-27. (Refereed, Not Invited)
10. Ali, M. 2004. "Honoring Religions". Peace & Policy. Vol. 9: p.86-89. (Refereed, Not Invited)
11. Ali, M. 2003. "Dialogue Amongst Civilizations". Resonansi. Vol. 1:2: p.1-7. (Non-Refereed, Invited)
12. Ali, M. 2002. "The Concept of Umma and teh Reality of the Nation-Sate: A Western and Muslim Discourse". Kultur: The Indonesian Journal of Muslim Cultures. Vol. 2/1: p.46-59. (Refereed, Not Invited)
13. Ali, M. 2002. "The Fatwas on Interfaith Marriage in Indonesia". Studia Islamika. Vol. 9:3: p.1-25. (Refereed, Not Invited)
E. Other
1. Ali, M. 2004. Information about the publication that was reviewed: (Working Paper) "Islam and Economic Development in New Order's Indonesia" 1967-1998. East-West Center Working Papers. p. 1-24. Vol. 12. (Non-Refereed, Not Invited)

F. Reference Entries
1. Ali, M. 2004. "Jihad: East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia". Brill Academic Publishers. Leiden. The Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Culture. p.231-234. (Non-Refereed, Not Invited)
(Submitted)
1. Ali, M. Islamic Liberalism in Southeast Asia. Editor(s): Robert Repino. Imtiyaz Yusuf . Oxford University Press. New York. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. (Submission 09/15/2011. 15 manuscript pages.) (Refereed, Electronic, Not Invited)
2. Ali, M. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (the Party of Liberation Indonesia). Editor(s): Henry Schwarz. Blackwell. Blackwell Encyclopedia of Postcolonial Studies. (Submission 05/26/2011. 12 manuscript pages.) (Refereed, Not Invited)
G. Review Essays
1. Ali, M. 2009. . . . Pages reviewed: p. . . p.409-415. (Refereed, Not Invited)
H. Textbooks

(Submitted)
1. Ali, M. Religion: A Clinical Guide to Religion. . Jones & Bartlett. Burlington, MA . (Submitted 08/10/2011. 8 manuscript pages.) (Refereed, Not Invited)

Semitechnical Publications
A. JournalArticles
1. Ali, M. 2005. Religious Pluralism in the United States. Syir'ah. Vol. 1: 2004 15p. (Refereed, Not Invited)
2. Ali, M. 2004. Indonesia's Tradition of Moderation. Elections Today. Vol. 12: 2004 2p. (Refereed, Invited)

Global Islam: between Images and Reality

2011-01-08T15:27:00.000-08:00

Global Islam: Between images and reality
Muhamad Ali, Riverside, California | Mon, 12/20/2010 3:03 PM | Review & Outlook
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Globalization has made the world of Islam more heterogeneous than homogeneous. It continues to shape Islam identities and moralities, imagined or real, at both global and local levels. What is conceptually homogenous is Islam itself, but what it means differs.

Globalization in its broadest sense is not new, and early Islam normatively preached trans-racial, trans-ethnic solidarity of the community of the believers, although information technology today has made them even more aware of the world.

Islam emerged as a local path of Prophet Muhammad and his followers, but with the power of the Koran and Arabic, Islam has ever since become increasingly global, crossing non-Arabic Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia and the Americas. From early times, Muslims have been politically divided into the Shiite and the Sunni, the Khawarij, the Murji’a, the Mu’tazila, and so forth, although the efforts to unify them have never ceased.

Of course, Muslims read the Koran, commanding them to be united in the rope of God, not to be divided into sects, but there is neither linear nor teleological history of Islam, as if all Muslims are progressing from the chaos to the orderly.

Elements of the old and the new, the normative and the practical, the just and the unjust, have interacted in ways that vary from people to people and from time to time. There is no one direction of Islam today, as was the case in the past.

The lack of one global leadership of Islam has been felt as a challenge to the unity by some of the believers reviving the caliphate when this same deficiency is cherished by most other Muslims scattered in and working through their nation-states, ethnicities, social or political organizations.

The phrase “the Muslim world” itself is problematic if it means there is real, effective, face-to-face unity among most Muslims in the world today.

Of course, in Islamic sermons and publications, prayers are recited for Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and other conflict areas where Muslims suffer from war.

But when people talk about global or transnational Islam, or Islamic revivalism, they refer to the fundamentalist, “Islamist”, “jihadist”, very little to the progressive, sometimes liberal orientations and expressions that exist.

Being socially and modernly constructed, the labels are felt necessary in people’s attempt at simplifying complex realities, but the perception of Islamic fundamentalism as the main player in global discourse and politics has not become weaker.

Thus, people today are not used to pointing to the Turkish Fethullah Gulan Movement, the Indonesian Muhammadiyah or the Nahdlatul Ulama, progressive Muslim networks, which have become increasingly no less global than hard-liners such as al-Qaeda, Jamaah Islamiyah, or the more diverse Muslim Brotherhood.

At the same time, much ignorance and instant information about Islam and Muslim societies: with so much information and variables available in TV programs, films, novels and the Internet, Muslims and non-Muslims alike do not necessarily have the knowledge to comprehend the complexity. Thus it may be easier to find a claim that Islam is an intolerant religion among the Islamophobic societies or to read another that claims it is a tolerant, peaceful religion among the devout preachers and committed leaders.

With other religious and secular leaders, Muslim leaders from Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey and other countries have been promoting global tolerance, balance of power and peace, searching for a common ground, although still limited to the Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, albeit still exclusive of other faiths.

Within the global religious markets, Muslim leaders and scholars, often along with non-Muslim counterparts, have thus been more preoccupied with correcting the images or what they call misperceptions about Islam and Muslims, but they generally are not interested in acknowledging the degree of diversity and complexity of Islam and Muslims. There is an obsession with image-correction.

The conspiracy or global makar theory, neo-imperialism, clash of civilizations and cosmic war have remained crucial parts of global public discourse.

But it is more difficult to find individuals and people who seek to understand both the complexity of Islam and the complexity of other religions and faiths, including secularism and liberalism.

Global Islam is the world of diversification, democratization and polarization of religious information and authority; no group represents or has the authority to orient all the Muslims across the globe, toward a real, unified community of believers.

The homogenization of the world of Islam has always been prayed for and preferred by many leaders, driven by both scriptures and real disunity, but problems and issues have endlessly polarized Muslims everywhere, not always as Muslims but as members of particular ethnic, national or political groups. Their immediate concerns are far more urgent for them to be addressed in their localities.

As minorities, some Muslims have just started to debate how to be French Muslims, American Muslims, Australian Muslims and so forth, and as majorities, many Muslims continue to negotiate their place in an increasingly pluralistic society. Even within the nation-states and provinces, Muslims are divided into various factions, political or non-political.

At the national and local levels, it is not so obvious for global citizens to recognize that many Muslim networks and organizations locally have contributed to addressing not so much Islamic problems but shared problems, such as governmental corruption, poverty, illiteracy, injustice, health, environment and violence.

Such local efforts in dealing with immediate problems with or without collaboration among Muslims, or between Muslims and non-Muslims, strengthen the diversification of Islam, rather than unifying it into a single global management.

There is no global or local, social or political engineering that would be effective enough to homogenize the world of local Muslim societies everywhere. Muslims have long been active participants in localizing their “universal” worldview, thereby pluralizing the world. Perhaps it is God alone who knows best the mystery of human unity and diversity.

The writer, author of Bridging Islam and the West: An Indonesian View (2009), is an assistant professor in religious studies, University of California, Riverside.

Amerika Serikat dan Kebebasan Beragama

2010-09-20T09:47:00.000-07:00

AS dan Kebebasan Beragama
Rabu, 15 September 2010 | 04:42 WIB

Muhamad Ali

Kontroversi pembangunan pusat Islam di dekat Ground Zero—tempat serangan teroris 11 September 2001— membuat Presiden Amerika Serikat Barack Obama yang beragama Protestan harus angkat bicara. Wali Kota New York Michael Bloomberg, yang beragama Yahudi, sebelumnya mendukung.

Meski awalnya low profile karena itu ia anggap urusan Kota New York, ikut campurnya Obama menunjukkan isu Islam dan Barat, Islam dan keamerikaan, serta agama dan kebebasan agama belum selesai di Amerika Serikat.

Mereka yang menolak, termasuk Sarah Palin, kandidat wakil presiden dari Partai Republik, dan kaum konservatif agama dan politik, beranggapan bahwa Islam bertanggung jawab terhadap tragedi 11 September. Banyak keluarga korban beranggapan, pendirian pusat Islam mengkhianati para korban. Penolakan juga mencerminkan anggapan Islam sebagai musuh Amerika dan ancaman keamanan.

Sebaliknya, bagi Obama, Bloomberg, dan banyak orang Amerika lain, Islam dan tragedi 11 September harus dibedakan. Islam telah menjadi bagian dari Amerika sejak berabad-abad meski baru berkembang pertengahan awal abad ke-20. Tokoh dan masyarakat Muslim Amerika yang mayoritas usia muda, kelas menengah, dan liberal secara politik terus menyumbang pembangunan dan kemajuan Amerika.

Mayoritas Muslim di Amerika sangat prihatin dengan terorisme dan munculnya ekstremisme keagamaan. Karena itu, makin banyak Muslim yang menyuarakan visi progresif dan inklusif Islam di Amerika.

Obama menekankan, kebebasan beragama tidak boleh tergoyahkan. Islam mengajarkan keadilan, perdamaian, dan toleransi. Sementara Al Qaeda adalah distorsi Islam.

Rencana pembakaran Al Quran dan ungkapan-ungkapan anti-Islam di media massa dan internet menunjukkan sebagian masyarakat memang tidak tahu tentang Al Quran dan Islam.

Fobia Islam

Dukungan Obama terhadap kebebasan agama muncul dalam konteks masih berkembangnya fobia Islam di Amerika di mana sebagian masyarakat masih mencurigai komunitas Muslim setelah 11 September. Oleh karena itu, ketegasan Obama secara terbuka di banyak kesempatan menjaga harapan akan ditepatinya janji- janji dia selama kampanye dan di awal pemerintahannya.

Dukungan Obama terhadap pendirian pusat Islam juga bukti komitmennya pada rasa keadilan Muslim Amerika yang kini mencapai tujuh juta jiwa. Karena sensus Amerika tidak punya afiliasi agama, asal kebangsaan dan bahasa menjadi tanda demografi Muslim. Sebagian besar Muslim di Amerika tetap ingin menjadi Muslim— Sunni, Syiah, Nation of Islam, atau tanpa afiliasi—sekaligus menjadi warga negara yang patuh, terdidik, dan maju.

Menurut survei, lebih dari separuh Muslim Amerika tidak mempertentangkan Islam, demokrasi, dan pluralisme. Banyak organisasi advokasi bekerja sama dengan Gedung Putih dan penegak hukum dalam menciptakan strategi di bidang kebijakan publik, hak-hak sipil, dan isu-isu publik lainnya. Banyak warga Muslim terlibat dalam pemerintahan lokal dan lembaga-lembaga swadaya masyarakat Islam maupun antaragama. Semakin Muslim berpartisipasi dalam kehidupan sosial dan politik, semakin moderat dan selaras pemikiran dan sikap mereka terhadap mainstream publik AS.

Paradigma hegemonik

Terhadap perkembangan Islam di AS, setidaknya ada dua kelompok: kelompok pertama adalah mereka yang ingin mempertahankan akar Protestan bangsa dan melihat imigrasi (termasuk Muslim) yang tanpa batas akan menggerogoti akar itu, seperti terbaca dalam buku Samuel Huntington Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (2004). Sejalan dengan paradigma hegemonik ini, banyak kalangan melihat Islam adalah ancaman bagi nilai-nilai demokratis dan liberal.

Kelompok kedua, seperti ditegaskan Diana Eck dan John L Esposito, adalah mereka yang melihat Amerika semakin pluralistis. Banyak kalangan melihat makin pentingnya peran Muslim sebagai bagian dari warga Amerika yang memiliki hak dan kewajiban sama dengan penganut agama lain dan bahkan non-agama. Islam dan Islam di Amerika menjadi bagian dari kurikulum di sekolah-sekolah dan perguruan tinggi di Amerika.

Pluralisme agama di AS di masa kontemporer–mulai dari toleransi, inklusi, hingga partisipasi, seiring dengan prinsip kebebasan beragama. Meski tidak tanpa perdebatan, kebebasan beragama menjadi komitmen setiap pemimpin Amerika. Konstitusi Amerika secara konsisten menyatakan pemisahan urusan agama dan urusan negara. Agama dan tidak beragama menjadi hak asasi pribadi dan komunitas sejauh tidak melanggar kebebasan orang lain dan ketertiban umum. Kebebasan ber-Islam harus adil dijaga, seperti kebebasan ber-Kristen, ber-Yahudi, ber-Hindu, dan bahkan hidup tanpa afiliasi agama.

Orang bisa berkata, Indonesia beda dari Amerika. Tapi interaksi dan saling belajar antarbangsa di dunia telah terjadi sejak berabad-abad lamanya. Amerika belajar dari sejarah imigrasi Spanyol, Inggris, Irlandia Utara, Afrika, Asia, dan sebagainya. Meski sekarang mayoritas, agama Protestan bukanlah agama asli penduduk AS. Di Indonesia, Islam, dan agama-agama dunia lain yang kini berkembang bukan agama-agama asli, tetapi semua muncul karena mereka terbuka terhadap gagasan- gagasan dari luar, seiring dan beradaptasi dengan tradisi-tradisi lokal, mereka pun berkembang.

Adil dan manusiawi

Kebijakan adanya agama-agama resmi memang tidak ada di AS. Sebaliknya, Indonesia mengakui adanya agama-agama resmi dan negara menjamin kebinekaan dan kebebasan beragama setiap warga. Meski pelaksanaan kebebasan beragama tidak kaku, ia harus selaras dengan prinsip-prinsip keadilan dan kemanusiaan.

Kebijakan pemimpin harus adil terhadap penganut agama dan kepercayaan seperti diatur hukum dan undang-undang. Prinsipnya, menjadi minoritas Muslim di AS seharusnya tidak ada beda dengan menjadi minoritas Muslim yang berbeda aliran dan non-Muslim di Indonesia.

Di AS, kebebasan beragama tidak tanpa batas. Salah kaprah jika beranggapan kebebasan beragama di negeri itu tanpa batas. Hukum dan perundang-undangan jelas membatasi penerapan kebebasan beragama. Maka, pendirian masjid di New York juga harus mengikuti peraturan yang berlaku.

Komitmen kebebasan beragama dan persamaan hak tidak boleh tergoyahkan meski harus bertentangan dengan sebagian orang yang tidak tahu dan tidak peduli. Hak beragama masih harus diperjuangkan secara lebih serius di negeri demokrasi terbesar ketiga di dunia ini.

Muhamad Ali Dosen Studi Islam dan Agama-agama di University of California, Riverside; E-mail: muali@ucr.edu

State, Islamic Law and Minorities in Indonesia

2010-06-09T10:42:00.001-07:00

State, Islamic Law and Minorities in Indonesia
The State, the Islamic Law,
and Religious Minorities in Indonesia

Author: Muhamad Ali, Ph.D
An assistant professor, Religious Studies Department,
University of California, Riverside

How did the State and civil society negotiate the Shari’a and the civil law in a modern pluralistic Indonesia? Why is it difficult for a compromise that pleases everyone? The State continues to function as the legitimate power to produce laws in which the Shari’a has to contribute and to adjust itself in a Muslim majority yet, pluralistic nation. The tensions and negotiations between various elements– the government and civil society, result from a long duree of encounters of the Middle East (including the Mediterranean), Europe, and Asia in the Indonesian archipelago. A history of a legal culture and interfaith interaction in a local context reveals the various and changing impact of global forces. Indonesia, being referred to as “the Umma below the winds”, or Jawi by people in Mecca, being part of Southeast Asia after World War II, is today described as the largest Muslim country in the world, although geographically and viewed religiously “peripheral” in relation to the Islamic center, the Middle East.

However, Indonesia has been a crossroads of various religions and cultures originating from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and more recently the United States. Connections and disconnections between continents prevail in this archipelago with more than 17,000 islands and 300 ethnic groups and 6 major religions. As for the Ottoman Empire, it was Acehnese who had the closest, albeit changing relations with the Ottoman, from the 16th century to the 19th century (for example, Aceh’s recognition of the Ottoman caliphate, asking for artillery technology, in exchange of pearls and diamonds, thus commercial, cultural, and religious interaction); Apart from being connected to India, exemplified by the kingdoms of Majapahit and Sriwijaya, the archipelago become gradually Islamized through Mecca and Medina, but more importantly via Egypt. The coming of the colonial powers (Portuguese, British, Dutch, and Japanese) had a lasting impact on the political, administrative, legal, and religious cultures of the population. During the late colonial time, in the early 20th century, world economy and print capitalism led to the emergence of socialist, nationalist, and Islamic organizations. Pan-Arabism, and pan-Islamism (caliphate) tried to penetrate into Indonesian market of ideas through the returning students and teachers and books, but they were not successful. Instead, localized, Java-based organizations were established–with Islam as the spirit and ethics rather than a trans-local political ideology. The MUHAMMADIYAH was a modernist organization adopting and adapting Dutch educational and organizational system, including how to dress and what language to use in mosque sermons. THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (the Awakening of the Islamic Scholars, NU) emerged as a response to that modernism, trying to conserve traditional ways of mission and education. Muslims under occupation asked the question as to the status of being subject to the infidel (kafir) rulers. Many reasoned by quoting medieval Sunni scholar Al-Ghazzali: “it is better to be under a just infidel than under an unjust believer.” They were certainly various responses to colonialism, but Muslims interpreted the Sha’ria not in a rigid way.

In 1928, the conference of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Java issued their fatwas in response to various questions concerning other religions and the practices deemed as foreign influences. One of the questions was: “What is the opinion of the NU regarding wearing trousers, ties, shoes, and hats?” The NU general conference replied in the following manner, which then became its fatwa: “If one wears these with the intention to imitate and to follow the path of the unbelievers (kafir) and to promote their unbelief, then the person becomes kafir. If he or she does not have an intention at all to imitate the kafir (simply wearing this or that) and to follow their path, then the act is not forbidden. Nevertheless, it is considered undesirable (makruh).” This shows how they construct which foreign ideas and symbols are okay and which are not okay.

The Independent Republic of Indonesia adopted and adapted centuries of such different types of influences in making laws. The governments and the people’s representatives continued to regulate difference based on various and changing identity communal markers, particularly ethnicity, class, and religion. Thus the law that has survived today is pluralistic, drawing from various sources, pre-colonial (generally called customary, ADAT), colonial, and Islamic (especially as pertaining to Muslims) as a result of a long history of interactions. With the end of the Caliphate system in 1924, Muslims and non-Muslim minorities endorsed the modern nation-state. The earliest debate was about whether or not ISLAM would become the Constitution. Thus, the controversy of the Jakarta Charter emerged about whether or not the Constitution includes the obligation of Muslims in following the Shari’a. In any case, Indonesians see law as both principle and mechanism to managing pluralism and ensuring order, but at the same time, law becomes a site of contentious discourse involving the governments and civil society. Law and order are closely intertwined, but disorder and sometimes violence have become related to legal discourse and struggle.

In the post-colonial time, Indonesian’s legal pluralism is manifested primarily in the eclectic procedures: The Roman Dutch colonial law (although the Dutch later subscribed to a French civil law), the oral law culture (ADAT, customary law), and Islam– primarily Sunni and Shafi’i. Because Islam or the Shari’a does not provide detailed legal procedures, the Dutch derived civil law has become the main source for such procedures. The Shari’a deals primarily with some domestic matters, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Gradually the Shari’a minded Muslims seek to include more, including the Shari’a court (apart from the civil court), the zakat collection and distribution, pilgrimage management, and interest-free banking. More recently, decentralization– after 32 years of centralization, has lead some regencies to enact Islam-based laws, concerning dressing, gambling, drugs, and moral issues.

The Marriage Law of 1974, for example, is to be implemented for Muslims through the Islamic Court and for non-Muslims through the Civil Court. The Law states the minimum age of groom (19 years old) and of bride (16 years old). The Ministry of Religious Affairs register Muslims, and the Civil Registration Office non-Muslims. The principle is monogamy, but polygamy is not forbidden with agreement of previous wives or the court with some requirements (financial and just treatment). Divorce is by the court’s decision. The Law does not allow interfaith marriage, and this and others have become controversial. The debates on the formalization of Islamic law at the national and local levels, are a reflection of an ever increasing influences of global ideas, including with the Iranian revolution, the global movement of caliphate, global Islamic movement for anti-neo-imperialism and neo-liberalism, and more recently the global sentiments of anti-American colonialism in the Middle East. However, the manifestation of such global ideas remains within the local and national constraints.

In the autonomous province of ACEH, for example, due to its unique history, the central government allowed it to pursue the formalization of Islamic Law. They have regional law (Peraturan Daerah) dealing with various aspects of private and public lives of Muslims, excluding non-Muslims. There is the council of the Shari’a and morality police controlling people’s prayers, fasting, sexual relations, gambling, and the like. The codification of the local law (QANUN) dealing with the Islamic court (marriage, inheritance, endowment, charity, economic transactions) includes the kind of punishment of prison or fines (ta’zir, diyat, not directly based on the Qur’an and the Sunna). The Qanun stipulates that non-Muslims, although not subject to the Islamic law, shall respect the implementation of the Islamic Law in Aceh.. The Acehness local rules dealing with heresies, blasphemy, and apostasy (MURTAD) indicate the increased influence of the religious authority in controlling the faith of the people, in the hope of religious conservatism and social order, but without necessarily considering the rights of minorities and the Indonesian Constitution. For many Indonesians outside Aceh, the formalization of Islamic law is not necessarily an Islamic, nor designed on the basis of a pluralistic Pancasila. For many, it is a politization of religion for the sake of identity and power.

Indonesia has been also a site and marketplace of global Islamic Movements emphasizing Islamic struggle (JIHAD) or Islamic call (DA’WA), such as Hizbut Tahrir (of Indonesia) of Palestinian origin, and Jama’at Tabligh of Indian origin, Wahhabism of Saudi origin, to name the most popular one, albeit their numbers are relatively small but vocal. Among the so many political discourses in Indonesia, Darul Harb versus Darul Islam are today no longer used; Indonesia has been seen by many if not most Muslims as either Darul Islam or Darul al-Sulh (Abode of Peace). The classical and medieval concept of the Dhimmitude is revived by some, but the idea and application seems not clear and not realistic. There are some Islamic movements who see the Constitution of Medina as the model for a pluralistic, tolerant State, but the histories of Muhammad and Indonesian Muslims are different. Others point to Muslim Spain (Convivencia) when talking about coexistence of Muslims, Christians, and Jews, but the still unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflicts overshadow the spirit of harmony, and instead often filled with tensions and prejudices.

Global and Islamic ideas and issues become localized, thanks to communication technology; and few Indonesians actually become involved in traveling to other countries. When they study or travel abroad, most tend to go home. However, despite the small number of Indonesian diasporas, Indonesian Muslims do not find any significant contradiction between Islamic solidarity (UMMA), national solidarity (WATAN), and international, humanistic solidarity (BASYAR). There is a movement toward nationalization of the Shari’a, which means different things to different peoples, but demonstrates how Islamization, globalization, and nationalism are perceived as not contradictory and instead reinforcing each other. In other words, broadly speaking, Indonesians experience multiple and multifaceted processes: Localization, Arabization, and Westernization. The persistence of the State Ideology of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution until today show how world ideologies (monotheism, humanism, nationalism, democracy, and socialism) have their strengths and relevance to the nation building. The Constitution which guarantees religious freedom (but its definition and limits have been contested) provides Indonesians with basis for justifying their actions toward one another. In the courts, political speeches, scholarly statements, leaders and people try a balancing act: Indonesia being neither an Islamic state, nor a purely Western type secular state; but instead the State of Pancasila, which guarantees freedom of religion, but supports religious development of the population. According to the official statements, Indonesia is not a theocratic State in the sense that the State Constitution is not based upon or derives its source from a specific religious law. By the same token, it is not a secular state in the sense that the government is neutral toward the development and the prompting of religious life of the people. Indonesian State does not recognize communism and atheism. At the semi-governmental level, there are councils for religious leaders: Islamic, Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian. The Council of Islamic Scholars, for example, have issued their Fatwas concerning “minorities”, fatwas which are not legally binding but are often heard by many. For example, the Council issued fatwas condemning religious pluralism, liberalism, and secularism in their definition (pluralism is to believe all religions are equal, liberalism is to use reason over revelation, and secularism is to separate the worldly from the religious).

They also condemned the Ahmadiyya of Qadiani (India) as heretical and the tensions and violence against its followers erupted in different parts of Indonesia. Contemporary Indonesia have witnessed various Interfaith Debates: Religious Mission (Christianization versus Islamization), the place of Chinese Minorities, Marriage Law (inter-religious marriage), National Education Law (religious education in public schools), Joint Celebration of Christmas, and the building of religious houses. The most recent rejection by the Constitution Court of some liberal groups to revoking the Blasphemy Law of 1965, banning a religious interpretation that is not in accordance with the mainstream, a complex story in itself, reveals how the majority mentality (fearing religious difference to cause social disorder) still prevails. Religious interpretations are subject to Law, but the Law that ensures a sense of security (based on perceived or real threats posed by far and near enemies). Different responses by other Muslims and non-Muslims toward the formalization of Islamic Law and the Blasphemy Law have emerged: Some say, Indonesia is not an Arab country (thus, tensions between outright Arabization versus Indonesianization); other say the formalization of the Islamic law is against the secular Pancasila and religious freedom guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution; still others argue that the Qur’an has no details about the kind of governance and that what is crucial is the substance and spirit– such as the objectives of protecting faith, reason, spirit, family, and property. Others suggest that the categorization of Muslims as majority and others as minority do not do justice to diversity among the majority themselves– such as in the cases of Muslims criticizing the formalization of Islamic law in Aceh and in parts of Indonesia, and the preservation of the Blasphemy Law this year.

In conclusion, the negotiation of the Shari’a and civil law in Indonesia is linked to multiple, long and short forces and processes, allowing tensions and coexistence of identities and cultures. The State’s management of difference cannot be well understood without investigating the strengths and limits of global and local ideas and networks in particular local contexts. What the Indonesian case can contribute to our world history perspective of encounters is that with the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate, and after world war II, religion and nationalism, or Islam and citizenship, interacted with tensions and integration depending on socio-political agency and contexts, in ways that Prophet Muhammad himself and Muslim caliphs never anticipated.

(This paper was presented at a panel “Confessional Communities and Legal Cultures in the Mediterranean and Beyond”, the World History Conference, University of California Riverside, 14-15 May, 2010)

Gus Dur as a Defender of Pluralism, Religious Freedom

2010-01-07T20:47:00.000-08:00

Gus Dur as a defender of pluralism, religious freedom

Muhammad Ali , Riverside, CA | Wed, 01/06/2010 9:31 AM | Opinion

Pluralism has always been a contentious issue, but Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid worked beyond passive tolerance. He advocated the creation of a public space for communication, dialogue and cooperation between the mainstream and the marginalized.

Raised in a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) tradition, but also in Western and Eastern traditions, Gus Dur became the advocate of a reform rooted in the traditions.

He received awards and honorary positions from Shimon Peres, Temple University, for his con-tinued advocacy for the rights of minorities in Indonesia, and many others.

He was the president of the Non-Violence and Peace Movement, a board member of the International Strategic Dialogue Center in Israel, Interreligious for Reconciliation and Reconstruction in London, and one of the founders and board members of the Shimon Perez Center for Peace in Israel. He has been regarded by many in the world as a true defender of pluralism.

Christian scholar Th. Sumartana calls Gus Dur a consistent interpreter and giver of meaning to pluralism as both reality and norm.

He underwent a religious and intellectual evolution from being an “extremist”, who viewed Islam as an alternative to the West, to being an “eclectic cosmopolitan”, who saw Islam as a way of life that learned from nonreligious and other religious ideas.

For him, religious pluralism was a new concept nonexistent in the writings of classical and medieval Muslim scholars, but the absence of the term did not mean Islam was not pluralistic.

For him, pluralism was both descriptive and prescriptive. It meant awareness that Muslims were diverse and people were religiously diverse, believers and nonbelievers.

Pluralism awareness could only come from a nation without a formalized religious system. He reasoned that because the Koran guaranteed religious freedom and no compulsion in faith, the state should not engage in making any one religious interpretation superior over others.

He asked, rhetorically, “Isn’t it that God and his messenger promote a universal brotherhood [persaudaraan manusia]?”

For Gus Dur, pluralism also meant accepting that everyone had the right to be exclusive as well as inclusive.

Muslims’ claim of truth is not unique, as the Second Vatican Council stated they respected everyone’s right to reach their truths, but they believed the truth was in the Roman Catholic Church. Competing truth claims are normal. Gus Dur said, “That is clear.

“And Islam is also clear. We will not be shaken in our tauhid concept, but we respect other faiths. Our founding fathers, although mostly Muslims, were able to accept other concepts of God, and worked out to agree on the basic concept of One God for Indonesia.”

In 1995, Gus Dur said, “Essentially all religions are the same as they are revealed by God in order that human beings from different origins, cultures and trajectories may love each other and in order that they may uphold morality, mercy and solidarity.”

He emphasized Islamic universalism in different aspects (belief, law and ethics), addressing humanness (insaniyya), including human equality and human rights.

At the same time, Islam is open to different cultural manifestations and intellectual insights from other civilizations.

This creative Islamic cosmopolitanism, in his view, had been achieved at its peak when there was a balance between Muslims’ normative orientations and freedom of thought given to all peoples, including non-Muslims.

For Gus Dur, a kafir was not just one who denied God’s truth, but also one who could be a believer but denied God’s blessing. “Kafir doesn’t necessarily mean non-Muslim,” Gus Dur said, but rather unbelievers who attacked Islam, in that context nonbelievers in Mecca. There was a difference, he went on, between non-Muslims and the offensive kafir, the categorical kafir.

To Gus Dur, the Koran was clear in affirming religious freedom. Concerning apostasy or irtidad, he was aware of the traditional view that it be punishable by death, but warned one should not compromise the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Indonesian contexts.

He wrote, “If capital punishment were to be applied in Indonesia, there would be more than 20 million people killed because of their conversion from Islam to Christianity since 1965.” Therefore, he urged reform in Islamic law in accordance with time and place.

Gus Dur also promoted the idea of localization (pribumisasi) of Islam, rather than “Arabization”,
although he was well versed in Arabic. By the Indonesianization of Islam he meant the blending of
Islamic beliefs and values with local culture.

“The source of Islam is revelation, which bears its own norms. Due to its normative character, it tends to be permanent. Culture, on the other hand, is a creation of human beings and therefore develops in accordance with social changes.

This, however, does not prevent the manifestation of religious life in the form of culture,” he said.

Islamic ecumenism, borrowed from historian Arnold Toynbee, Islamic universalism or cosmopolitanism, was for Gus Dur based on the five objectives of Islamic law (of al-Shatibi): protection of life, protection of belief, protection of family and future generations, protection of property and protection of mind. The rule of law and certainty must guarantee fair and just treatment for all citizens, without exception.

He believed that through free and open dialogue, truths could be reached by those participants who had “healthy and common reason”.

In dialogues, one must be sincere in seeking and keeping truth and in thinking and expressing views.

Intolerance comes from religious illiteracy and narrow-mindedness. For instance, one who likes to mock the deities of others is religiously illiterate.

Gus Dur quoted the Koran: “You should not mock the gods of others because when you mock them then it means you mock your own god.”

Gus Dur was a consistent defender of the Pancasila, and saw the Religious Affairs Ministry as a political compromise between the Islamic state and the purely secular state. Muslims do not have the obligation to establish an Islamic state.

His progressive thinking, advocating democracy, religious tolerance and human rights, have become influential among younger, progressive NU and non-NU activists, liberal intellectuals, NGOs, Christians and Chinese, Ahmadiyah sect leaders, businesspeople and more. Rest in peace, Gus Dur!

The writer wrote a master’s thesis on Gus Dur’s religio-political thought. He is now an assistant professor at the Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Riverside.

Learning Salaam, Making Peace on Earth

2009-10-10T13:46:00.000-07:00

Learning universal `Salaam', making peace on Earth

Muhamad Ali , California | Wed, 09/23/2009 12:19 PM | Opinion

If one walks along the Ganges River in Benares, India, one keeps hearing the phrase "Shanti, shanti, shanti", meaning "peace, peace, peace", and when used in English, one understands it as "farewell", or "Rest in Peace", or in Hawaii, Aloha. When one sees Jews greeting each other, one hears, "Shalom", and from Muslims, one hears "Salam" or "Al-salaam mu *alaikum: "Peace be upon you." Salaam has many meanings: safety, welfare, prosperity, security, fortune, friendliness, and peace.

There is no religion, faith, or spiritualism that does not preach peace, yet one or some religious traditions are singled out as "a religion of the sword", "a religion of violence or terrorism", whereas others as "religion of peace", religion of pacifists, and so on.

It is often forgotten that religions and ideologies have to face occasions when tensions, conflicts, violence, and sometimes wars become inevitable for complicated different reasons: Political, economic, cultural, as well as religious.

Peace is sometimes understood as an absence of aggression, war, violence, or hostility. Peace is when there are healthy interpersonal, inter-group, inter-family, inter-church, international relationships. The causes for the absence or lack of peace can be insecurity, social injustice, economic inequality, ignorance, religious fanaticism, or chauvinist nationalism.

Indeed, some Muslim groups use the sword either in defending or expanding their universalizing faith. But Islam, like any other religion and ideology, can be used for that expansionist zeal as well as for protecting, supporting, and making a difference to make a world a better place to live.

A violent leader is more likely to see the texts such as the Koran as justifying his violent acts against the others he sees as "the enemy".

A peaceful, tolerant leader will see the Koran in an entirely different way. For him and many others the Koran is an inspiration for love of others, coexistence, and peace. They cultivate the ethos of tolerance and non-violence.

Therefore, for us, it is a time to choose whether we act as a loving, peaceful personality or otherwise. As a rabbi Jonathan Sacks in his book "the Dignity of Difference", says, "if religion, or faith, cannot be part of a solution, it will certainly be part of the problem."

Islam shares such common values as love, compassion, freedom, responsibility, and interconnectedness. A Muslim is anyone who loves his or her brothers and sisters and does not kill nor incite killings of self or others. A Muslim is someone whose heart fluctuates but remains controllable and peaceful.

Peace is not a state where there is no noise, trouble or hard work: peace is in the midst of those things and still to be calm in our heart.

Islam also endorses "no coercion in matters of faith", because a coerced faith is neither genuine nor sincere. Islam emphasizes that mankind is made up of brothers and sisters, regardless of religion, race, gender, politics, and economic standing.

Global brotherhood and sisterhood manifests themselves in very local, very personal lives. "And the people of God are those who walk on the earth in humility, and when the ignorant address them, they say, "peace"(Guidance: 63) . "Had not God checked one group of people, there would surely have been destroyed monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of God is much remembered." (Pilgrimage: 40)

Faith-based communities, local or global, were born out of concern about surrounding social problems. Faiths operate to make a difference. It is therefore necessary for faiths to listen to each other, to understand what the others are working on, to seek common concerns and work in co-existence, while symbolic and ritualistic differences are simply respected and valued.

A basic understanding of humanness and human kindness (that everyone has equal dignity as human before being Christian, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, atheist, straight, gay, and so forth). If people believe in God, but they use different terms for God, then they share that humility before God. If some believe and others do not believe in God, they still share that human kindness. The Koran uses the term "children of Adam".

Peace can only last when there is such basic understanding of equality of every single being. German religion scholar Hans Kung, for instance, says, "no peace among the nations without peace among the religions, no peace among the religions without dialogue between the religions, and no dialogue between the religions without investigation of the foundation of the religions." I would add that there is no sound investigation of the religions without the understanding that every human being has inherent dignity.

What is sometimes missing in many peace efforts has been "an affirmation of the convergent spiritual and cultural bases for peace". There are Muslims who view God as scary, a punishing judge; but there are other Muslims who view God as a primarily loving, compassionate, forgiving power. There are Muslims who thinks that others do not deserve religious freedom, but there are other Muslims who struggle to uphold religious freedom.

There are Muslims who emphasize a Koranic passage "There is no coercion in religion" (2:256), but others stress "fight against infidels". There are Muslim women who wear headscarves, but others who do not; and so on. Among Muslims you have people who judge other Muslims as *less Islamic', not part of the Islamic community. Healthy and unhealthy relationships have started since the rise of humankind and continue today.

Why not embrace diversity when diversity is more beautiful and meaningful than homogeneity? How else would one understand a Koranic verse that says "Had your Lord so willed, He would have made humankind one community, but He made them different in order to try you with that which He had given you." (5:48)?

Peace in the heart would make it easier to accept and to cherish peace in society. A genuine, comprehensive and lasting peace will only be possible if it is based on peace within the hearts of each participating individual (fi qalbun salim). If our heart-mind is peaceful, our relationships with each other will be peaceful. If one's mind is in a mess, then our actions will be a mess.

Before anything else, we need to have "inner peace": by valuing the life we are in, realizing weaknesses we are attached to, hoping that a better one is possible. That inner peace can be realized at the very individual level as a mom, dad, daughter, son, partner, teacher, student, neighbor, citizen, immigrant, black, white, brown, purple, yellow, green, and so on.

Inner peace does not depend on symbols, cloths, flags we wear. It is deeply inside our own hearts. The Prophet Muhammad once reminded his followers, "Arabs are no better than non-Arabs, what defines them is their piety", "it is not about what you wear, nor about your body appearance, it is what is in your hearts." In other times, when asked to make decisions, he would reply, "consult your heart".

The idea of Islam as being "submission to the divine and the spiritual" is not to make human beings puppets, incapable, powerless, submissive, inactive, reactive, violent, unjust, discriminatory. A Muslim is someone whose words and actions are not harmful to anyone else and to anything, including plants, animals, and the natural environment.

On compassion and mercy or rahma, the Koran says, "We have not sent you except as a mercy for all beings." (21:107) Prophet Muhammad said "Have mercy on people so you may receive mercy; forgive people so you may be forgiven"

Islam states that God is love (hub) and there is no realm of existence where love does not manifest itself in some way. An Iranian-American scholar Hossein Nasr says, "metaphysically speaking, the gravitational attraction of physical bodies for each other is a particular instance of the universal principle of love operating on the level of physical reality." A woman Sufi of Bashra (in today's Iraq), Rabi'ah al-Adawiyyah, describes her love of God in her poem, "Two ways I love Three: selfishly, And next, as worthy is of Thee, Tis selfish love that I do naught, Save think on Thee with every thought."

Jalaluddin Rumi, the most widely read poet in America, says that when the pen comes to the question of describing what love is, it breaks in half. There will be no lasting peace without love. There are people who claim that they love God and because they love God and His prophet, they show hatred to others seen as "the enemy", "a threat", "obstacles", or "heretics". How come they love God but do not love His creations? How come people claim they love human beings when they hate Muslims just because they are Muslims? How come people claim they are compassionate when they perpetuate prejudices of other peoples because of their faith? Love cannot be partial. Love cannot be discriminatory. Love cannot be limited to certain beings while harboring hatred against others. "Wish for others whatever you wish for yourself."

Peace is not a state of being without anger. To abstain from anger and hard feelings is plainly impossible. Those qualities are within everyone, a Sufi philosopher Imam al-Ghazzali said "It is to live in this world productively, constructively, peacefully, not in a utopian kingdom. This world can be a paradise, heaven - when we love and bless each other, serve one another, and become the partners for one another's growth, enlightenment, and bliss".

But this world can also be a hell- in which we experience endless pain, loss of love, lack of caring, and wars. It is to compete with one another in good works, in service to the community, to the environment we live in, and to the world. It is to make peace when there are conflicts, to build and to keep peace when there is relative peace.

Jalaluddin Rumi has invited us in his poem:

Come now whoever you are!

Come without any fear of being disliked

Come whether you are a Muslim, a Christian, or a Jew,

Come whoever you are!

Whether you believe or do not believe in God

This door is not a door of fear

This is a door of good wishes

The writer, Ph.D., is an assistant professor, Religious Studies Department, University of California, Riverside.

My article Umma and the Nation State Islamic and Western Discourses

2009-05-01T12:32:00.000-07:00

http://www.scribd.com/doc/14831142/Umma-and-the-Nation-State

What I am writing and hoping to publish this year

2009-04-17T11:33:00.000-07:00

Terima kasih atas komentar-komentarny a dan sudah membaca sharing saya.Anda semua membuat saya perlu merespons balik. Awalnya, saya tulis daftar judul itu supaya bisa sharing kepada kawan-kawan saja, siapa tahu ada yang sedang menulis topik-topik yang sama, sehingga bisa tukar pikiran dan sumber. Dan siapa tahu diantara kawan-kawan ada yang mau sharing juga topik-topik apa yang mereka, Anda semua sedang riset dan tulis. Saya suka buka-bukaan. ...hihihi, karena saya pikir inilah salah satu fungsi milis ini.

Saya senyum-senyum saja, sunan Sukidi, sampe harus membawa mafia Harvard William Graham dan Eng Sengho, yang sudah professorr dan sangat established. Eh, saya suka sekali artikel Graham "Islamic traditionalism" dan Quran as a spoken word. Tapi pesan Sukidi sampe ke saya, bahwa kualitas itu lebih penting daripada kuantitas. Daftar judul yang saya tulis agak menyesatkan, seolah-olah saya menulis dalam waktu yang bersamaan sekaligus. Saya akan cerita dibawah.

Makasih banyak Sheik Nadirsyah atas kesalutan Syeikh terhadap perjalanan karir yang masih sangat dini ini. Saya apresiasi sekali, bahwa kita saling mendukung satu sama lain. Dalam benak saya, Kak Edy, Anda, Kak Oman, Sukidi, Arskal, dan semua yang pernah menulis artikel dan buku; Saya selalu berusaha mengoleksi karya-karya kawan sendiri. Saya sudah beli buku-buku Anda. Kitalah yang membaca karya-karya artikel dan disertasi kawan lebih dulu.

Masing-masing judul itu sebagian besarnya sudah saya riset dan tulis, karena sejak tahun 2005 ketika saya disertasi dan ketika saya pulang ke Indonesia setiap summer. Sekalian tip buat kawan-kawan, ketika riset disertasi, kita bisa mengumpulkan bahan-bahan yang tidak terbatas untuk disertasi. Ketika saya keliling cari sumber dan wawancara di Indonesia, Malaysia, Eropa, dan bagian-bagian AS.

1.. Pluralism in Madrasah in Indonesia and Malaysia (English and French). Artikel ini saya baru mulai tulis, berdasarkan sumber-sumber yang saya kumpulkan sejak riset 2005 dan akan lanjutkan risetnya Summer ini. Artikel ini saya akan presentasikan di Copenhagen dan di Paris. Selama ini, belum ada yang menulis topik pluralisme dan sekolah agama. Banyak artikel dan beberapa buku yang menulis reform madrasah, tapi belum spesifik tentang toleransi dan pluralisme, isu yang sejak lama saya geluti. Secara metodologis, ini adalah kajian sejarah analitik, dengan teori-teori pluralisme yang berkembang di AS dan di Perancis dan anthropology of knowledgenya Talal Asad. Bagaimanakah pluralisme didefinisikan, dikonstruksikan, dan dikontestasi dalam konteks pendidikan Islam.

2. Moderate Islamism in South Sulawesi (French). Artikel ini untuk saya presentasikan di Paris, dan saya sudah kumpulkan seabreg sumber sejak 2005 dan nanti juga Summer ini.

3. Religious Pluralism in Indonesian: A Theological and Political History (French). Ini sebetulnya artikel awal untuk proyek buku kedua saya. Sumber-sumbernya dah banyak terkumpul, tinggal menulis draftnya dan menambah sumber lain yang diperlukan summer ini. Ini juga untuk Paris.

4. Liberal Islam in Indonesia (French). Saya pernah nulis soal ini sebelumnya, hasil paper kelas waktu S-3, dan baru saja selesai kelanjutannya Online Liberal Islam, untuk konferensi di Pittsburgh beberapa bulan lalu, yang akan dibukukan dalam edited volume.

5. Enemy Within: Contesting Ahmadiyah in Indonesia (English) Ini berdasarkan talk yang sudah saya sampaikan di Hawaii, dan saya akan tulis karena sumber-sumbernya sudah menunggu di meja kerja saya. Perspektif sejarah dan religious studies.

6. Constructing and Contesting Progressive Islam: Islam Hadhari in Malaysia. Ini paper untuk AAR di Montreal, dan sudah saya awali menulis draftnya, tapi saya rencana interview Badawi dan lain-lain di Malaysia summer ini.

7. Diversity of Islamic Reforms in Indonesia and Malaysia. Sudah saya tulis draftnya untuk konferensi AAR tahun lalu, dan masih menunggu untuk dipertajam.

8. Islam and Local Tradition in Java and Sulawesi, ini paper kuliah S-3 saya, dan saya harus teruskan untuk jurnal. Sumber-sumbernya sudah banyak. Perspektif sejarah dan antropologi.

9. Constructing Religious Pluralism: Asghar Ali Engineer and Abdurrahman Wahid. Ini sudah saya tulis draftnya untuk konferensi American Muslim Social Scientists di Harvard tempo lalu. Dan saya mau kirim ke jurnal.

10. Jews in Madrasah in Indonesia. Ini saya tulis karena diundang workshop ARI, NUS, Juni ini, awalnya sebagai keynote speaker tapi karena keterbatasan waktu quarter ini, saya decline, saya hanya sebagai discussant saja. Summer ini mau cari sumber yang lebih memadai untuk topik ini.

Ada beberapa artikel lagi yang saya ingin kirim ke jurnal, berasal dari disertasi saya, yang saya akan pertajam, tentang 1. Japanese occupation dan Islam di Malaya dan Indonesia; tentang 2. bureaucratizing Islam: Dutch and British policies and Islam. 3. Constructing Boundaries: fatwa, khutba, and speeches.

Walhasil, tulisan-tulisan tidak ujuk-ujuk sekaligus, karena ngak kuaaat juga daah....asyiknya, saya bisa nulis ini disela-sela mengajar, membimbing mahasiswa, dan campus dan public service yang semuanya wajib untuk terus naik. Seperti diceritakan syeikh Nadir. Saya mau buka-bukaan juga soal situasi saya sekarang. Posisi sekarang kan assistant professor, dan sudah direview tahun pertama oleh jurusan, fakultas, dan tingkat universitas, dengan sangat memuaskan. Ada kolega saya, orang Amerika, yang tidak lolos proses review tahun awal ini karena kurang riset/publikasi. Saya lolos dan memuaskan. Ini semakin menjadi cambuk buat saya. Visa Amrik saya akan habis tahun depan; kalo saya mau lanjut, saya wajib daftar visa namanya "Outstanding Scholar", dan syaratnya, riset dan publikasi, dan sekitar 10 letters of support yang menunjukkan saya layak bekerja di AS. Semua ini membuat saya nervous dan wajib tetap produktik. Dalam dua terakhir, istri saya kuliah S-2 di Hawaii, jadi bolak balik Hawaii, dan belum dikarunia putra/putri, makanya saya punya banyak cukup waktu untuk riset dan nulis, dan bisa sering kerja di kantor sampe tengah malam. Saya satu-satunya di kampus kayaknya yang masih di office sampe tengah malam.

Persoalan positioning keilmuan, saya adalah sejarawan, tapi bukan sejarawan ala konvensional. Saya belajar Tafsir-hadith, lalu di Divinity waktu di Edinburgh, Islamic and Middle Eastern, dan sejarah (Eropa, Timteng, Dunia, Asteng), tapi saya memposisikan diri lebih sebagai new historian, yang menulis topik-topik kontemporer dalam perspektif sejarah dan teori ilmu-ilmu sosial. Saya at home sekali dengan ini. Antara disiplin ilmu dan area studies, Asia Tenggara khususnya. Di AS dan di Eropa, scholar Islam in Southeat Asia sangat sedikit, dan saya ingin terus memperkuat positioning ini. Tulisan-tulisan dan riset saya sejauh ini masih berada pada "Islam di Asia Tenggara" ini, meskipun meneliti aspek-aspek pengaruh Timteng, AS, dan Eropa di Asia Tenggara. Jadi, saya sulit menulis artikel dari pendekatan ilmu politik (Ali Munhanif, Saiful Muzani, dst), atau filologi (Kak Oman pakarnya); kalo pun menulis tentang politik, sejauh relasinya dengan Islam, dan kasusnya di Asia Tenggara.

Ali

Gaji dan Kinerja Dosen

2009-02-21T14:15:00.000-08:00

soal perbandingan antara dosen muda IAIN/UIN, ITB, dan dosen muda di luar negeri. Topik ini bisa jadi artikel di Kompas atau Jakarta Post nih. hehe. tapi di sini aja karena kebetulan disinggung. Di semua tempat itu, ada hubungan antara gaji dan kinerja dosen (tridarma PT dimana-mana sama: ngajar, riset, ngabdi ke publik). Di IAIN Jkt, saya ingat dulu 180 ribu gaji pertama saya, cukup besar pada tahun 1998, tapi memang kurang untuk hidup di Jakarta; nah, "ngamen" menulis, dan undangan sana sini cukup membantu. Lalu dari beasiswa ke beasiswa juga cukup membantu. Tapi ternyata, bukan jumlah uangnya, justru keterampilan lah yang membuat kita survive. Apakah menulis, atau bagi yang ahli ceramah, atau berorganisasi, dan sebagainya. Keterampilan yang terus diasah, otak yang selalu dipakai, hati yang selalu dibersihkan. Di luar negeri, memang nominal gaji itu sangat besar dibanding dengan di Indonesia, tapi pengeluaran/kebutuhan di LN (termasuk pajak ini dan itu, asuransi ini dan itu) sangat besar juga. Di LN, seorang dosen muda, pilihannya juga sewa rumah, atau beli rumah dengan cara mortgage (atawa kredit sampai 30 tahun atau lebih, karena harga rumah yah milyaran lah), nah dosen muda di Indonesia kan sudah banyak yang punya atau beli rumah, tanpa harus ada beban kredit tiap bulan selama 30 tahun. Hal lain, dosen-dosen di LN mandiri dalam banyak hal: nyupir sendiri, kadang masak dan laundry sendiri, laki-laki maupun perempuan, semuanya serba mandiri. Nah di Indonesia kan, banyaklah yang punya supir, pembantu, dan minta tolong orang sana orang sini, karena memang secara kultural dan demografis berbeda. Ada banyak hal lain juga yang menunjukkan bahwa dedikasi, mentalitas, dan keterampilan lah yang menentukan hidup yang produktif, konstruktif dan cerah dan mencerahkan.

Jadi gaji dan kinerja itu relatif dan kontekstual juga. Dedikasi seorang dosen bisa sangat besar terlepas dari gaji yang secara relatif. (Saya jadi ingat guru Muslimah di Belitung seperti dinovelkan/difilmkan Laskar Pelangi). Masa depan cerah dan suram tergantung banyak faktor yang tidak bisa direduksi hanya pada masalah gaji.

Belakangan saya melihat di banyak kampus di Indonesia ada kesadaran dan peningkatan perhatian terhadap masalah gaji ini. Semoga upaya-upaya ini bisa membantu mengangkat kinerja para dosen, meskipun, seperti pengalaman saya, yang paling penting adalah dedikasi dan keterampilan mencipta dan menghasilkan yang bermanfaat. Mentalitas lah yang paling penting. Karena bisa saja nanti meskipun gaji dosen sudah memadai, tapi ngamen sana sini tetap jalan, perhatian terhadap mahasiswa tidak bertambah baik, penelitian tidak juga menjadi kebiasaan, menulis juga tidak meningkat, kebiasaan menonton dan ngomong lebih kuat. Lalu, apa fungsinya gaji naik itu kalo pola pikir dan mentalitas dosen kita tidak mengalami suatu "paradigm shift" (mengutip Thomas Kuhn)?

Islam Yoga Practice and Religious Essentialism

2009-02-06T16:25:00.000-08:00

Islam, yoga practice, and religious essentialism
Muhamad Ali , Riverside, CA | Fri, 01/30/2009 1:58 PM | Opinion
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/01/30/islam-yoga-practice-and-religious-essentialism.html

The recent banning through a fatwa by the Ulema Councils in Malaysia and in Indonesia (Majelis Ulama Indonesi, MUI) of a particular form of yoga, the one with “Hindu elements”, poses some questions regarding the relationship between Islam, Hinduism, and other religions, and is filled with unnecessary essentialisms that have preoccupied Muslim scholars and society at large.

Understandably the fatwa was an attempt of some of the ulemas dominating the Council to guard the faith of the Islamic community from “corruption” and “heresies”.

Fatwas, although not legally binding to Muslims, are heard and followed by many Muslims who feel they need practical guidance from religious authorities.

In Indonesia, the MUI has served that purpose from 1975 to date, with much controversy about their existence and their role in the country.

The fatwa on yoga demonstrates that a religion is inherently pure, without any outside influences. It implies that Islam is pure, and its purity should be maintained.

The current discourse and the fatwa on yoga have overlooked the fact that Islam is historically and religiously diverse and complex; and yoga is also a very complex idea and practice.

The banning of a particular form of yoga for Muslims ignores the similarities and interaction between some forms of Sufism and some forms of yoga throughout history.

Yoga has been viewed and practiced in different and changing ways.

In Sanskrit, yoga can mean “to unite” or “to control”. It can be related to action, devotion, or knowledge. As a concept and practice, yoga has become not uniquely Hindu; it prevails in Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and other religions.

And it has become popular among many people today without any religious affiliation. Among Sufi Muslims, there are such yogic-like practices as recitation (zikir), invocation (doa) and exercise (riyadha) as part of their methods (suluks).

There is some ambivalence among those ulemas who tend to see purification as their major concern.

They ignore the fact that many ideas from the Koran and prophet Muhammad have influenced those who are not institutionally part of the Muslim community.

For example, Sufi Jalaluddin Rumi has been influential in the US, Europe and Australia; the so-called “non-Muslims” have learned much from Rumi without necessarily being “Muslim” if this term refers to a person who follows Muhammad as the main model.

Many of the verses that Rumi uses in his poems are Koranic and derived from Muhammad’s sayings and traditions, but “non-Muslims” do not necessarily consider these as corrupting their religious beliefs or unbelief (Catholic, Jewish, Hindus, Buddhist, etc).

It is theologically unfair to appreciate one’s tradition influencing others while not appreciating other traditions influencing yours.

On the other hand, there is a curious question regarding the Council’s differentiation between what is religious and what is not religious. The ban was directed at yoga which involves Hindu chanting and ritual.

Yoga aimed at physical health and mental discipline is permissible. Here we see how religion has been defined as exclusively ritualistic. Physical health is not considered religious.

This is very interesting because the ulemas are used to defining Islam as a complete way of life, which includes the maintenance of physical health. They must be aware that the Koran and Muhammad’s traditions talk about maintaining physical health and mental discipline by various means.

It seems that the ulemas of the Council believe that the means of keeping a Muslim healthy can be anything, including yoga, but the one without other “religious” elements.

By allowing physical discipline and banning mental and spiritual discipline, the ulemas seem to distinguish belief from practice, mind from body movement. They usually do not want to make distinctions between belief and practice, mind and body movement.

A more fundamental issue, I think, is the scholarly and popularly held view about the contradiction between Islam and Hinduism. Islam has been believed to be monotheistic, whereas Hinduism polytheistic, and therefore both are inherently antagonistic.

This is a simplification of the long and complex history of what we label Islam and Hinduism.

There were Muslims, either Sufis, philosophers, scholars, or lay people, who practiced the traditions of India – later called “Hinduism” – without seeing contradictions.

Abu Rayhan Al-Biruni, a Persian philosopher and scientist of the 11th century, for example, in his Kitab al-Hind, studied the Ramayana and the Mahabharata and appreciated the Hindu philosophical and spiritual system. Based on Hindu texts, Al-Biruni regarded Hinduism as monotheistic because not all Hindus worship multiple gods.

For example, many Hindus regard God is one, eternal, without beginning and end, acting by freewill, almighty, all-wise, living, giving life, ruling, preserving, unique, and so forth. These are some of the divine qualities not unlike the beautiful 99 attributes of God (asma al-husna) as described in the Koran.

In India, there were some Arab rulers, such as Muhammad Ibn Qasim, who saw Hindus as ahl al-kitab (people of the books) because they had scriptures – from the Vedas, Upanishads, and Bhagavad Ghita, among others. Thus, it is a gross simplification of belief among most Muslims – and most monotheists – to view Hinduism as of polytheism and idolatry.

There are many Hindus who only worship and give reverence to one supreme power – either Vishnu or Shiva – or their manifestations avatar or Brahman (in the Upanishad). Muslims also discuss some ideas of karma and reincarnation.

There are Sufis who do not see Hindus as necessarily kafir, usually defined as “non-believers”, because Hindus believe in God and have divine scriptures.

Indonesian Muslims are actually well-known for their long history of religious and cultural accommodation with animistic, Hindu, and Buddhist ideas – including stories of the Ramayana and Mahabharata.

And this has become one of the major factors that facilitate the transmission and localization of Islam in many parts of the archipelago. Religious diversity and interpenetration between ideas and practices need be seen as a strength rather than weakness.

When relating to other religions, the ulemas have a responsibility to understand the complex and different and shared aspects of religions and not be satisfied with unnecessary oversimplifications and essentialism.

There is today a greater responsibility for those who claim themselves as ulemas to reform themselves by broadening their perspectives. In fact, the Koran defines the ulemas as those who are learned in various different disciplines, not simply the so-called traditional revealed knowledge.

The Council’s fatwas are one among many voices of Islamic interpretation in Indonesia.

In fact, religious authority has become increasingly diverse and dispersed; and more and more people are being educated through the increasing means of learning and communication.

These fatwas, like others, should remain voices in the public sphere, and hopefully will not be linked to any political or legal institution that would enforce them.

The writer teaches Islam and Asian religions. He is currently an assistant professor at the University of California, Riverside.

Barack Obama and Revival of American Values

2009-01-20T22:05:00.000-08:00

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/01/21/barack-obama-and-revival-american-values.html

Barack Obama and revival of American values
Muhamad Ali , Riverside, CA | Wed, 01/21/2009 10:58 AM | Opinion

Barack Obama’s rise to the presidency of the United States of America is a historic moment for Indonesians as much as for Americans and others around the world. Barack Obama has been shaped by history and is making history.

To me, Barack Obama is the second person I become proud of whom I can personally and intellectually relate to after Muhammad Ali, a Muslim African-American boxer.

As an Indonesian, born and raised in Indonesia and who studied abroad for a doctoral degree at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and as an assistant professor at the University of California, Riverside, I have become increasingly in love with America as much as with Indonesia. America has its shared values. And so does Indonesia.

The greater challenge for America and Indonesia is how to revive those values and who can lead the nation in the right direction.

During my five-year residence while studying in Hawaii I found the people incredibly diverse and hospitable. I volunteered in the international student’s organization as well as in the Indonesian community. I learned that bridging differences was the key to resolving miscommunication, prejudice, and hatred between people.

I enjoyed teaching a workshop on Islam to teachers at the Punahou School, which Obama attended, because we learned so much from each other’s cultures.

I have become more aware that when we emphasize the common values, problems and issues will be easier to handle.

I knew his half sister Maya Soetoro Ng before I knew her brother as a senator. Maya Soetoro is a humble, straightforward and intelligent friend, before and even after her brother’s candidacy.

She is very proud of her Indonesian heritage, loves Indonesian food and is always excited to talk about Indonesia. Barack Obama sometimes speaks a few Indonesian words with her.
Making jokes about names was fun when Arabic names became an issue, especially after 9/11.

In interviews, Barack Hussein Obama admitted that his name had become a liability after 9/11 and the Bush administration’s war on terror, as many associate Obama with Arabs and Islam.

Obama often jokes with his friends about his name, as I often do with friends and others.

Obama’s spiritual faith is even more revealing. In his autobiography Dreams from My Father, he saw his Kenyan father as being a Muslim “thinking religion to be so much superstition”, and this influences one of his spiritual life stages.

On his Indonesian step-father, Lolo Soetoro, Barack Obama wrote, “like many Indonesians, Lolo followed a brand of Islam that could make room for the remnants of more ancient animist and Hindu faiths…” His memory of his Indonesian stepfather was that of accommodative Islam and tolerant religiosity shaped by Indonesian syncretism.

Obama felt his mother’s “secularism”, but his mother for him was “the most spiritually awakened person” he had ever known, having instincts of kindness, charity, love, discipline, empathy and hard work. Obama recalled his time in schools in Indonesia.

“In Indonesia, I had spent two years at a Muslim school, two years at a Catholic school. In the Muslim school, the teacher wrote to tell my mother that I made faces during Koranic studies. My mother wasn’t overtly concerned.

“Be respectful,’ she’d said.” His spiritual journey did not end there. He became a member of Trinity United Church of Christ in Chicago which has since transformed his spiritualism and faith.

As an American, with a diverse religious, cultural, national and racial background, Obama believes in what others would call a civil religion. Obama said that Americans should acknowledge the power of faith and its diversity in the lives of Americans.

“Whatever we once were, we are no longer just a Christian nation; we are also a Jewish nation, a Muslim nation, a Buddhist nation, a Hindu nation, and a nation of nonbelievers,” wrote Obama in his The Audacity of Hope. In speeches he delivers, he would end with “May God bless America.”

More importantly, Obama advocates an active and authentic faith to turn American back to its core values inherited from the founding fathers and shaped by influential figures.

He recognizes faith not for faith; it is for community empowerment. Obama’s faith has been and continues to be shaped by problems and challenges facing America.

Barack Obama’s journey was that of not only dreams, but of clarity in how to fulfill these dreams: Perseverance, discipline and hard work. Martin Luther King Jr. and Abraham Lincoln in particular have long inspired him as dreamers of their times, and as role models for the struggle toward racial justice, freedom, equality and citizenship rights. King’s speech “I Have a Dream” shapes and echoes Obama’s rise to presidency.

“All men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” King said powerfully. And that was how Obama became inspired.

The challenges Obama’s administration are facing now are greater than the time of King’s and any previous American presidents: Two wars to finish, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to mediate, economic crises to navigate, healthcare and education to improve.

A great lesson to learn however is not so much about his sound judgment of the details of each
problem and challenge, but his repeated attempts to turn to American values.

Barack Obama demonstrates an inspiring intelligence, a calm and cool personality, and great oratory skills. Obama has brought many Americans of common values and common destiny together.

He believes that problems of injustice, the economic crisis, and the diminishing image of Americans in the world require a change of hearts and minds before anything else.

In cultivating American values, Obama puts the emphasis on education. For him, academic success is not enough without proper values and preparation for responsible citizenship.

Obama’s administration, for example, promises to encourage schools and parents to work together to establish expectations for student attendance, behavior, and homework, calling parents to turn off the TV and video games, and expect all students to engage in community service.

Moreover, in facing the challenges, Obama stresses a shared responsibility. “It is not about me, it is about you, all Americans,” he said. When he met the pilot who successfully landed a plane in trouble, he said, “If everyone does his job, we are going to be fine.” Everyone needs to serve the country. Everyone has to take the burden.

For Obama, politics, like science, depends on the ability to persuade one another of common aims based on a common reality. For him, it is to ensure that persuasion rather than violence or intimidation determines the political outcome.

Internationally, Obama has received worldwide support. His first speech during the campaign period in Berlin is perhaps one of the best speeches ever delivered.

“Look at Berlin, where Germans and Americans learned to work together and trust each other less than three years after facing each other on the field of battle,” he said. Trust is perhaps what the key value is but it is often missing in many international relationships.

In Berlin, Obama emphasized common humanity. “Partnership and cooperation among nations is not a choice: It is the only way, to protect our common security and advance our common humanity.” “That is why the greatest danger of all is to allow new walls to divide us from one another.

“The walls between old allies on either side of the Atlantic cannot stand. The walls between the countries with the most and those with the least cannot stand.

“The walls between races and tribes; natives and immigrations; Christian and Muslim and Jew cannot stand. These now are the walls we must tear down.”

If there is a crucial lesson for Indonesians to learn, Barack Obama’s successful rise to presidency shows that it is the people’s minds and hearts that should be transformed before anything else.

It is to revive American shared values in order to move forward. It is to have vision and hope, in turmoil and in peace. It is to have dreams and a clear path to follow.

Congratulations to President Barack H. Obama! And may God bless you (as your name means) and America, Indonesia, and all the people around the world!

The writer is assistant professor, Religious Studies Department, University of California, Riverside.

Obama's Faith

2009-01-20T15:46:00.000-08:00

Obama's faith comes to the public square
James A. Donahue

Tuesday, January 20, 2009

Religion - and its role in public life - more often than not gets a bad rap. Those who see religion as divisive may be prone to speculate what may become of the religious right or the religious left in an Obama administration. They may be failing to see the forest for the trees.

Far from religious views that can be used to divide people, Barack Obama's faith may be a powerful offering and an invitation to people in America and around the world to work together on solutions to the dire economic, political and social problems confronting us. A careful reading of Obama's books and his speech on faith at Jim Wallis's 2006 Call to Renewal conference discloses that our president-elect sees his religious beliefs as informing and shaping his values. In turn, his values and ethical outlooks may shape our policies.

During the campaign, as Obama spoke often about his personal faith, his words suggested a commitment greater than a political ploy to woo faith voters. In a speech last summer to a conference of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, he spoke not of what divides us, but of how our common values can lead to constructive policy: "The challenges we face today - war and poverty, joblessness and homelessness, violent streets and crumbling schools - are not simply technical problems in search of a 10-point plan. They are moral problems ... and so the values we believe in - empathy and justice and responsibility to ourselves and our neighbors - these cannot only be expressed in our churches and our synagogues but in our policies and in our laws."

Obama claims that the separation of church and state is important for democracy and for religious practices to thrive. His is a cosmopolitan identity forged from multiple identities, and the view that all of humanity belongs to a single moral community, and deserves justice and basic human rights.

He places a high premium on tolerance. And yet, as a deeply faithful man, he has a low tolerance for religious certainty. In a 2004 interview with Chicago Sun-Times columnist Cathleen Falsani, Obama said, "In my own public policy, I'm very suspicious of religious certainty expressing itself in politics. Now, that's different from a belief that values have to inform our public policy..."

So what might religion in the public square look like in the Obama administration? We get a glimpse of this in who Obama invited to give invocations at his inauguration. Rick Warren, pastor of the powerful Saddleback Church, will give the main invocation today. New Hampshire Episcopal Bishop Gene Robinson, a gay man at the center of the Anglican church's global battle over homosexuality, delivered a prayer for Obama at Sunday's event on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. Rather than showing alliance, Obama is showcasing the value of inclusivity.

Religious values and ethical outlooks point to the worth of each person as an individual, and as part of the larger human family. They can offer unity if there is the willingness to engage in open and honest dialogue, especially with those who believe differently than we do. From that dialogue can emerge new priorities, policies to solve domestic problems and the framework for peacemaking among nations.

Religion gets its bad rap is because it is misused. But if we distinguish between religions as institutions, and the values and ethical outlooks underpinning the world's great faiths, we can see that religion has much to offer beyond being a source of personal solace. As the world waits with great hope for the new administration to begin work, we can be optimistic that our new leader will be led not by narrowly conceived "truths" derived from religious doctrine, and not by culture war issues that divide. He will be guided by "a belief that we're all connected." We should take him up on his invitation to rise above what divides us.

James A. Donahue is president and professor of ethics at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley.

http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/20/ED9115BBEK.DTL

This article appeared on page B - 7 of the San Francisco Chronicle

The Siege of Gaza

2009-01-02T12:15:00.000-08:00

The siege of Gaza: Barack Obama's first “test”?

By John L. Esposito

While some had predicted Barack Obama would be "tested" early in his administration by America's enemy Osama, Obama's first major foreign policy "test" has instead come from America's ally, Israel.

Israel's war in Gaza has been calculated and deliberately planned to occur at this time. The Israeli government has taken advantage of a world in which many are distracted by the global economic crisis and the celebration of Christmas and the New Year.

Equally important the bombing of Gaza has been executed on George Bush's "watch" so that Israel can count on a Bush administration whose failure to act as an honest broker was seen most starkly in the U.S. silence and support during the Israeli war in Lebanon.

The Israelis struck during the U.S. presidential transition and before Barack Obama, who could prove less sympathetic, takes office.

The pretense for the bombings and threat to invade Gaza with ground troops is Hamas breaking the ceasefire by shelling Israel. However, Hamas started shelling after the talks to renew it failed.

Israel ignores the fact that during the ceasefire, Israel put up blockades to stop essential goods from getting in. The siege created a humanitarian catastrophe for Gaza's 1.5 million Palestinian residents by restricting the provision of food, fuel, medicine, electricity, and other necessities of life.

The U.S. and Europe were complicit in the blockade of a democratically elected Hamas government, a siege whose primary victims have been Gaza civilians. Hamas fighters vented their anger by firing rockets.

Reports have been circulating for sometime in the Israeli press that the Israeli military was planning for and looking for a pretext or provocation to strike. Despite the fact that the fighters shelling did not kill a single Israeli, Israel acts as if it has been driven to a "fight to the bitter end."

Following a past pattern, most recently in its humiliating defeat in the Israeli-Hezbollah war, the Israeli military engages in an all-out war that ignores moral and international standards of warfare: the bombings and massacre of more than 375 people and injuring of some 700 lacks any sense of proportionality.

Mosques and the Islamic University have been targeted and destroyed as have homes and hospitals. The Bush administration lamely and falsely blames Hamas, holding it alone responsible for the deaths. If Palestinians had slaughtered and injured a similar number of Israelis, the administration would denounce such actions as war crimes and rightly seek to mobilize the international community.

The international community must move swiftly not only to demand an immediate ceasefire as has the UN and EU but also put pressure on the Bush administration, which has in recent years claimed that it wishes to act multi-laterally and not unilaterally as it had in the decision to invade Iraq.

While the shelling by Hamas' fighters cannot be condoned, Israel's unbridled military response must also be condemned. Until the Israeli government gets a message that the international community will hold Israel to the same standards as it does other nations and the Palestinians, there can be no hope for peace negotiations to work.

President-elect Barack Obama cannot remain silent. While he is right to acknowledge that until January 20th George Bush is in charge of American foreign policy, for him to remain silent now will be seen as simply condoning Israel's devastation of Gaza and undermine his promise of a new international vision and a new approach to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. He will be brush-stroked by the failed policies of the Bush administration in the Middle East and lose his credibility before he even comes to office with an Arab and Muslim world that sees his election as one of hope and promise.

-- John L. Esposito is University Professor and Professor of Religion & International Affairs, Georgetown University and co-author of Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think.

Source: Middle East Online

Ideology Behind Terror in Mumbai, India

2008-11-26T19:50:00.000-08:00

The deadly attacks of some hotels in Mumbai, India, said to be carried out by Muslim terrorists connected to global terrorist network (usually associated with the Al-Qaidah), demand a thorough analysis of the roots and causes in order that governments, the media, and the peoples, can deal with these problems more effectively. I argue that a particular political ideology inspired by textual out-of-context interpretation of Islam is the key element for everyone fighting against terror to focus on, rather than the on the surface issues. This political ideology cannot be simply said as "Islamist" ideology, because Islamism also carries with it various kinds of political manifestations, including the democratic moderate one. The discourses that are obviously stated by the organizations claiming responsible for the attacts in India have included the politicization of a strict truth claim of Islam vis-a-vis Hinduism, Western-type Indian secularism, and colonialism. The terrorists perceive they are under siege; they are within the war zone -- against American and British interests, as well as against the Indian Hindus and democrats,secularists.

The ideological contradictions perceived by the terrorists - mostly in their twenties and thirties, that motivate them to wage their terrors should not be however seen as a clash of Islam and the West, a clash of Islam and Hinduism, clash of Islam and secularism, and clash of Islam and colonialism. The historical and contemporary situations are more complex than these perceptions perpetuated by the terrorists and many fundamentalist media reporters and leaders. Islam has been defined, constructed, implemented, and practiced in so many different ways, within contexts: local, regional, and global. A sound analysis of what really happens should involve both textual dimension of a religion and contextual situations that could change.

Any kind of murder and killing of innocent people is not humanistic, not Islamic (which I adhere to), not at all to bring the actors to the heaven they are wishing for. Islam has and can become tolerant, moderate, peaceful, democratic, and diplomatic through all kinds of educational, cultural, diplomatic, economic, political efforts made by Muslims and non-Muslims in the world. Obviously many of the terrorists use Islam for their own political ideology against their enemies. The terrorists' enemies" are not the enemies of most Muslims.

Labeling the terrorists as "Islamist fundamentalist radical", is not the key effort in the world's struggle against terrorism and its roots. More grass-root efforts are what we need: cross-religious, cross-cultural, cross-national. These efforts are endless and should be even more serious and more global and local at the same time in order to reduce if not to eliminate the political ideology that fuels hatred against the "other". The problem of violence is always complex, but clear and sound judgment about its roots will help a lot.

We, including the U.S. government, should not make another mistake like what is happening in Iraq: Targeting the wrong enemy, Ignoring the roots.

Glen Mor, 8:21 pm, Nov 26, 2008

How Obama is to be Viewed by the Islamic World

2008-11-22T20:06:00.000-08:00

How Obama is likely to be viewed by the Islamic world both in the Middle East and Asia.
• With some exception (some radical Muslims), most people in some 56 Muslim-majority countries apparently favor Obama in the elections because of the perceived and actual failure of the current administration’s foreign policies and international relations.
o Obama’s victory represents change in direction of the U.S. relationship with the world; the rest of the world have been watching the whole process of the elections from the start and people congratulated and many celebrated Obama’s victory. No “anti-Americanism” has existed if it means anti-American people and values. The target of world’s criticisms has been politics and foreign policy. Few radicals are skeptical: the U.S. will not change: they still don’t like political Islam/Islamism. “great global expectations”
• Obama’s victory has demonstrated to the world that it is one’s capability, rather than racial identity, that most matters, and American elections show democracy both in procedure and substance. “the global impact of the desirability and workability U.S. democracy”
• Obama is also seen as a truly global president: African, Asian (Indonesian), American. Facilitating his sensitiveness to cross-cultural problems. His speech in Berlin also attests his global appeal: “the walls between countries with the most and those with the least cannot stand. The walls between races and tribes; natives and immigrants; Christian, and Muslim, and Jew cannot stand. There now are the walls we must tear down”..
What can Obama do to repair the damage done by the current administration to the reputation of the U.S. in the Islamic World?
• Prioritize” “Soft power” (public diplomacy, talks, dialogue) over Hard power (military intervention): not “politics of fear”, but “politics of reconciliation and hope”,
o STABILISATION of IRAQ and its unity. Two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (reduce violence, civilian casualties, support the Iraqis in rebuild their lives): troops careful withdrawal-
o Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis (resume talks, amidst uncertainty of Israeli leadership on Feb 20, two state solutions: a secure and lasting peace): the challenge is the political division among HAMAS, PLO, the rejectionists and the conformists
o Rapprochement with Iran: send a clear message to Iran that it must abandon its nuclear ambitions, but the challenge: “nuclear for weaponry or peaceful purposes”
o Independence from Middle East oil
o India, China, and Southeast Asia (Indonesia: the largest Muslim majority country in the world, working with moderates)
• “Understanding the roots of violence and terrorism” (sense of injustice, “colonialism”, ideological conflict), the step is “reaching out” not just to opponents at home but also enemies abroad”, remaking alliances with the Muslim moderates everywhere, but making sure that the world have enough information about the U.S. history, culture, and society.
• “Reconciliatory, and communicative leadership”: listening, willing to be criticized, empathetic, acknowledging complexity of every problem, differences between faiths, cultures, political interests, but seeking commonalities in resolving common problems as human, as citizen of the world
• “A new and global partnership”: “partnership with Muslims at home and abroad”, interfaith dialogue and cooperations, dialogue of civilizations, alliances of civilizations, American Peace Corp, American Library/Corners, international exchange (journalists, educators, students, etc), humanitarian works for social justice and peace.
• The responsibility should also be taken by civil society (national and international) and the Islamic world themselves to engage with the West, to learn about American cultures and religions.

Meanings of Obama's Election

2008-11-07T10:24:00.000-08:00

http://newsroom.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/display.cgi?id=1964
UCR Scholars Analyze Election Results

Obama's election is historic and inspiring, panelists say.
(November 4, 2008)

RIVERSIDE, Calif. – The 2008 presidential race was historic in the election of Sen. Barack Obama as the nation’s first African American president and energized minority and first-time voters, UCR scholars agreed in a panel discussion two days after the election. But Obama’s agenda of social and environmental issues likely will be pushed to a back burner by the necessity of addressing the economic crisis, they said. “I’m giddy, tempered with dread,” said John Cioffi, assistant professor of political science. “Given the severity of economic conditions a lot of environmental programs are going to be put on hold. They tend to be expensive and the costs are front-loaded.” The exception could be where environmental policy supports new industry that would put more people to work, he said. Reviving the economy must be Obama’s priority, said Anil Deolalikar, professor of economics and associate dean of CHASS. “Many people are predicting unemployment may reach 8 to 10 percent. To prevent that Obama will have to move quickly,” he said. “To prevent the collapse of the economy what will be needed is a new stimulus. … What will be needed is a program of increased government spending, perhaps new construction projects that governments have already deemed worthy, but there was no money. This might be the opportunity to invest in infrastructure we have ignored for decades … that will improve our economic competitiveness in the long run.” Obama’s election “raises the glass ceiling, but does not eliminate racism,” said Erica Edwards, assistant professor of English. His skill at organizing a grass-roots campaign is a reaffirmation of the individual as a participant in democracy, a powerful demonstration of the ability of people to get together and decide what they want, she said. “It’s a fair start for a more participatory democracy,” she said. Obama’s election represents a new direction in how the United States relates to the rest of the world, a change that is particularly welcomed by Muslim nations, said Muhamad Ali, assistant professor of religious studies. “The positive response from the Muslim world suggests there is no anti-Americanism,” he said. “They have been critical of American foreign policy. They see Obama’s election as a victory of American values. … They see this as a sign of democracy’s workability.” Ali cautioned that Obama needs to understand the roots of violence and terrorism. “It is in colonialism and a sense of injustice,” he said. “In the Muslim world there is also some sense of a clash of civilizations.” Although many pundits have referred to this as an historic election, “it was and it wasn’t,” said Karthick Ramakrishnan, associate professor of political science. Voter turnout – about 62 percent – was higher than in recent decades, but was well below the 80-plus percent of eligible voters who cast ballots in the last half of the 19th century, he said. The youth vote was not greater than in previous elections, “but they were far more likely to vote for Obama,” he said. Georgia Warnke, distinguished professor of philosophy and associate dean of CHASS, said she has been moved by Obama’s eloquence and the traditional American values of equality, opportunity and hope that are constant themes in his speeches. “He really believes them,” she said. “That’s what makes him so inspiring. In an age where we have become cynical and have to be ironic, all of a sudden we have a president-elect who can bring up Abraham Lincoln and the ideas of our founding, who can remind us about Kennedy and FDR. He brings us back to the ethical sense of who we are.”
Additional Contacts:
Susan Beals, (951) 827-2762
The University of California, Riverside is a doctoral research university, a living laboratory for groundbreaking exploration of issues critical to Inland Southern California, the state and communities around the world. Reflecting California's diverse culture, UCR's enrollment of about 17,000 is expected to grow to 21,000 students by 2020. The campus is planning a medical school and has reached the heart of the Coachella Valley by way of the UCR Palm Desert Graduate Center. The campus has an annual statewide economic impact of more than $1 billion. To learn more, visit http://www.ucr.edu/ or call (951) UCR-NEWS.

Congratulations, Obama, Congratulations, America!

2008-11-04T22:17:00.000-08:00

As I have been following the U.S. elections process and have watched with great interest and emotion the news and comments about the results in my apartment at Riverside, I have felt how Americans are now feeling: hope in the future. Certainly for McCain and his supporters, it is a moment of disappointment as they have worked hard to win, but Obama and his supporters have worked harder and smarter from the start to the end of the campaign. Perhaps today's history is simply on Obama's side: problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, worsening health care, loss of hundreds thousands of jobs, and finansial crisis, but without understanding such problems, coupled with disciplines and sound reason, Obama would not win.

I would live to congratulate Barack Obama, Joe Biden, and all the people behind him and all those who support him, but also to McCain and others who did not vote for Obama. They all demonstrate a beautiful model of what democracy should like. And the rest of the world can learn from this historic moment: moment of excitement and commitment for change, moment for addressing challenges in the best way.

Glen Mor, Riverside, 10.30 pm, November 4th, 2008

Agama dan ruang publik di AS dan Indonesia

2008-11-03T08:43:00.000-08:00

Pertanyaan apakah di Indonesia selama ini agama telah terlalu kecil atau terlalu besar bermain di ruang publik, memang telah dan terus ditanggapi secara berbeda oleh berbagai kelompok pemikiran. Bagi kalangan liberal, terlalu besar. Bagi kalangan fundamentalis dan konservatif secara umum, terlalu kecil. Pertanyaan ini masih menjadi perhatian banyak kalangan di AS. Neuhaus, seorang Lutheran liberal, dalam bukunya the Naked Public Sphere, dan jurnal yang dia pimpin First Things, terus mengkampanyekan kearah lebih besarnya suara-suara agama di ruang publik AS. Namun, agama dalam pemahaman Neuhaus adalah suara-suara Protestan (dan untuk batas tertentu Yahudi) yang menurutnya selama ini belum cukup kuat berhadapan dengan suara-suara liberal sekuler yang menganggap agama tidak relevan dalam politik. Menurutnya, demokrasi mensyaratkan makin kerasnya suara-suara agama itu dalam pengambilan keputusan publik dan berbagai isu-isu etik, karena ruang publik yang telanjang bisa berbahaya: totalitarianisme dan anarki radikal yang memarginalkan agama. Karena itu, dia tidak setuju dengan Diana Eck yang mempromosikan pluralisme suara semua agama, termasuk agama-agama minoritas, karena semakin pluralistiknya publik Amerika. Saya kira garis besar dinamika seperti ini kita bisa baca pula di Indonesia.

Saya kira teori sekulerisasi tidak bisa tidak kecuali pertama-tama dibaca dari sejarah Eropa dan kemudian AS. Konseptualisasi dan analisis proses dan dinamika sekulerisasi bisa dianggap relevan di dunia non-Barat sejauh variabel-variabel pokoknya dianalisis secara komparatif dan lintas. Teori-teori desekulerisasi dan sacred canopy Berger, civil religion Bellah, public religions Casanova, religious markets, political theology, dan seterusnya, bisa didiskusikan bersandingan dengan konsep-konsep yang belakangan muncul seperti integrasi agama dan negara, "Pancasila", bhineka tunggal ika, Islam politik dan politik Islam, pribumisasi agama, "membumikan Al-Quran", dst. Dinamika sejarah negara-negara bangsa memang berbeda. Namun, tumpang tindih teoritis dan konseptual bisa terjadi, meskipun penerjemahan bahasa tidak selalu sempurna. Poin saya adalah proses teoritisasi lintar budaya dan lintas sejarah mungkin dan baik dilakukan selama variabel-variablenya memiliki kesamaan makna denotatifnya. Variable seperti privat-publik, misalnya, perlu mengalami proses translasi di Indonesia. Dalam sejarah sebelum 1945, kerajaan-kerajaan hanya mengenal: adat, syara, dan civil law Belanda, tidak dikategorisasikan sebagai privat-publik, religius-sekuler, dan sebagainya. Pekerjaan yang tidak mudah memang, namun sangat memperkaya pengetahuan komparatif,yang idealnya dapat diuji secara "universal" atau lintas budaya. Dan saya kira, harus ada riset mengenai bagaimana sejarah tradisi sekuler-agama, privat-publik ini sejak dulu, kini, dan proyeksinya untuk masa depan.

Pertanyaan yang saya kira menarik adalah membaca sejauh mana epistimologi dan konsep-konsep Arab, Melayu, Hindu, Buddha (Jawa), selain Belanda dan Barat, mempengaruhi pemikiran dan aksi politik Muslim Indonesia mengenai agama dan demokrasi, agama dan ruang publik. Bagaimana proses transmisinya, lokalisasinya, nasionalisasi, dan seterusnya.

Pesantren and Pluralism

2008-11-03T08:03:00.000-08:00

Pesantren progressives defend constitutional religious freedoms.

http://insideindonesia.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1145&Itemid=47

Promoting Pluralism

Pesantren progressives defend constitutional religious freedoms

Joanne McMillan

It is a sweaty April afternoon, and the community hall in Cangkol, a fishing community on the outskirts of Cirebon on Java’s north coast, is packed to the gills. People have come to see former first lady, Ibu Sinta Nuriyah Wahid. Ibu Sinta, the wife of former president Abdurrahman Wahid, is touring halls like this around the country ahead of next year’s election, listening to ordinary people talk about the problems they face in their everyday lives.

Today, however, there are some technical difficulties in hearing those voices. The sound system is playing up, and while technicians fiddle, the MC, a popular and charismatic young kyai, KH Maman Imanulhaq Fakieh, keeps the crowd entertained. The captive audience presents a perfect opportunity for him to push his favourite issue of the moment: freedom of religion, a hot topic in Indonesia thanks to recent attacks on Ahmadiyah mosques and calls to outlaw the sect.

‘Is Islam a religion of violence?’ he cries, raising his fist in the air. ‘No!’ The crowd, largely comprised of jilbab-wearing housewives, responds with enthusiasm. ‘Does Islam permit violence by anyone?’ ‘No!’ ‘Towards anyone?’ ‘No!’ ‘On any grounds?’ ‘No!’ ‘Do we want the government to uphold the rights guaranteed in the constitution?’ ‘Yes!’

Kyai Maman, 35, is the spiritual leader of Al-Mizan Pesantren in Jatiwangi, West Java. Outside Indonesia, thanks to coverage of terrorism cases, Indonesian pesantren, or Islamic boarding schools, have earned a reputation as extremist havens where young students are indoctrinated in fundamentalist teachings and groomed to become terrorists. While it is true that many pesantren teach conservative, literalist interpretations of Islam, only a tiny number have links with terrorist organisations and in fact the pesantren world is the source of some of the most progressive Muslim voices in Indonesia and indeed the Muslim world.

The best known progressive kyai is former president Abdurrahman Wahid, but surrounding Wahid are a number of increasingly vocal and influential progressive pesantren leaders. Kyai Maman is a protégé of a group of kyai and pesantren alumni in West Java that includes KH Syarief Usman Yahya, head of Kempek Pesantren and KH Husein Muhammad of Dar al-Tauhid Arjawinangun Pesantren. The late KH Fuad Hasyim of Buntet Pesantren and KH Yahya Masduki of Babakan Ciwaringin Pesantren were role models for this group. They preach values of pluralism and encourage their students, or santri, to reread religious texts contextually. The vision of Islam that they promulgate is grounded in the Qur’an, Sunna and classical Islamic texts and advocates justice for all human beings.

Rallying point

Earlier this year, the Ahmadiyah issue became a rallying point for progressive Muslim leaders. While fundamentalist groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), along with many moderates, called for Ahmadiyah to be outlawed, progressive kyai, including Kyai Maman, were organising community events with Ahmadiyah in order to emphasise a message of tolerance and pluralism. When police and local government failed to protect Ahmadiyah from increasing incidents of vandalism and violence, progressive kyai offered NU paramilitaries, known as Banser, to protect Ahmadiyah mosques and homes.

For those like Kyai Maman who defended Ahmadiyah, the issue was never really about Ahmadiyah, but about upholding the rights of citizens, guaranteed in the constitution, to practice their respective religion and beliefs. The issue also had the potential to set a precedent for the religious beliefs of the majority to become the basis of laws that discriminate against other groups. This potential looked set to be realised when in April, a government-appointed body of prosecutors, religious scholars and government officials recommended that the government outlaw the sect, declaring that its members ‘had deviated from Islamic principles’.

While fundamentalist groups and many moderates called for Ahmadiyah to be outlawed, progressive kyai, including Kyai Maman, were organising community events with Ahmadiyah in order to emphasise a message of tolerance and pluralism

Whether Ahmadiyah members have deviated from Islam is not the point, argues Kyai Maman: ‘I have never defended Ahmadiyah’s teachings,’ he says. ‘What we are defending is their rights as citizens, as set out in the constitution. I would defend FPI if they were being oppressed and terrorised. This issue is not about Ahmadiyah but about people whose rights as human beings, as citizens, have been denied.’

For their defence of Ahmadiyah’s rights, progressives have themselves become targets of violence by extremist groups. The most high profile incident occurred at the National Monument (Monas) in Jakarta on 1 June this year, the anniversary of Sukarno’s famous 1945 speech where he formulated Indonesia’s state ideology, known as pancasila. With the government’s decision regarding the fate of Ahmadiyah due to be handed down any day, dozens of demonstrators, among them Kyai Maman, held a peaceful rally in support of religious freedom. ‘We came to Monas for two reasons,’ Kyai Maman explains. ‘One was to celebrate pancasila, our national philosophy, which is all about living in a plural society. The second was to urge the government to uphold the constitution.’

‘We were just about to get started,’ Kyai Maman recalls, ‘when suddenly a group of people wearing white robes and carrying FPI banners arrived, shouting “Allahu akbar!” (God is great).’.The FPI supporters attacked the demonstrators with sharpened bamboo stakes and stones. Nineteen people were injured, some seriously. Kyai Maman was among the most badly hurt. He recalls being beaten on the head with bamboo stakes until he fell to the ground where he was repeatedly kicked and stamped on by at least ten people. He was hospitalised with concussion and head wounds.

The incident shocked many in the Indonesian public. The attack on Kyai Maman in particular was significant in swaying public opinion because FPI had, deliberately or unwittingly, dared to attack a kyai, the moral equivalent in Muslim Indonesia to attacking a priest or a nun. In the days after the incident, calls to disband Ahmadiyah were replaced in the headlines by calls to disband FPI. Fifty-seven members of FPI, including leader Rizieq Shihab, were arrested following the incident, and the group is now seriously weakened.

The government’s eventual decision on the Ahmadiyah case was neither an outright victory for anti-Ahmadiyah campaigners nor a win for pluralism. The joint ministerial resolution, released on 9 June, did not ‘ban’ Ahmadiyah per se but demanded that they stop practising their beliefs and strongly encouraged them to ‘return to mainstream Islam’. Kyai Maman sees the decision as an excessive and ambiguous form of intervention by the government, designed to get them out of a difficult political situation. ‘The government’s job is to guarantee freedom of religion,’ he argues, ‘not to meddle in matters of belief.’

From puritan to progressive

Kyai Maman has not always defended the values of pluralism. There was a time when he supported, rather than opposed, violence in the name of religion. Kyai Maman grew up in a puritanical pesantren where he mixed in narrow circles and studied only traditional religious texts. His understanding of the world, he explains, was black and white, and anyone different from himself was a sinner. Just seeing a church or a Christian cross, he confesses, would make his blood boil. He was involved in militant groups that participated in ‘cleansing’ gambling and prostitution dens in the Majalengka area. In 1998, he stood by while members of his congregation destroyed churches, shops and houses belonging to Chinese Indonesians in Jatiwangi. ‘At that time,’ he says, ‘I thought that there was only one truth: only we were right and everyone else was wrong.’

But the violent events of 1998 proved a turning point in his life. Witnessing the effects of violence perpetrated by Muslims convinced him that there had been something wrong with his readings of religious texts

But the violent events of 1998 proved a turning point in his life. Witnessing the effects of violence perpetrated by Muslims convinced him that there had been something wrong with his readings of religious texts. The texts, he explains, always refer to Islam as a blessing for the whole universe, not just for Muslims. The goal of Islam, he reasoned, could not be to make people afraid of it.

On this basis, he says, he decided to start listening to the voices of ‘the other’. He began inviting leaders of other religions to his pesantren – priests, pastors and Buddhist monks – for inter-religious dialogue. He also invited them to come along to religious and cultural ceremonies at his pesantren, and even to teach classes to his pupils. It was a move that initially met with disapproval in his community and in his own family. ‘My father didn’t like me associating with non-Muslims,’ says Kyai Maman. ‘They were dirty unbelievers (kafir). But eventually my family began to see that, “Oh, it turns out priests are cool, and Buddhist monks are cool.”’

He also began to read from a variety of sources including philosophy, socialist thought and Christian liberation theology, and mixed with artists, writers and musicians. He dabbled in writing his own poetry. In his view, art has values that are congruous with religious values, such as freedom from contamination by worldly power or earthly desires. ‘From art,’ he says, ‘people can understand how to live a more harmonious life, not just see in black and white.’

Politics and public image

Despite having what he claims is a fundamental disinterest in politics; Kyai Maman has recently become an active member of the National Awakening Party (PKB). ‘I was invited [to join the party] by Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid], so I decided to see whether politics could be made into a tool to fight for pluralism.’ Certain goals, he realises, can only be achieved through parties and through policy: ‘We must take steps that push our friends in the legislative assembly to ensure that pluralist values continue to be upheld and defended.’ The Ahmadiyah case, he says, has reinforced this conviction in him.

However, he continues to see his main work as being at the grassroots level. This is not just a matter of seeding pluralist values, he maintains, but about improving people’s welfare. ‘Who can be influenced or provoked by radical groups?’ he argues. ‘Usually they are people who have trouble making ends meet, so our job is not to oppose those groups with violence but to try to create community prosperity and end poverty.’

The Ahmadiyah case and his own brush with celebrity following the Monas incident have also taught him the power of the media in shaping public opinion. ‘The failure of progressive Muslims, in my opinion,’ he says, ‘is that we don’t dominate the media. Maybe this is a problem with the media itself: you know “bad news is good news”. So it means that if a priest eats in my pesantren, or I break my fast in a church or a monastery, that will never get in the newspaper. But if a priest beats me up, or if I poison a priest’s altar wine, that’s the kind of thing that makes the newspaper. ii

Joanne McMillan (jo_mcmillan@yahoo.com) works as a translator and editor for Fahmina Institute in West Java and is currently completing a Masters of Applied Anthropology and Participatory Development at the Australian National University.

AMSS Conference at Harvard Divinity School

2008-11-01T05:22:00.000-07:00

Harvard Divinity School, MA, October 24-25, 2008

East-West Center Workshop on Patnership For Schools/Pesantren "Islam and Religious Pluralism in Indonesia and America"

2008-11-01T05:18:00.000-07:00

University of Pittsburg Conference Islam and Popular Culture in Indonesia and Malaysia

2008-11-01T05:15:00.000-07:00

Some of my students, ISLAM course & Understanding the Qur'an course

2008-08-21T17:28:00.000-07:00

Islam and Popular Culture in Indonesia and Malaysia

2008-08-20T19:02:00.000-07:00

http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/asc/conference/

The Powers and Limits of Cyberspace: Indonesian Progressive Islam Networks

The production of Islamic discourse has increasingly taken place in the cyber-space, arguably not as a replacement, but as an ambivalent alternative to the traditional spheres of school, mosque, and literature. The Digital Age witnesses the dual if not paradoxical functions of globalization: democratization/pluralization and authoritarianization/homogenization of religious discourse. Although all Muslim groups perceive the Web as advantageous, the conservative groups would become more conservative, and the progressive more progressive, conditioned by the greater virtual sense of difference and otherness facilitated by the Information Communication Technologies (ICTs). The websites, mailing lists, discussion forums, on-line editorials, on-line fatwas, blogging, and friendship networks, serve as a cross-cultural, cross-boundary media, but at the same time serve as a marker and a tehnological tool for furthering the previously and traditionally held ideologies and discourses. The Digital Age certainly has allowed more interaction between the activists or the makers of Islamic discourse and their audience, but has not necessarily witnessed more interaction and dialogue among competing religious ideologies. This paper will analyze the role of the ICTs in the rise of Islamic progressive networks, and their powers and limits in the construction of new religious discourses, with a special reference to the Progressive Islam Network and Liberal Islam Network. The main question will be: how democractic is cyber-Islam after all?

2008-08-18T22:53:00.000-07:00

http://www.pe.com/localnews/religion/stories/PE_News_Local_N_indonesian18.49ee0fa.html

Indonesians celebrate Independence Day with Mass

08:32 AM PDT on Monday, August 18, 2008
By DAVID OLSON
The Press-Enterprise

Inland Indonesian Catholics on Sunday celebrated their native country's independence day with a special Mass, traditional games and plenty of Indonesian food.
About 125 Indonesians sat in St. Joseph the Worker Catholic Church in Loma Linda as the red and white Indonesian flag was brought to the altar to stand near the U.S. and Vatican flags. Later, five young girls approached the altar with red and white streamers.
San Bernardino County has one of the largest Indonesian communities in the country, said Anwar Agusti, consul for information at the Indonesian Consulate in Los Angeles.

Sharon Johannes, 6, left, and sister Charissa, 8, walk down the aisle of St. Joseph the Worker Catholic Church in Loma Linda on Sunday during a Mass to celebrate Indonesian Independence Day.
St. Joseph the Worker holds Indonesian-language Masses twice a month. Sunday's Mass was partly in English, because -- in honor of Independence Day -- it was celebrated by the Rev. Romeo Seleccion, the diocese's Episcopal vicar for San Bernardino County. He does not speak Indonesian.
"Viva Indonesia!" Seleccion said at the beginning of the Mass, mixing an exclamation common in Latin America and Seleccion's native Philippines into a service filled with Indonesian-language songs.
Two members of the church youth group who carried the Communion wine and wafers wore traditional Indonesian clothing, one donning a modern Indonesian fashion accessory: a pair of white Nikes.
Indonesia declared its independence 63 years ago from the Netherlands.

Growing Population
Most Inland Indonesians did not arrive here until the early 1990s -- when changes in immigration law allowed more Indonesians to come to the U.S. -- or the late 1990s, when chaos and violence surrounding the push to overthrow authoritarian leader Suharto caused many Indonesians to flee, said Densy Chandra, of Highland, a consultant for the Indonesian community for the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops.
Although Christians comprise only 9 percent of Indonesia's population -- most Indonesians are Muslim -- a large majority of Indonesians in San Bernardino County are Christian, Agusti and Chandra said.
That is partly because Muslim-Christian tensions have increased in recent years, Chandra said.

Muhamad Ali, an assistant professor of religious studies at UC Riverside and a native of Indonesia, said Muslims and Christians have generally lived in harmony over the past several centuries, although some Christians and ethnically Chinese Indonesians have suffered discrimination. The 1998 fall of Suharto led to increased political and economic competition, leading to greater tension in parts of the country between Christians and Muslims, he said.

According to a U.S. State Department report, although the Indonesian government and public generally respect religious freedom, in recent years extremist Muslim groups have used violence and intimidation against Christian churches and against mosques of the Ahmadiyya branch of Islam, which some Muslims view as heretical.
Some Christians have also attacked Muslims, the report said. In addition, people from the six religions not officially recognized face discrimination.
The 2000 U.S. census lists 3,301 Indonesians in San Bernardino County and 5,626 in Los Angeles County, although it showed that the Indonesian population doubled in San Bernardino County between 1990 and 2000 and fell 13 percent in Los Angeles County.
Chandra said the census underestimates the population because Indonesians must write in their nationalities on census forms and many do not do so.
Many Indonesian Christians are Seventh-day Adventists who settled in the Loma Linda area because of the large Seventh-day Adventist presence there, Chandra said.
About 20 members of the Indonesian Seventh-day Adventist Church of Loma Linda traveled to Los Angeles on Sunday for an Independence Day celebration at the Indonesian Consulate there, said the Rev. Albert Pardede, pastor of the church. About 700 people attend services at the church each Saturday, he said.

Getting Together
After the Mass at St. Joseph the Worker, celebrants filled the church hall to feast on dishes such as gado gado -- cabbage, eggs and bean sprouts topped with a spicy peanut sauce -- and woku chicken, with onions, lemon grass and spices.
Outside, children played the traditional Indonesian game of makan krupuk. Tapioca-starch chips hung from string and, at the count of three, children with hands behind their backs furiously tried to be the first to finish the chips.
Alice Wiraatmadja, 33, of Rialto, said she looked forward to the twice-monthly Indonesian Mass and social hour.
"It's a time to get together with our Indonesian people and talk and share experiences in America," Wiraatmadja said. "It's like family here."
Reach David Olson at 951-368-9462 or dolson@PE.com

Dari Ciputat ke California

2008-08-18T22:50:00.000-07:00

MEDIA INDONESIA, Selasa, 12 Agustus 2008 00:01 WIB

Dari Ciputat ke California

Penampilan Muhammad Ali sederhana. Pria kelahiran Jakarta, 33 tahun silam itu berhasil meraih gelar philosophy doctor (PhD) dalam bidang History and Politics pada University of Hawaii, Amerika Serikat dengan judul disertasi Religion and Colonialism: Islamic Knowledge in South Sulawesi and Kelantan 1905-1945. Istimewanya lagi, Ali juga berhasil meraih posisi asisten profesor dan dosen University of California, AS pada 2007. Ketertarikan profesor University of California, khususnya di Depertement of Religion Studies, pada sosok Ali tidak hanya pada potensi akademik yang dimilikinya, tetapi juga karena ketajaman analisis ilmiah dan sikap kritis yang terangkum dalam banyak tulisannya di jurnal-jurnal internasional dan media massa. "Mungkin karena saya orang Indonesia, muslim scholar, lantas mereka menyebut saya sebagai Islamisis," katanya. Ketiadaan profesor studi Islam di University of California yang berasal dari Indonesia juga menjadi faktor penentu. Selama ini mereka hanya mengenal Islam dari Arab dan Timur Tengah. Profesor studi Islam di sana rata-rata berasal dari Pakistan, Iran, dan Palestina. Belum lagi sebagai public intellectual, reputasi Ali terangkum dari banyak tulisannya yang dimuat di jurnal internasional. Bagaimana sosok Muhammad Ali mengembangkan tradisi ilmiah? Kebiasaan Ali untuk membaca, menulis, merenung, dan berdiskusi tampaknya berkontribusi pada perjalanan akademik sekaligus kariernya. "Untuk menulis itu harus banyak membaca. Saya tetap menulis, bahkan ketika dalam keadaan sakit selam dua bulan. Badan saya memang sakit, tapi otak saya tidak," tuturnya. A. Fernandes/T-2

http://www.mediaindonesia.com/index.php?ar_id=MjI1MDk=

Kaitan Islam dan Muslim

2008-08-17T13:05:00.000-07:00

Komentar singkat saya, pendapat Ameer Ali dibawah ini penting sekali agar ada proses ijtihad terus menerus di semua kalangan levelumat Islam, termasuk pengkhotbah dan pemimpin agamanya. Satu catatan saya,pembedaan antara Islam dan Muslim saya kira tidak terlalu bermanfaat. Seringkita baca "teroris itu kan orangnya, bukan agamanya." Atau, "yangkorup kan orangnya, agamanya tidak korup." "Orang Barat itu banyakyang takut Muslim, tapi tidak takut Islam." Dan semacamnya. Saya kira, dariperspektif sejara dan sosiologi agama, sulit dipisahkan antara manusia danagamanya. Barangkali lebih pas berpendapat: ada banyak penafsiran manusiaterhadap agama. Ada banyak Islam. Catatan kedua, bisa jadi, dan memang,problemnya juga terletak pada agama-agama itu sendiri: yang kontradiktif, yang kontekstual, yang multi-dimensional, yang multi-interpretable. Bukan sekedar manusia, kelompok, atau masyarakatnya, tapi agamanya.

http://cetak.kompas.com/sosok
Ameer Ali, Membuka Pemikiran Muslim Sabtu, 16 Agustus 2008 03:00 WIB LUKI AULIA

”Tidak ada fobiaIslam, yang ada fobia Muslim, melihat tingkah laku Muslim yang kerapemosional dan terlalu sensitif menanggapi masalah apa pun akibatpikiran yang tertutup.” Pernyataan ini dilontarkan intelektual Islammoderat, Ameer Ali, yang ditemui di sela International Conference ofIslamic Scholars atau ICIS, 29 Juli- 1 Agustus 2008, di Jakarta.Diera modern semestinya rasionalitas dan pikiran kritis dikedepankansehingga tak ada lagi bentuk kekerasan apa pun yang terjadi akibatemosi tanpa dasar.Pesan Ali untuk umat Muslim ini muncul darikeprihatinannya melihat banyak orang yang mulai berpaling dari Islam.Padahal, kata Ali, Allah SWT sama sekali tak membebankan kesulitan apapun terhadap umat-Nya dalam menjalankan ajaran agama Islam.Iniditegaskan dalam Al Quran Surah Al-Hajj Ayat 78: Dan berjihadlah kamudi jalan Allah dengan jihad yang sebenar-benarnya. Dia telah memilihkamu dan Dia sekali-kali tidak menjadikan untuk kamu agama yangmembuatmu dalam kesempitan (wa jaahidu fil-laahi haqqa jihaadih.Huwajtabaakum wa maa ja’ala a’alikum fiddiini min harajin).”Allahmembuat Islam mudah dipahami dan diikuti. Tetapi, kenapa sebagian ulamajustru membuatnya jadi sulit? Akibatnya, banyak yang menjauh dari Islamkarena dirasa sulit menjadi Muslim,” kata Ali, Wakil Presiden MajelisDakwah Islam Regional Asia Tenggara dan Pasifik (RISEAP) di Australiaitu.Berbagai bentuk kekerasan, terutama di negara Muslim, seakanmenjadi trademark Islam bagi negara Barat. Akibatnya, gambaran tentangIslam dan Muslim menjadi serba menakutkan. Padahal, yang berada dibalik segala bentuk kekerasan hanya segelintir Muslim yang berpandanganekstrem.Untuk memperbaiki citra Islam dan Muslim, Ali membericeramah dan dakwah mengenai Islam dan Muslim kepada siapa pun, termasukuntuk umat Nasrani di gereja-gereja Australia. Pertanyaan yang seringmuncul, antara lain, arti jihad dan kondisi perempuan.Karenamemiliki pandangan moderat, Ali yang pernah menjadi Presiden DewanIslam Federasi Australia itu lantas ditunjuk menjadi Ketua KelompokReferensi Komunitas Muslim pada era pemerintahan Perdana Menteri JohnHoward.Ia lantas menjadi duta Australia ke berbagai dialogantaragama internasional untuk membuka mata dan pikiran Muslim, sertaberusaha menyadarkan kembali pentingnya rasionalitas dalam memahamiIslam dan menginterpretasikan Al Quran.Menginterpretasikankembali Al Quran sesuai dengan konteks dan zamannya, menurut Ali,menjadi kunci penting untuk membuka pikiran Muslim agar lebih kritis.Ketidakmampuanuntuk menginterpretasikan Al Quran sesuai konteks dan waktunya hanyaakan membuahkan fanatisme, pandangan ekstremis, dan emosional tanpalogika. Padahal, Al Quran sebenarnya ada untuk memancing pemikirankritis yang tidak asal menerima mentah-mentah kata-kata yang ada didalamnya.Ali mengingatkan, ayat-ayat Al Quran diturunkan padazaman Muhammad SAW sehingga isinya pun menyesuaikan dengan zaman itu.”Kalau tidak tahu konteksnya, kita tidak akan tahu maksudnya. Kitaharus mengkritisi dan menginterpretasi lebih lanjut isi Al Quran. Iniindahnya Al Quran,” ujar ayah dari dua anak ini.Pengetahuan modernPersoalannya,justru sebagian ulama tradisional juga yang menutup pikiran Muslim,baik secara langsung maupun tidak langsung, dengan pemikiran atauajaran tradisional konvensional yang sudah ketinggalan zaman.Banyakulama tradisional tidak mendalami pengetahuan modern dan terpaku padaajaran yang sama selama berabad-abad. Padahal, jika ditilik dariartinya, ulama semestinya seseorang yang memiliki pengetahuan luas dantidak hanya terbatas pada pengetahuan agama.Jika seseorang inginmemahami Al Quran dengan baik dan lengkap sekaligus obyektif, dia harusmempunyai bekal latar belakang pemahaman ilmu sejarah, ekonomi,sosiologi, dan politik.Tren intelektual Islam yang sarat bekalilmu pengetahuan lengkap dan modern seperti itu, kata Ali, justru lebihbanyak muncul di negara-negara Barat.Meskipun demikian, menurutpandangan Ali, hal ini wajar mengingat banyak intelektual Islam yangterpaksa migrasi ke Barat. Di tempat ini mereka justru mendapatkesempatan luas untuk berpikir, berekspresi, dan mengeluarkan pendapat.Olehkarena itu, tidak berlebihan apabila dikatakan kebangkitan generasibaru Muslim kemungkinan akan dimulai dari Barat. ”Kalau kita tidakmempunyai latar belakang pengetahuan yang lengkap, akan sangat sulitmemahami Al Quran dan memecahkan misteri Allah yang ada di dalamnya,”kata Ali.Misteri Allah yang ada di dalam Al Quran dimaksudkanuntuk dibuka, dipecahkan, dipelajari, dan dikritisi. Al Quran adalahkitab untuk siapa pun pada segala zaman. Kitab yang bisa digunakanuntuk menjelaskan berbagai macam hal apabila diinterpretasikan sesuaikonteks dan zamannya.PendidikanMasalahnya,Al Quran sering kali justru terlalu dipuja, tetapi isinya takbenar-benar dipahami. Ali menilai persoalan umat Muslim ada padapendidikan.Minimnya pendidikan dan masih tingginya tingkat butahuruf di dunia Muslim, ditambah indoktrinasi selama berabad- abad olehkelompok ortodoks, telah melumpuhkan kemampuan rasionalisasi. Karenaitu, perlu ada pendidikan modern untuk mengembangkan daya pikir kritisagar bisa menganalisis persoalan dengan logis dan menghasilkan solusipraktis.”Ini tidak ada pada sebagian ulama tradisional,” kata Ali.Diakhawatir ulama tradisional justru akan memicu gerakan ekstremisme yangmuncul akibat pikiran yang tertutup. Khotbah-khotbah di masjid, kataAli, bisa berakibat buruk apabila ditelan mentah-mentah oleh Muslimyang pikirannya tertutup.Seharusnya khotbah-khotbah itu membahasisu-isu yang tengah hangat dan terkait dengan kehidupan sehari-hari.Imam juga diharapkan memberi semacam panduan bagi Muslim.”Sayayakin, sebagian ulama itu tak dengan sengaja membentuk pikiran ekstrem.Tetapi, isi khotbahnya yang sering kali memancing orang ke arah itu.Yang lebih parah, kita tak boleh membantah atau mengkritisi khotbah.Kita harus bisa menjaga anak-anak muda agar tidak sampai menelan ideyang keliru dan terjerumus dalam kekerasan,” kata Ali yang dikenalsebagai pakar ekonomi dan pembangunan di negara-negara Muslim.Carapaling efektif untuk mengantisipasi hal itu adalah lewat pendidikan.Untuk mendukung pendidikan perlu suasana demokratis sehingga masyarakatbisa diberdayakan. Padahal, mayoritas negara Muslim belum mempraktikkandemokrasi.”Ini tantangan kita. Allah tidak akan mengubah nasibsuatu bangsa kecuali kita mengubah diri sendiri. Caranya, denganmemberdayakan generasi muda dan wanita. Kita sudah tahu kelemahan kitadan akar masalahnya. Jangan salahkan orang lain, tetapi salahkan dirisendiri. Kita harus menjadi agen perubahan, tetapi harus ubah dirisendiri dulu,” kata Ali yang migrasi ke Australia pada 1977 karenaalasan politik itu.

Nabi Perempuan?

2008-08-10T22:55:00.000-07:00

Dalam berbagai buku tentang nabi dan kenabian, baik Western maupun Eastern, saya tidak menemukan nabi perempuan. Memang ada Maryam, atau Mary, menerima 'wahyu', tapi tidak disebut sebagai nabi seperti definis konvensionalnya. Kita juga tahu banyak figur-figur keagamaan perempuan, tapi tidak sampai level 'nabi', seperti dipahami secara konvensional. Ini membawa implikasi signifikan. Pertama, agama-agama itu ternyata "male dominated". Kedua, agama-agama itu turun dalam masyarakat-masyarakat yang patriarkal. Ketiga, para penafsir kitab-kitab suci pun ternyata predominantly laki-laki, sehingga produk-produk penafsirannya juga dipengaruhi itu. Keempat, apakah ini karena Tuhan dikonstruksi sebagai "laki-laki"? Atau apakah Tuhan memang lebih percaya sama laki-laki karena apa yang mereka miliki dan usahakan ketimbang perempuan? Kata "huwa" dalam bahasa Arab. Atau pertanyaan gender seperti ini tidak relevan ketika mendiskusikan konsep nabi-nabi, sehingga ada "implicit understanding" di kalangan scholar dan awam bahwa agama-agama "naturally"laki-laki? Saya sendiri tidak tahu jawabannya. Masih misteri yang belum terkuak akal pikiran manusia, setidaknya akal pikiran saya.

Kontekstualisasi Nabi Muhammad di Indonesia

2008-08-08T16:23:00.000-07:00

Saya kira pembedaan “historical Muhammad” dan “contextualized Muhammad” ( Indonesia) cukup membantu, tapi yang kedua, hemat saya, membutuhkan yang pertama, dan keduanya tidak berarti perlu dipisahkan. Upaya kontekstualisasi dan liberalisasi Muhammad untuk Indonesia dan sekarang tidak mungkin bisa dilakukan tanpa memposisikan Muhammad sebagai figus historis yang hidup dan berjuang pada zamannya sambil pada saat yang sama melakukan pembacaan terhadap Indonesia, sejarahnya dan masalah-masalahnya. Proses historisasi dan kontekstualisasi saya kira terjadi secara bersamaan dan back and forward. Pendekatan historis terhadap Muhammad adalah sarat pertama, meskipun tidak cukup. Berikut ini, pemaparan apa yang saya maksud kontesktualisasi Muhammad, dan secara khusus liberalisasi Muhammad dan Quran untuk Indonesia. Sebelumnya, perlu diingat, citra Muhammad selalu atau lebih seringsebagai figur perang tidak sepenuhnya benar untuk konteks Indonesia. Waktu saya menyantren, figure militer Muhammad hanya disebut sambil lalu, tidak begitu penting dan tidak berpengaruh pada pendidikan kesantrian; yang ada waktu itu, Muhammad adalah cinta ilmu pengetahuan, pemaaf, tidak ingkar janji, menyantuni fakir miskin, menghormati tamu, suka humor, mencintai perempuan, dan aspek-aspek etik lainnya, yang saya percaya kontekstual untuk konteks saya sebagai santri dan anggota masyarakat di Indonesia. Saya kira ribuan pesantran dan madrasah dan institusi agama di Indonesia melihat figure Muhammad dari banyak sisi, dan sisi militer itu, meskipun salah satunya, tidaklah begitu atau paling signifikan. Pertanyaannya barangkali, mengapa ada kelompok Islam yang lebih melihat “sisi keras” dan padang pasir itu? Apa yang “salah” pada model penglihatan dan kepengikutan semacam ini?Saya kira konteks umat Islam yang merasa terbelakang, terjajah, terpinggirkan, terserang, atau sebaliknya merasa umat pilihan dan arogan, menjadi conditioning kenapa muncul kelompok garis keras yang memunculkan dimensi militer dan dakwah keras Muhammad. Proses kontekstualisasi Muhammad tidak mungkin bisa lakukan tanpa pertama mengakui kesejarahan Muhammad yang keras itu dan memang benar berperang beberapa kali. Karena itu kontekstualisasi Muhammad harus lebih dulu membaca sisi militeristik Muhammad dan para sahabatnya dan pada saat yang sama membaca sisi non-militeristik Muhammad yang lebih signifikan sepanjang hidupnya: sebagai suami yang membuat salah satu istrinya cemburu, sebagai ayah yang sangat sedih ketika anaknya meninggal, seorang mertua yang bangga dengan menantunya Ali, sebagai anggota masyarakat Mekah yang dipercaya (al-amin) dan kemudian pemimpin yang adil dan jujur dan anggota masyarakat yang terlibat langsung turun (bukan sekedar bicaradi depan) untuk mempertahankan Madinah dari serangan dalam dan luar, dengan kata lain sebagai patriot dan “nasionalistik” juga.Perlu juga dicatat, pemahaman Muhammad dan Islam di Barat sebagai dengan sendirinya “Western” dan “liberal” tidaklah tepat, karena Islam dan Muhammad di Barat telah dipahami secara sangat majemuk dan berbagai spektrum. Mereka yang belajar dan mengajar Islam di Amerika atau Eropa tidak dengan sendirinya menggunakan metodologi rasional, historis, dan kontekstual. Saya beberapa kali mendengar ceramah keagamaan scholar yang sangat apalogetik. Tidak sedikit scholar of Islam di AS yang cenderung defensif dan selalu menekankan peaceful character of Islam semata-mata dan wonderful character of Muhammad sambil menegasikan kompleksitas dan multidimensi sosok Muhammad. Juga di masjid. Saya baru saja menghadiri solat Jumat, yang isinya urusan Palestina dan Israel melulu; itu karena konteks perang media di AS, tapi banyak imam masjid dan scholar di Amerika juga tidak sensitive dengan problem real keAmerikaan, problem hidup di dunia global, dan seterusnya.Di pihak lain, liberalisasi Muhammad sudah dimulai, meskipun kekuatan masih marginal dan terpencar-pencar. Bagi Farid Esack di Afrika Selatan, Muhammad dan Al-Quran menjadi “liberatif dan pluralis”; bagi Kecia Ali, Leila Ahmed, Fatima Mernissi, dan Amina Wadud, Muhammad itu cukup gender-sensitive untuk zamannya, meski tidak sampai “feminis” liberal, bagi Khaled Aboe el-Fadl, Muhammad itu toleran dan human right activist. Di Indonesia, bagi Soekarno dan Hatta, Muhammad itu liberal dan sekularis; bagi Syu’bah Asa, Muhammad itu “socially caring and publicly engaged”, bagi Emha Ainun Najib, Muhammad itu penyair, bagi Musdah Mulia, Muhammad itu pro-gay, buat Cak Nur almarhum Muhammad itu modern, inklusif, dan multikultural. Bagi kaum Muhammadiyah, Muhammad itu puritan moderat; bagi kalangan NU, Muhammad itu senang kalo dirayakan ulang tahunnya, dan tidak terlalu peduli dengan “bidah hasanah” inovasi agama yang baik dan konstruktif, danseterusnya. Liberalisasi Muhammad, menurut saya, adalah memposisikan Muhammad sebagai Nabi dan manusia, sebagai sosok yang sangat ukhrawi, tapi juga manusiawi duniawi. Salah satu hadis yang popular “ Antum a’amu bi umuri dunyakum: Kalian lebih tahu urusan dunia kalian” bisa jadi landasan pijak, meskipun tidak cukup, karena statusnya yang masih controversial dari sisi sanad dan pemahamannya. Konsep duniya dan akhirat yang ada dalam Al-Quran dan di dalam hadis ini bisa kita kontekstualisasikan untuk Indonesia dan bisa menjadi rujukan upaya liberalisasi Al-Quran dan Sunnah. Liberalisasi Muhammad berarti meliberalisasi Al-Quran dan Sunnah. Urusan ekonomi, politik, kriminal, pertanian, perdagangan, dan semua urusan “dunia” adalah ranah yang bisa diliberalisasi tanpa harus selalu merujuk pada hadis-hadis yang juga cukup rinci mengenai masalah-masalah ini untuk konteks masa lalu. Ada banyak sekali hadis-hadis, sekalipun secara sanad kuat, tidak relevan dantidak bersifat universal untuk Indonesia dan kini. Akal sehat dan kritisisme sejarah harus dipakai. Liberalisasi Muhammad juga perlu menyinggung hubungan AL-Quran dan Sunnah; dan hubungan Sunnah dan Hadis, fiqh, ilmu agama, dst. Berbeda dengan hubungan Kristiani, Jesus, dan Bible, bagi banyak Muslim, Quran adalah sumber pertama, dan Sunnah sumber kedua. Tingkat normatif Quran dan Sunnah berbeda. Begitu pula, tingkat normatif antara ayat-ayat Al-Quran tidak selalu setara: ada ayat-ayat favorit atau yang paling sering dibaca atau diteladani. Surat Al-Lahab misalnya paling tidak favorit. Apalagi Sunnah, yang bagi umat Islam zaman sekarang “terlanjur” harus percaya dengan Hadis, sebagaimana yang dikonstruksi dan diseleksi Bukhari, Muslim dan lainnya- khususnya kaum Sunni; sementara Shi’a memiliki koleksi Hadis dan produk fiqh nya sendiri. Di antara umat Islam, ada yang lebih ke Quran, ada yang lebih ke Hadis, ada yang lebih ke pikiran, sehingga dulu ada Ahlu al-Hadis dan Ahlu al-Ray (pemikiran) seperti Mutazila. Ada yang “kekurangan gizi”karena terlalu membaca Hadis sebanyak-banyaknya dan seliteral mungkin, tapi kurang membaca Quran yang banyak memuat substansi ketimbang rincian. Jadi, masalah buat Muslim Indonesia adalah bagaimana supaya “gizi” mereka seimbang. Untuk liberalisasi Muhammad di Indonesia, Sunnah harus subject to gagasan substantik Quran dan reason (ijtihad) dan didiskusikan terus menerus. Memahami Muhammad melalui Sunnah, dan melalui Hadis yang ada, secara historis dan kontekstual. Dalam wacana internal Islam, tradisi (Sunna) Muhammad dilawankan dengan bid’ah. Saya cerita sedikit soal bid’ah ini. Salah satu mahasiswa Katolik saya dalam kelas “Islam” yang saya sedang aja, tertarik dengan konsep bid’ah ini, dan dia akan menulis paper soal ini. Sayangnya, saya tidak punya buku dalam bahasa Inggris khusus soal ini, yang ada hanya buku-buku pengantar tentang Muhammad, sunnah, Hadith. Dalam bahasa Arab, sunnah cukup controversial: Sunnah yang mana saja yang normatif. Dan sejauh mana tingkat normatifnya. Ini terkait dengan bid’ah: sesuatu yang dianggap mengada-ada, yang baru, yang tidak ada pada masa Nabi. Makanya ada bid’ah hasanah (baik) dan bid’ah sayyiah (jelek). Kata Gus Dur, kalo ada orang Islam melarang bid’ah, jangan pake celana dalem. Hehehe. Jadi ada proses kreatif pemikiran bid’ah ini menjadi sesuatu yang konstruktif, tentu pertanyaan lagi hal-hal mana yang bisa dikreasi dan inovasi dan hal-hal manayang tetap dan subtantif. Proses liberalisasi Muhamamd dan Islam karena itu, bukan proses yang final, dan tidak akan pernah final. Dan tidak akan pernah seragam. Beberapa pemikir Muslim Arab memulai upaya kontekstualisasi Sunnah Nabi, mulai dari Yusuf Qardhawi, Muhammad Al-Ghazali (yang menulis tentang nyanyian, wanita, makan-minum, pakaian, dst),. Pak Quraish Shihab saya kira termasuk yang paling produktif untuk kontekstualisasi Al-Quran di Indonesia, meskipun tentu saja karyanya dipengaruhi pendidikan dan pembacaannya. Tentu saja usaha mereka berbeda, namun poin saya adalah semangat untuk kontekstualisasi Al-Quran dan Sunnah sudah ada dimana-mana.Kontekstualisasi Muhammad butuh pemahaman problem real masyarakat Indonesia saat ini. Dari pemahaman ini kemudian kita bisa membaca Muhammad: bagaimana kira-kira Muhammad akan merespon masalah ini jika dia hidup sekarang dan di Indonesia? Misalnya, di Jakarta, persoalan realnya sangat kompleks: remaja-remaja yang hedonistik, jalan yang macet, selokan dan sungai yang kotor dan bau, rasa tidak aman ketika naik angkot dan bis kota, inflasi yang melonjat melewati daya beli, korupsi, pembunuhan, perusakan dan pembakaran tempat ibadah, diskriminasi pendidikan dan pekerjaan, konflik etnis-agama, dan seterusnya. Ketika terlanjur terjadi konflik etnis-agama di Ambon dan sebagainya, ramai-ramai para penulis muda menulis kontestualisasi Quran dan Muhammad sebagai anutan conflict resolution. nilai-nilai Pancasila saya kira adalah salah satu liberalisasi Muhammad dalam konteks Indonesia. Historical awareness tentang Indonesia? Tentang founding father Soekarno danHatta, tentang sumpah pemuda, bhineka tunggal ika, Pancasila, ---memahami bahwa Indonesia adalah Negara majemuk: dari mulai penganut agama asli, Hindu, Buddha, Islam, Protestan, Katolik, Kong huchu. Bagi Muslim yang nasionalist, figur Muhammad yang melakukan kontrak politik dengan suku-suku Yahudi di Medina bisa dikontekstualisasikan untuk Indonesia, meskipun tidak sepenuhnya, karena Indonesia bukan Medina, dan presiden bukan Nabi agama-politik. Nilai-nilai kontrak sosial itulah yang saya kira bisa relevan untuk Indonesia. Liberalisasi Muhammad di Indonesia membutuhkan historical awareness tentang Indonesia itu sendiri yang memiliki sejarah panjang dan pendek, memahami bagaimana the founding father Soekarno dan Hatta, sumpah pemuda, bhineka tunggal ika, Pancasila, UUD 1945 dan amandemen-amandemennya ---memahami bahwa Indonesia adalah Negara majemuk: dari mulai penganut agama asli, Hindu, Buddha, Islam, Protestan, Katolik, Konghuchu, dan sebagainya. Mengenai bahasa, Muhammad, Al-Quran, Hadis, Sunnah, fiqh, dan seterusnya memang berbahasa Arab. Proses Arabisasi tidak bisa terelakkan karena kepercayaan Muslim tentang posisi bahasa Arab itu sendiri, agak berbeda dengan Katolik dan Protestan. Injil bahasa Inggris dan bahasa Yunani atau Aramaik memiliki posisi yang kurang lebih setara. Beda dengan Al-Quran dan terjemahannya. Patokan bagi liberalisasi Islam adalah sejauh mana tingkat Arabisasi itu relevan dan tepat untuk Indonesia dan sejauh mana proses lokalisasi dapat dilakukan terhadap Muhammad, Quran, dan Islam. Dalam kenyataannya, selalu ada proses lokalisasi ayat- Hadis, fiqh, tasawwuf, kalam di Indonesia. Antara Aceh dan Banten, Makassar, Lombok, Bali, beda-beda pula. Contoh saja, nilai local sirri di masyarakat Bugis-Makassar, dipahami sebagai harga diri yang melegitimasi pembunuhan laki-laki yang bawa kawin lari perempuan, mengalami proses “Islamisasi”: harga diri adalah Islami, tapitidak dengan membunuh, bisa dengan cara lain yang lebih “beradab”. Kategori santri dan abangan saja, kan proses Jawanisasi kategori murni keagamaan yang ada dalam Al-Quran seperti Mukmin, Muslim, Fasik, Munafik, dan seterusnya. Dan masih banyak contoh lokalisasi lainnya.Kontekstualisasi Islam dan Muhammad untuk Indonesia juga perlu lebih spesifik lagi: untuk individu, profesi tertentu, laki/perempuan/gay, status ekonomi, politikus, intelektual, guru, budayawan, saintis, dan seterusnya. Jadi Indonesianisasi penting, tapi belum spesifik, karena proses internalisasi/teladanisasi pada ujungnya bersifat personal dan komunal. Bagaimana Muhammad sebagai pacifist? Sekarang intelektual dan media tidak pernah memberikan citra Muhammad sebagai pacficist. Hanya Yesus, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr, Mother Teressa, dan seterusnya. Saya sendiri kesulitan mencari sumber-sumber soal ini, baik Arab, Ingris, Jerman, Perancis, dan Belanda. Ketika mahasiswa paska saya menanyakan referensi gerakan perempuan Muslim yang focus pada peace building dan noviolence, saya hanya dapatkan sedikit saja. Belum banyak kajian soal ini. Ada fragmen Muhammad yang bisa mengindikasikan posisi Muhammad sebagai mediator, antara elit-elit suku-suku di Mekka yang konflik mengembalikan “batu hitam” (hajar aswad) ke tempatnya di Kabah. Ada juga bagian kehidupan Muhammad ketika dia berdoa dan memaafkan musuhnya: “Ya Allah maafkanlah mereka karena mereka tidak tahu” ketika dia diejek dan dilempari kotoran di Thaif. Ada juga hadis yang menyatakan Tuhan adalah Damai; Kasih Tuhan melampaui marah-Nya; Siapayang tidak menuai kasih dia tidak dikasihi; tentang kemiskinan, tentang haramnya saling membunuh dan bunuh diri, tentang siapa Muslim: seseorang yang lidah dan tangannya tidak mengganggu orang lain; tidak tanggung jawab; tentang percaya dan tunduk sama hukum, tentang keserakahan, materialisme, dan sebagainya; ini semua kan aplikable dalam konteks Indonesia dan kini.Bung Ioanes, saya kira perlu ada kajian khusus dan buku khusus. Paparan saya di atas sekedar awal saja karena problemnya sangat kompleks dan multi-dimensional. Masing-masing poin diatas perlu dielaborasi lebih panjang dan dalam lagi seharusnya. Yang tak kalah menariknya lagi adalah kontekstualisasi NU dan Muhammadiyah yang khas Indonesia itu dalam konteks Amerika saat ini. Bagaimana Muhammad-nya NU dan Muhammad-nya Muhammadiyah mengalami lokalisasi lanjutan di Amerika. Lebih lanjut, dialog kontekstualisasi Nabi-Nabi abad silam (termasuk Sidarta Gautama, Lao Tze, Master Kung, Gandhi, dan sebagainya) di ruang-ruang publik untuk masa depan Indonesia sangat penting dan strategik. Saya kira ada banyak kesamaan dari figur-figur keagamaan itu, dan karena mayoritas Indonesia beragama maka adalah historically natural bahwa pemahaman mereka terhadap figur-figur itu sangat berpengaruh terhadap bagaimana mereka melihat Indonesia dan masa depannya.

Nabi Muhammad Kontekstual

2008-08-08T09:40:00.000-07:00

Menarik saya mendiskusikan bagaimana pemahaman "liberal" bisa menjadi jalan upaya kontekstualisasi Nabi Muhammad di zaman kini dan di sini (lokalitas). Dalam sejarah Islam, status Muhammad sebagai "anutan" sebetulnya mengalami proses penyejarahan di lokalitas dimana Islam dianut oleh masyarakat Persia, Rusia, India, Asia Tenggara, Afrika, Amerika, Europa, dan seterusnya. Jadi, Muhammad Europa, Muhammad Indonesian, Muhammad Afrika, dan lebih spesifik lagi, Muhammad desa, dan Muhammad kota, sudah terjadi dan akan terus terjadi. Proses kontekstualisas Muhammad juga terjadi pada level individu-individu dan kelompok-kelompok yang sama dalam hal "melakukan referensi" terhadap dirinya, tapi sangat berbeda dalam manifestasi kultural, politik, ekonomi, sosial, dan seterusnya. Ketika Nabi menikahi Khadijah sebagai satu-satunya istri, dan baru menikah lagi setelah istri pertamanya ini wafat, dan menikahi wanita Qibthi, dan janda-janda (kecuali Aisyah), tidak semua pengikutMuhammad "mempraktekkan" poligami yang persis seperti itu. Mayoritas Muslim, secara statistik, malah monogami, atau berpoligami tapi bukan janda, dan sekaligus, karena berbagai faktor kontekstual sepanjang sejarah yang tidak memungkina kawin seperti Nabi itu. Ketika Muhammad menjadi pemimpin agama dan politik sekaligus, umat Islam dalam sejarah dalam prakteknya adalah sekularistik, bahkan sejak zaman Umayyah, dan apalagi Abbasiyah, sampe Dinasti Usmani dan apalagi sekarang di masa negara-bangsa, dan hanya kalangan minoritas saja yang "teokratis" persis seperti Nabi (Iran zaman Khomeini misalnya), tapi negara-negara Arab lainnya tetap saja "sekularistik" ) karena sudah ada pembagian otoritas keagamaan (ulama) dan otoritas politik (sultan, president, dst).Di bidang ekonomi, mayoritas Muslim tidak mempraktekkan bagaimana Nabi berdagang. Di bidang sosial apalagi, konsep baduin dan nomad (kinsip, hospitability tribalistik) , tidak sepenuhnya dipraktekkan masyarakat Muslim zaman sekarang dimana ikatan profesional (kolega), teman bermain, teman kuliah, teman aktifis lintas agama, dan sebagainya lebih penting, atau ketika kemajemukan identitas menjadi hal yang lumrah.

Saya kira karakter masyarakat dan zaman adalah perubahan. Meskipun kelompok-kelompok fundamentalis berteriak mengikuti Sunnah Nabi, pada kenyatataan hanya bagian kecil saja yang betul-betul mirip dan persis dengan sifat-sifat Muhammad. Dalam sejarah Islam dan bahkan Eropa dan dunia, sejak abad ke-7 sampai sekarang, Muhammad telah mempengaruhi berbagai tradisi yang berbeda dalam berbagai kehidupan. Masalahnya adalah perubahan yang seperti apa dan sejauh mana yang pas dan diinginkan pemikiran "liberal" itu. Perubahan natural dan sosial seperti saya ilustrasikan di atas tidaklah memadai. Masih ada kalangan Muslim yang tidak dapat atau tidak mau membedakan antara mana yang subtantif dan mana yang tidak subtantif, yang "universal" dan yang lokal (Arab Mekah, Medina, dan abad ke-7). Muhammad dengan turbannya, dengan jubahnya, dengan siwaknya, dengan sendal jepitnya, dengan bahasa Arabnya, dan seterusnya.

Persoalan selanjutnya adalah umat Islam tidak sepakat mana yang substantif dan mana yang cabang itu, meskipun selalu dianggap bahwa tauhid, keimanan, dan rukun islam, sebagai yang universal, tapi kenyatannya praktek kepercayaan tauhid itu juga telah mengalami lokalisasi di berbagai tempat, mengalami sinkretisasi. Apakah mereka yang melakukan lokalisasi iman dan kepercayaan mereka terhadap Muhammad (misalnya di Cikoang Sulsel) bisa disebut "liberal"? Mereka yang akomodasionist terhadap kepercayaan, bahasa, dan budaya lokal, tampaknya tidak berarti liberal dan progresif.

Jika salah satu karakteri Islam liberal adalah "rasional", maka mencium hajar aswad ketika berhaji tidak perlu diikuti oleh Muslim liberal. Bukan hanya itu, mempercayai air zam zam bernilai sakral dan kesehatan juga tidak rasional. Status Muhammad sebagai pemimpin agama dan politik sekaligus di Medina tidak perlu diikuti. Nikahnya Muhammad terhadap Aisyah yang berusia 9 tahun (menurut beberapa sumber) juga bisa dianggap "aneh" kalo terjadi saat ini.Di sini lain, Muhammad juga mau berdiri hormat di depan jenazah Yahudi yang lewat, dan meminta tawanan Yahudi untuk mengajar baca tulis kepada Muslim, ketika sekarang banyak orang Islam benci Yahudi. Muhammad juga melakukan kontrak politik di Medina (mitsaq al-Madinah) dengan Yahudi dan Kristiani, ketika sekarang di Palestina, kelompok Muslim, Yahudi dan Kristen belum bisa melakukan hal yang sama untuk menjaga Yerusalem dan sekitarnya. Muhammad juga membebaskan penduduk Mekah ketika mereka membencinya. Muhammad juga adalah pemaaf, ketika sekarang hukuman-hukuman pengadilan tidak lagi memperhitungkan pemaafan. Dan seterusnya.

Salah satu sumber referensi yang jarang dibaca umat Islam adalah sirah, padahal rincian-rincian kehidupan Muhammad bisa dibaca disana secara kontekstual. Nilai-nilai keadilan sosial, penghargaan terhadap wanita ketika wanita nomor dua, nilai-nilai persaudaraan atas iman yang mengatasi suku yang suka bertengkar, nilai-nilai kesantunan, ketegasan, keberanian, dan semacamnya, jika dilihat dari kaca mata zaman itu, bisa dianggap "progressif". Jika pemikiran liberal percaya bahwa zaman bergerak progressif, maka pergerakan itu tidak berhenti di zaman Nabi. Pergerakan itu pun terus terjadi hingga sekarang, dan seterusnya. Referensi terhadap Muhammad akan tetap, tapi bentuk, intensitas, pilihan, manifestasi, dan geraknya sangat berbeda dan berubah.

Singkatnya, peran Muhamad dalam sejarah adalah paradoksal, kompleks, dan multi-dimensional. Jangankan sekarang, ketika Nabi ada pun dan terutama ketika dia wafat, para pengikutnya sudah berbeda pendapat, dan menimbulkan permusuhan dan bunuh-bunuhan.Tinggal kembali kepada dimana dan siapa yang memposisikannya dan sebagai apa?Muhammad Nabi liberal? Atau liberalisasi Muhammad? why not?

Religious Pluralism in Southern California

2008-08-04T22:48:00.000-07:00

I enjoy listening to the lectures by a lecturer and students on religious pluralism with specific reference to Southern California. Hope you enjoy this too.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5jNqitmBdnk

Secular Muslims?

2008-07-30T17:29:00.000-07:00

My short response to a question by a sister in Hawaii on who a secular Muslim is.

My short answers are like this. There are different ways to define secular Muslims. First, they are those Muslims who believe in Islam, become part of Muslim community, but do not practice prayer regularly, do not go to Hajj and other ritual practices. People in the West define them as "non-practicing Muslims". Second, Muslims who believe and practice most rituals, but do not hold an integration between Islam and politics, nor integration between Islam and science; they believe that politics, science, and other worldly affairs are "profane" and should not be part the religious, or the Islamic. Third, a secular Muslim can be anyone who views himself or herself as a secular Muslim. This is more personal view of the meaning of "Islam" and "secularism" by the person.

For the question whether Indonesian Muslims were secular, the answer would depend on which definition we use. If we use the first definition, historically Indonesian Muslims were secular because they were many local Muslims who didnot practice prayer regularly or didnot prayer at all; they might celebrate religious festivals as "social events" rather than "religious ones". If we use the second definition, Indonesian Muslims in the past can be said secular when they separate religion from politics, such as Soekarno and Hatta. But on the other hand, Muslim kings integrated and combined the matters of religion and adat (custom) through the parewa sara and the parewa adat in Aceh kingdomes, Makassar, Gowa-Tallo, Banten and others. Still, on other hand, it can be said, Muslim kings and local people were actually "secular" in the sense that they retained local beliefs and practices such as spirit offerings, magic, bissue, etc, despite identifying "formally" with Islam. Today, Indonesians are mixed: mostly religious, some secular, but many are in grey areas, somewhere in between. We know that any attempt of categorization is a useful simplification of a complex reality.

I have intended to write about a book on the origins and development of Islamic secularism in Indonesia. So much more later.

MUI dan Gedung Dana APBN

2008-07-25T18:32:00.000-07:00

Aliran dana APBN untuk pembangunan gedung baru MUI di Jakarta menunjukkan relasi agama dan Negara di Indonesia sama sekali belum tuntas: neutral, full separation, equal recognition, atau apa? Kalo persoalan ini belum selesai, maka dana-dana semacam ini akan terus berjalan. Untuk kasus gedung MUI ini, kalo MUI dapat dari APBN, apakah PGI, WALUBI, MATAKIN, dan sebagainya, juga mendapat dana APBN? Masih kuat logika "mayoritas" Islam dan karenanya umat Islam "berhak" dapat dana mayoritas Islam, dan MUI mereka anggap "representasi" berbagai kelompok Islam. Saya tidak anti-MUI as such sebagai sebuah perhimpunan yang berhak bersuara di ruang publik Indonesia. Saya tidak setuju klaim kebenaran absolut sebagian besar tokoh MUI yang diwadahi Negara dan pakai uang negara?

Ada ketidakadilan dan diskriminasi struktural yang kacaunya tidak dipahami tokoh-tokoh kita. Saya percaya akar masalahnya ada di mind-set. Dari mana kah memulai untuk sebuah reformasi logika dan mind-set figur-figur agama dan politik kita?

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) dan Ruang Publik Indonesia

2008-07-23T01:42:00.000-07:00

Seringkali MUI tidak bisa membedakan antara "In the name of God" dan "On Behalf of God". Yang kedua ini yang terus terjadi, dan bisa merusak tatanan the Indonesian public sphere.

MUI tentu saja tidak sama dengan kelompok "islam radikal" dalam hal sejarahnya, para pemain didalamnay, dinamikanya, kekuatan dan pengaruhnya, namun belakangan, khususnya sejak 1998, bermacam-macam kekuatan penekan tampaknya berkolaborasi untuk menjadikan public sphere Indonesia tidak "telanjang" (naked). Kompetisi mencari "influence" dalam "naked public sphere" Indonesia dilakukan semua kelompok masyarakat, radikal, liberal, moderat, tradisionalis, modernis, neo-modernis, dst. The naked public sphere itu rentan (vulnerable) karena semua suara sah.

Di Amerika, perdebatan antar kelompok religious new right, conservatives, liberals, dan sebagainya masih terus. Perdebatan tentang wall of separation dan integration of religion and politics masih berjalan. Kelompok religious new right, biasanya juga disebut evangelical Protestant, percaya bahwa moralitas agama (private) bisa dan harus menjadi moralitas public (public virtue) juga. Lihat saja debat-debat yang belum selesai soal abortion, gay marriage, agama dan presidency, agama dan kebijakan luar negeri, dan sebagainya di Amerika. Banyak kalangan yang berusaha mencari a happy convergence antara religion and democracy, antara private morality dan public virtue, antara agama dan keAmerikaan. Saya sedang baca buku "The Naked Public Sphere" oleh Richard John Neuhaus, seorang Lutheran, tapi Catholic, ecumenical, economically pragmatic, culturally conservative, and politically devoted to the vital center of liberal democracy. Menarik sekali, antara lain, bagaimana dia melihat Amerika sebagai 'theonomous' society, yaitu masyarakat dimana agama dan aspirasi2 kultural mengenai Tuhan diberikan expresi publik. Bukan theocracy dimana agama mengklaim kebenaran absolut. Dalam theonomous society, agama bisa dan berhak menjadi "public" (mirip dengan gagasan "public religions"nya Casanova), namun religious morality bisa menjadi "public" dalam mekanisme demokratis; morality yang kemudian menjadi publik adalah morality of compromise.

Menurut saya, MUI dan berbagai kelompok Islam garis keras perlu mengikuti "workshop" dan pengajian "democratic citizenship" , bukan untuk memprivatisasikan agama (karena tidak historis dan tidak realitik dalam konteks Indonesia, sebagaimana juga dalam konteks Amerika), tapi untuk memposisikan agama dalam tempatnya yang lebih pas, demokratis, dan menyejukan berbagai kelompok masyarakat yang majemuk.

The Middle East Crisis and Obama

2008-07-21T20:28:00.000-07:00

http://news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/20080721/wl_mcclatchy/2997150

MuslimChannel.tv

2008-07-21T16:46:00.000-07:00

http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE_News_Local_S_muslimweb21.1156f7d.html
The Press-Enterprise

A Temecula group has launched a Muslim version of YouTube.

10:00 PM PDT on Sunday, July 20, 2008
By DAVID OLSON, The Press-Enterprise

MuslimChannels.tv aims to educate non-Muslims about Islam and provide an Internet site for Muslims to view videos without worrying about anti-Islamic tirades or sexually explicit content, said Tarek Ayoub, a volunteer for the site and for the site's nonprofit founder, Islam The Answer Corp.
"It's a way for Muslim users to feel safe," Ayoub said.
Story continues below

The site also includes non-religious programming, such as comedy, travel, sports and cultural videos, along with documentaries containing trenchant political commentary on subjects such as the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. The volunteer-run site will not accept advertising or donations, to avoid compromising its mission, Ayoub said.
Larry Slusser, secretary of the Southwest Riverside County Interfaith Council and a Mormon, praised the idea behind the site.
"I think it's great anytime someone can dispel misconceptions and promote understanding of and appreciation for a faith," said Slusser, who has not visited the site. "As a Latter-day Saint, I know many people have misperceptions about my faith. There's enough hatred in the world. We need more understanding of our differences."
Hussam Ayloush, executive director of the Southern California office of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, said MuslimChannels.tv's nonreligious videos show how Muslims are culturally and ethnically diverse and cannot be defined solely by their religion.
Ayoub said the site was founded in part because he and other Muslims grew weary of seeing viciously anti-Muslim comments that YouTube users posted as reactions to Islamic-oriented videos. Some YouTube users e-mailed Muslim video-posters and threatened them with violence -- in some cases with warnings such as "We know your address" -- or made sexually demeaning comments toward Muslim women, Ayoub said.
Ayoub said he and others have met with FBI agents about the threats. FBI spokeswoman Laura Eimiller said the agency does not typically confirm or deny investigations. Ayoub said YouTube did not respond to repeated phone calls and e-mails about the anti-Muslim comments or to allegations that the company suspended the accounts of some people who had posted videos critical of Israel.
In an e-mailed statement, YouTube said it does not comment on individual videos. The company said it relies on users to flag content that violates YouTube's prohibition on hate speech, defined as speech that demeans people based upon their religion, race, ethnic origin, disability, gender, age, veteran status, sexual orientation or gender identity. YouTube staff reviews flagged material and usually removes it within minutes if it is deemed hate speech, the statement said.
Although Islam the Answer founded MuslimChannels.tv in part as an alternative to sites such as YouTube, volunteers with the group are also forming a team to better respond to the anti-Muslim comments on YouTube and other sites, said Cait Ramshaw, a Florida volunteer for MuslimChannels.tv and a sister site, MuslimBridges.org.
Muslims need to ensure that misrepresentations of Islam do not go unanswered, and that the responses are reasoned and factual rather than angry, said Ramshaw, who developed "Golden Rules for Muslim Bloggers."
MuslimChannels.tv is not only a way of allowing non-Muslims to quickly access factual information about Islam to counter misperceptions, said Muhamad Ali, an assistant professor of religious studies at UC Riverside who specializes in contemporary Islam. The site's features that allow video-sharing, online forum discussions and other interaction help unite U.S. Muslims, he said.
"It provides a better sense of community, of being an American Muslim, rather than a Pakistani Muslim, an Egyptian Muslim, a Palestinian Muslim or a South Asian Muslim," he said.

Graduation, UH Manoa, May 2008

2008-07-17T21:07:00.000-07:00

Relaxing and Productive Summer

2008-07-05T08:28:00.000-07:00

This summer, I teach, read, and write my book and articles, but also see movies, meet people, and visit interesting places with my beloved wonderful wife. I will conduct research in Indonesia from August to September before the beginning of Fall on the state, civil society and production of Islamic knowledge. I want to leave this Summer saying: What a relaxing yet productive time!

The Struggle for the Word ALLAH

2008-07-04T09:30:00.000-07:00

This is an interesting phenomenon in Malaysia where the statist-formalist Muslims, the Christians and the Sikhs are struggling for the use of the word ALLAH. The conservative Muslims believe that the term is exclusively theirs as they read it only in the Qur'an without deep understanding about its terminological history. The Christians and the Sikhs have also used the term in their scriptures and ordinary usage.

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/07/04/sikh-group-joins-protest-against-ban-use-word-039allah039-malaysia.html

Indonesian Education Symposium at Los Angeles

2008-06-23T10:02:00.000-07:00

http://www.indonesiamedia.com/2008/6/MID/local/Simposium.htm

The Discriminative State and the Compulsory Faith

2008-06-12T21:52:00.000-07:00

http://www.thejakartapost.com/node/171841
The discriminative state and the compulsory faith

Muhamad Ali , Riverside, CA Fri, 06/13/2008 10:04 AM Opinion

The recently issued joint ministerial decree reprimanding and instructing Jamaah Ahmadiyah to end their religious activities and interpretations, which suggest a prophet exists following the Prophet Muhammad, is in my view an unwelcome product of collaboration between the discriminatory state and the compulsory faith.

The decree clearly favors the mainstream yet particular Islamic interpretation of the meaning of Islam and prophethood, as well as of the Constitution and Pancasila state ideology. The decree symbolically recognizes religious freedom but prohibits "an interpretation of a religion in Indonesia which is deviant from the fundamental doctrines of that religion".

In the case of Ahmadiyah, the decree charged that their religious interpretation and activities "could harm social order". The first statement shows the government officials have interfered with an internal theological dispute and endorsed favoritism toward the dominant interpretation, rather than leaving the difference to democratic procedures among Muslim groups.

The second statement indicates the government's prejudice that the group has already harmed or could harm social order. Here interpretations, rather than actions, have become the criteria.
The decree is in my view based on a narrow and exclusive understanding of the Islamic notion of prophethood and revelation. The mainstream idea of prophethood has been taken for granted even by religious scholars.

Although not stated in the decree, it is proclaimed by many religious leaders, scholars and ordinary people that Ahmadiyah has committed "religious blasphemy" (penodaan agama) and heresy (aqida). These charges of religious blasphemy and heresy are not based on a sound understanding of the Koran.

Khatam al-anbiyya may carry the meaning that Muhammad was the last prophet to receive God's revelation, but this is not the only possible interpretation, because the Koranic language has multiple meanings. Some Koranic verses clearly suggest the universality of God's revelation and prophethood throughout human history.

God's revelation is not confined to the Prophet Muhammad. God's guidance is universal and not restricted to a particular age and nation. "And there is no nation wherein a warner has not come" (35:24). "For every people a guide has been provided." (13:7). Prophets speak the language of their own nations.

The logical interpretation is that prophets were not only Arab; they could be Indian, Chinese, African and so forth, as long as they preached the existence of the divine and the good. The Koranic prophethood is inclusive: submission to God, judgment day and commitment to good works.

Many claim that prophets unmentioned in the Koran were only applicable to the period before Muhammad. This interpretation contradicts the other verses (Ghafir:78, An-Nisa:164) which clearly state there are numerous prophets untold in the Koran irrespective of time.

Traditionally, Muslim scholars have made a distinction, saying that a nabi is a divine envoy without a law and a revealed book, whereas rasul means one with a law and a revealed book; but the Koran often uses both terms interchangeably. The meaning of prophethood is complex and nuanced, not to be limited to only the Prophet Muhammad.

If the Sabeans, the Jews and Christians are mentioned in Sura Al-Baqara:62 to gain God's rewards and salvation as long as they believe in God and judgment day and do good works, then why do we pretend to be so absolute in judging an Ahmadi -- who believes in God and even in the prophethood of Muhammad while believing in another prophet or reformist -- will not be rewarded by God?

Defining Islam as the religion of the Prophet Muhammad is historical yet specific. Islam also means submission to God and good works. If Islam is the religion of all true prophets, then there is the possibility of an interpretation suggesting a prophet who follows Muhammad.
A "solution" offered by some is that Ahmadiyah should exist as a new religion, separate from Islam. This is an erroneous view and religious fallacy.

The Koran clearly states there is no compulsion in religion (Al-Baqarah:256). God gives freedom to anyone to believe and not believe in Him. Religion is based on faith and will, and these would be meaningless if induced by force, as Koranic commentator Abdullah Yusuf Ali has said.
Many say there has been a consensus (ijma') among Muslim scholars about the heresy of Ahmadiyah, and that the argument is taken for granted as an absolute truth. The fact is that a consensus is never completely a consensus because there are so many Muslims in the world. There is no consensus that consensus (ijma') is part of the source of Islam. Definitions and manifestations of Islam remain plural.

K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari, Hamka and M. Quraish Shihab, to mention only a few, do not share the belief and interpretation with Ahmadiyah but they recognize difference in interpretations and have never advocated the restriction of the movement in Indonesia. It is only now that such intolerant pressure emerged in the escalated politics of "religious purity" and "closed identity", unfortunately based on narrow-minded interpretations, insensitive to goodness and justice.

In the history of all religions, orthodoxy and heterodoxy are always judged by the dominant power, never from the minority or subjugated groups. Religious heresy seen by the mainstream is not necessarily a threat to social order. Charges and campaigns against religious heresy being harmful to the social order is a narrowed-minded political act.

The Koran states that disputes in theological matters will be settled by God alone, not here in this world where human knowledge is truly limited (Al-Maidah:48). Even when one has the right to invite others, the Koran suggests inviting them with wisdom, not by political pressure or discrimination, let alone banning. Invite the people to the way of Allah with wisdom and beautiful teaching, and argue with them in ways that are best, for the Lord knows best who has strayed from his path and who receive guidance (Surah An-Nahl:125).

When there is conflict of interpretation, the Koran asks not to judge the faith of the other but to compete with one another in goodness (fastabiqul khairat:Al-Maidah:48). There are many paths to God and many ways to be Muslim. Many religious individuals forget and do not care about their intolerant actions; they are quick to spread injustice, physically or psychologically, to those who happen to have different interpretations.

Indonesians should have resumed dialog as exemplified by A. Hassan and an Ahmadi leader in Java facilitated by colonial officials. The key point here is that the state should not but respect different religious interpretations. Faith should not be compulsory, and the state should not take side in any religious interpretation, mainstream or marginal.

The writer is an assistant professor at the religious studies department of the University of California, Riverside. He can be reached at muhali74@hotmail.com

Pluralisme Agama di Amerika Serikat

2008-06-09T10:53:00.000-07:00

Pluralisme Agama di Amerika Serikat

Muhamad Ali

Umumnya masyarakat internasional, termasuk masyarakat Indonesia, mengetahui lebih banyak tentang wajah Amerika Serikat (AS) ketika berhadapan dengan masyarakat di Negara-negara lain. Dengan kata lain, kebijakan luar negeri AS lebih sering mewarnai dunia ketimbang kebijakan dalam negeri dan kehidupan masyarakat AS sendiri dari waktu ke waktu. Maka tidak heran apabila dunia Muslim misalnya melihat AS sebagai negeri Kristen, seolah-olah seluruh warganya beragama Kristen, atau memberinya label negeri Yahudi karena umat Yahudi lebih menonjol dalam ekonomi, sains, dan media massa di AS. Ada lagi persepsi bahwa AS adalah Negara sekuler dan karenanya semua masyarakatnya tidak peduli dengan agama. Ini semua sebagian dari citra-citra yang perlu diteliti lebih jauh kebenarannya dengan melihat sejarah kemajemukan agama-agama di AS secara lebih dekat dalam konteks ruang dan waktu. Agama dan keberagamaan di manapun mengalami perubahan-perubahan disamping kontinuitas, perbedaan-perbedaan disamping kemiripan-kemiripan.

Tulisan ini tidak bermaksud untuk berpendapat bahwa kehidupan agama di AS adalah yang terbaik ataupun mengajak agar masyarakat Indonesia meniru pluralisme agama AS. Tulisan ini sekedar memberikan gambaran singkat kehidupan beragama di AS agar pembaca dapat mengetahui perbedaan dan persamaan antara AS dan Negara-negara lain, termasuk Indonesia, karena kita sama-sama tengah berjuang menciptakan kerukunan agama, seperti halnya pemerintah dan masyarakat AS terus berjuang. Masyarakat kontemporer – dimanapun – kini semakin majemuk. Masyarakat dan Negara di mana pun kini memiliki masalah yang serupa: bagaimana menghadapi kemajemukan itu.

Jacob Neusner dalam bukunya World Religions in America (1994) menggambarkan bahwa kebanyakan orang Amerika adalah relijius. Mereka percaya adanya Tuhan, sembahyang, dan menjalankan agama. Mereka membentuk cita-cita bangsa Amerika dengan merujuk pada ajaran-ajaran agama: “satu bangsa, dibawah Tuhan” (“One nation, under God”) yang tercantum dalam Sumpah Setia kenegaraan (Pledge of Allegiance). Menurut sebuah survey di tahun 1990-an, sekitar 92 persen orang Amerika percaya Tuhan. Mayoritas melakukan doa setiap hari, mengunjungi gereja setiap minggu. Hampir semua orang Yahudi menjalankan Hari raya Passover dan memperingati the Days of Awe (Tahun Baru, Hari Penebusan Dosa).

Kebanyakan orang AS tidak hanya religius tapi juga memeluk sebagian besar agama-agama dunia. Menurut data Jacob Neusner, sekitar 60 persen dari seluruh warga AS (yang berjumlah total 280 juta) memeluk Kristen Protestan (dari percentage ini, 19 persennya Baptis, 8 persen Methodis, 5 persen Lutheran, dan 28 persen lagi terbagi dalam banyak gereja lainnya). Sekitar 26 persen penganut Katolik Roma. Sekitar 2,5 persen adalah bangsa Yahudi, dan kebanyakan mereka menjalankan agama Yahudi.[1] Penganut Hindu sekitar 1 persen, Buddha sekitar 1 persen, dan Islam kurang dari 1 persen. Lainnya ada penganut Shinto, Zoroaster, dan sekitar 7,5 persen tidak memeluk agama sama sekali (sering disebut ateisme).[2]

Sejarah Amerika awal dimulai karena agama juga. Orang-orang Eropa menduduki benua Amerika dengan dasar agama. Bagian timur Amerika diduduki orang-orang Inggris Raya karena faktor agama, dan bagian baratdaya Amerika oleh orang Spanyol juga karena agama. Para penganut Kristen – Puritan, Anglikan, Quakers, Presbysterian, dan sebagainya – yang berasal dari negeri-negeri Eropa menjelajah dan menetap di benua Amerika. Sejarah awal ini memberi konteks bagi dominasi agama Kristen di AS sehingga banyak orang berpendapat bahwa AS adalah negeri Kristen. Pada perkembangan selanjutnya, terutama setelah Perang Dunia I dan II, penganut Yahudi dan agama-agama lain mendatangi AS. Lebih jauh, kewarganegaraan AS tidak ditentukan atas dasar agama. Untuk menjadi warga AS seseorang tidak perlu beragama Kristen; ia bisa memeluk agama mana saja dan bahkan tidak beragama sama sekali. Menurut Konstitusi dan Bill of Rights AS, Negara tidak berdasarkan atas satu agama tertentu, ras, etnisitas, dan jender tertentu.[3]

Agama dan kepercayaan masyakarat asli Amerika dikenal sebagai ‘tradisi-tradisi tribal’, yang telah muncul lebih awal dari agama-agama dunia dan masih berperan dalam keberagamaan masyarakat asli Amerika (Native Americans). Umumnya agama-agama asli ini tidak memiliki kitab tapi turun temurun. Sebagian mereka, seperti suku Pomo di California mempertahankan tradisi perdukunan (shamanism), perantara antara manusia dan dunia roh, yang dipercaya bisa menyembuhkan penyakit, mengetahui masa depan, dan sebagainya.Agama-agama asli Amerika dikenal menurut budaya-budaya spesifik, meskipun kini sebagiannya melampaui batas-batas budaya mereka. Agama Peyote (peyote religion) adalah salah satu agama di AS yang melampaui batas-batas tribal, yang kemudian berintegrasi dengan agama Kristen dan menjadi Gereja Amerika Asli (Native American Church). Kini identitas Indian di AS masih cukup kuat baik sebagai kesukuan, agama, maupun identitas politik ketika berhadapan dengan dominasi Kristen dan dominasi orang kulit putih (orang Eropa yang menduduki benua Amerika dan kemudian menguasainya). Atas kerja misionaris Kristen, sebagian orang Indian menganut Kristen dan membentuk gereja-gereja Amerika asli, seperti orang-orang Pueblo dan Yaqui di Arizona. Secara umum, komunitas-komunitas Indian yang memeluk agama Kristen masih melestarikan kepercayaan-kepercayaan lama mereka dan mengambil bagian-bagian ajaran Kristen yang relevan bagi kebutuhan mereka.[4] Meskipun demikian, hubungan kepercayaan-kepercayaan local dan agama Kristen ditandai dengan konflik dan kompromi.

Sebagian masyarakat asli Amerika memeluk gerakan-gerakan agama baru (New Religious Movements) di mana mereka berusaha menemukan makna hidup di tengah modernitas. Mereka mengembangkan gerakan-gerakan keagamaan, politik, dan legal untuk menanggapi situasi-situasi politik. Sebagian gerakan ini berbentuk kultus, yang dipimpin semacam prophet. Mereka memiliki bahasa, cara berpakaian, ritual, nafkah kehidupan yang unik, antara lain untuk membedakan diri mereka dari agama Kristen dan dominasi orang Eropa/putih (white people). Sebagian lain lagi mengembangkan spiritualitas (spirituality). Dalam hal ini, orang Amerika asli menyebut religion untuk agama seperti Kristen. Untuk membedakan kepercayaan mereka dari mayoritas Kristen, mereka menyebutnya spirituality, dan sebagiannya memiliki buku semacam kitab suci seperti Black Elk Speaks yang dikarang John Neihardt dan The Sacred Pipe. Spiritualitas Amerika Asli kemudian menjadi populer di kalangan orang Amerika non-asli.[5]

Katolik adalah pertama kali di Amerika sebagai agama kaum pendatang. Umat Katolik termasuk yang pertama datang di Amerika seperti tercermin dalam nama-nama St. Augustine, St. Petersburg, San Antonio, San Diego, San Fransisco, dan Los Angeles. Kebanyakan keluarga Katolik sekarang ini adalah keturunan dari para pendatang itu. Berdasarkan etnisitas, penganut Katolik di Amerika berasal dari Irlandia, Jerman, Italia, Polandia, dan Spanyol. Orang Katolik tinggal terutama di kota-kota besar seperti Boston, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburg, Chicago, dan Minneapolis. Umat Katolik Amerika secara umum menjadi pendatang yang sukses yang setia dengan gereja mereka meskipun sering pula terjadi perbedaan pendapat dengan para pemimpin mereka. Mereka telah beradaptasi dengan perubahan-perubahan di Gereja Katolik sejak Konsili Vatikan Kedua tahun 1962.[6]

Berbeda dengan kaum Katolik Roma di atas, sebagian orang Amerika juga menganut agama Kristen Ortodoks. Orthodoxy berasal dari kata Yunani, doxa, yang berarti pendapat, ajaran, kemenangan. Orthodoxy berarti doktrin, ajaran atau metode yang benar. Dogma kaum ortodoks seperti Trinitas dan Inkarnasi. Penganut Kristen Ortodoks terutama tinggal di New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Florida, dan Ohio. Pada tahun 1990an, ada sekitar 4 juta penganut Kristen Ortodoks di Amerika, yang memiliki hubungan (dengan tingkat yang berbeda-beda) dengan gereja-gereja induk mereka di Yunani, Timur Tengah, dan Eropa Timur dan Tengah.[7]

Penganut Protestan (berasal dari kata Protest - protes terhadap kejumudan gereja Katolik Roma ketika) pertama kali datang ke Amerika pada abad ke-17 dari Eropa. Mereka menyebut diri mereka Reformasi Protestant –meskipun banyak lebih suka menyebut diri mereka berdasarkan denominasi seperti Baptist, Lutheran, atau Methodist, karena istilah Protestant bisa dimaknai defensif dan negatif. Kaum Gereja Baptist dan kaum Gereja Lutheran mempengaruhi Amerika. Di Selatan mereka mempraktekan perbudakan, tapi di Utara mereka menentang perbudakan. Kedua Gereja ini pecah sebelum Civil War, and kaum Baptists tidak pernah datang secara bersama-sama. President Jimmy Carter adalah penganut Baptist Utara yang berjuang demi hak-hak asasi mansuia. Kaum Methodist juga sangat berpengaruh di Amerika, namun perkembangan masing-masing gereja atau denominasi mengalami pasang surut.[8] Pada masa Revolusi Amerika, bentuk baru dari Protestanisme muncul, yang dikenal dengan Pencerahan (Enlightenment, tapi bedakan dengan Enlightenment di Perancis). Dari kalangan pencerahan ini Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, George Washington, dan John Adams, yang percaya Tuhan, tapi juga akal, alam, dan hukum. Melalui The First Amendment, mereka memajukan kebebasan agama dan dinding pemisah antara Gereja dan Negara.[9] Secara umum, sekulerisme ini, yang tidak ditemukan presedennya dalam agama Katolik dan Protestanisme Resmi, merupakan reaksi terhadap dominasi Gereja Katolik Roma dalam pemerintahan dan masyarakat.

Doktrin Protestanisme menekankan iman kepada Tuhan dan amal, tanpa berdasarkan pada otoritas pemimpin seperti Pope (Paus) bagi Katolik. Karena itu, individualisme cukup dominant. Masing-masing mendirikan denominasi dan menafsirkan Bible dengan berbagai metode. Protestanisme Amerika adalah cabang dari Kristen Barat, bukan dari Ortodoksi Timur dan menolak otoritas Pope Roma. Kaum Protestan berkeyakinan bahwa semua umat beragama memiliki akses yang sejajar terhadap Tuhan. Pendeta dan orang awam memiliki hak dan kewajiban yang sejajar.[10] Oleh karena itu, dalam bidang,ekonomi kaum Protestan dikenal cenderung individualis dalam pengertian tidak terlalu bergantung pada otoritas. Martin Luther (1483-1546) berkeyakinan tidak ada paus, tidak ada otoritas, yang dapat bertanggung jawab atas iman seseorang. Menurut Max Weber, yang mengkaji Protestant Calvinism di Switzerland, Jerman, dan Inggris, berpendapat bahwa etika Protestan berpengaruh pada jiwa kapitalisme.[11] Namun pendapat Weber tidak menjelaskan kompleksitas perkembangan kapitalisme di Amerika dan banyak Negara lain. Terlepas dari tesis ini, mayoritas Protestan di Amerika mendukung individualisme, kerja, kompetisi, dan kapitalisme. Dalam Protestan ditemukan bermacam kecenderungan: ada yang liberal atau modernis, seperti Episcopalian, Presbyterian, dan the United Church of Christ, dan ada yang konservatif, evanjelikal, atau fundamentalis, seperti Baptist Utara, Churches of Christ, Adventist, Pantecostal, lain-lain yang menyebut diri mereka evangelical atau fundamentalist. Kalangan fundamentalis ini berpegang pada prinsip-prinsip (fundamentals) doktrin dan praktis seperti dalam Bible. Kalangan fundamentalis zaman sekarang merupakan respons terhadap modernitas. Sebagian lagi menyebut diri mereka Protestan moderat.[12] Dalam bidang politik, kalangan Protestan juga berbeda-beda. Sebagian bekerja di luar pola-pola denominasi mereka. Mereka mempunyai semacam jurubicara seperti Billy Graham dan televangelists –juru misionaris melalui TV. Kini lebih dari 5 saluran TV di AS merupakan TV-TV keagamaan sebagain besarnya Kristen. Sebagian mereka tidak tertarik berpolitik praktis, tapi sebagian berpolitik. Kaum Protestan awal berpendapat, dalam bahasa Latin, bahwa ecclesia semper reformanda, gereja selalu perlu direformasi. Mereka tidak pernah merasa puas bahwa kerajaan Tuhan telah tercapai. Karena itu, perkembangan Protentanisme di Amerika mengalami perubahan-perubahan mengikuti perkembangan zaman.

Orang Amerika yang berasal dari Afrika (African American, atau Black Americans) juga mengembangkan gereja-gereja mereka sendiri. Sejak zaman perbudakan hingga masa pasca-Perang Dunia II, orang Amerika Afrika mengalami sejarah konflik dan kompromi antara dominasi dan subordinasi. Sebagian menggabungkan budaya Afrika, Amerika, dan Kristen sehingga menjadi Kristen Amerika Afrika. Mereka umumnya tidak jatuh pada fatalisme, memperjuangkan persamaan hak politik dan kultural. Martin Luther King, Jr. menjadi salah satu pemimpin mereka yang sangat berpengaruh, yang pernah berpidato dengan judul ‘I Have a Dream”, Saya Punya Mimpi.[13] Gereja-gereja kalangan Amerika Afrika ini antara lain The African Methodist Episcopal Church, the African Episcopal Church, the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, dan the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church. Sebagian lainnya mendirikan gereja-gereja yang mandiri dari denominasi tersebut, seperti National Baptist Convention, U.S.A. Inc., dan The Church of God in Christ. Ada pula gereja-gereja Black American di dalam denominasi Orang Putih. Seorang wanita bernama Ida Robinson menjadi pemimpin the Mount Sinai Holy Church of America, Inc., di Philadelphia. Sebagian kaum Black Americans ini aktif dalam gerakan anti-racisme di Amerika.[14] Mulai pertengahan abad ke-20, agama kaum Black American tidak hanya Kristen. Yahudi dan Islam juga telah dipeluk kalangan Black American.

Penganut Yahudi berjumlah sekitar 2,5 persen atau sekitar 6 juta, yang berarti lebih setengah seluruh umat Yahudi di dunia. Umumnya umat Yahudi dilihat sebagai entitas yang monolitik, padahal mereka sangat beragam. Di Amerika saja, sekitar 28 persen perkawinan orang Yahudi, merupakan perkawinan campur dengan non-Yahudi (disebut ‘gentiles’). Yahudi di Amerika tidak membentuk satu organisasi yang mengatasi semua orang Yahudi. Ada Yahudi Hitam- seperti Sammi Davis Jr., dan Whoopi Goldberg. Ada Yahudi kaya, Yahudi miskin, Yahudi kota, Yahudi desa. Namun sebagian besar orang Yahudi menganut agama Yahudi. Dari sekitar 6 juta orang Yahudi, 4.5 jutanya mengidentifikasikan diri mereka sebagai penganut agama Yahudi. Artinya, sekitar 1,5 juta orang Yahudi tidak menjalankan agama Yahudi. Umat Yahudi terdiri dari mereka yang reformist, ortodoks, rekonstruktifis, dan konservatif. Penganut agama Yahudi percaya pada Satu Tuhan, Taurat (Perjanjian Lama, menurut orang Kristen), dan Israel (keturunan Ibrahim). Orang Yahudi hidup di rumah, sinagog dan pilgrimage (kunjungan ke tempat-tempat suci). Di Amerika, secarfa garis besar ada penganut Yahudi yang segragasionis dan penganut Yahudi yang integrasionis. Yang pertama adalah mereka yang agak terpisah, menyendiri dari kebanyakan orang lain. Mereka menggunakan bahasa Yiddish – sebuah bahasa campuran bahasa Jerman, Polandia, dan Rusia. Mereka memakai pakaian khusus, makan makanan tertentu, belajar kitab-kitab suci Yahudi saja, bertransaksi hanya dengan orang Yahudi. Kalangan segragasionis ini tinggal di AS dan Kanada, di New York City dan Montreal dan sejak berdirinya Negara Israel tinggal di sana.Mereka ortodoks. Di antara kalangan ortodoks ini adalah Hasidisme dan Yeshiva. Hasidisme percaya dengan Orang Suci (tsaddiq dalam bahasa Hebrew).Yeshiva rajin belajar Taurat dan khususnya Talmud. Mereka tinggal di Boston, New York City, Baltimore, Chicago, dan lain-lain, sementara sebagiannya pindah dan tinggal di Israel, Palestina. Kalangan integrasionis cenderung berbaur dengan penganut agama lain. Mereka terdiri dari reformis (35 persen), konservatif (43 persen), dan rekonstruktifis (2 persen). Mereka berintegrasi dengan masyarakat sekitar. Mayoritas Yahudi di Amerika adalah integrasionis. [15]

Selain penganut agama-agama di atas, ada penganut minoritas seperti Hindu, Buddhisme, Islam, dan lain-lain. Penganut agama Hindu berasal dari India. Menurut sensus 1990, ada 815.447 orang India di AS, kebanyakan tinggal di New York dan California, selain di Chicago, Los Angeles dan lainnya. Kebanyakan mereka kaum terdidik dan memiliki posisi di bisnis maupun akademia. Kini ada sekitar 150 candi Hindu di AS, termasuk yang cukup besar bernama Lord Venkateshwara Balaji Temple di Malibu Canyon. Penganut Hindu di AS tidaklah monolitik; mereka beragam. Menurut Gerald James Larson, ada beberapa tipe Hindu di AS: sekuler, non-sektarian, bakti, reformist-nasionalist, dan Neo-Hindu. Hindu sekuler adalah penganut Hindu yang tidak menekankan identitas Hindu, tapi juga tidak memilih agama lain. Hindu non-sektarian mempraktekan Hindu secara eklektik. Hindu bakti mengidentifikasikan diri mereka dengan tradisi aliran tertentu seperti Vaishnawa, Shaiva, atau Shakta. Hindu reformis adalah para pengikut Ramakrishna, yang menekankan pembaruan doktrin. Sementara Neo-Hindu adalah para pengikut gerakan Transcendental Meditation dan gerakan Hare Krishna. [16]

Penganut agama Buddha juga cukup signifikan di AS. Buddhisme lahir di India dan berkembang ke seluruh dunia, termasuk AS. Di antara kelompok agama Buddha di AS adalah the Buddhist Churches of America (BCA) yang membawa tradisi Jepang dalam berbakti pada Amidha Buddha. Penganut Buddha di AS menjalankan kebaktian mereka di candi-candi. Sebagian mereka membentuk organisasi mahasiswa Buddha – seperti penganut agama lain. Mereka melakukan Sunday School dan mendirikan the Young Buddhist Association. Praktek Zen (duduk meditasi) juga berkembang. Bahkan penganut agama lain –termasuk Kristen dan yang tidak beragama sama sekali, mereka mempraktekkan beberapa tradisi Buddhisme untuk kesehatan dan alasan-alasan lain. Salah satu organisasi yang berkembang di AS adalah the Nicheren Soshu of America (NSA) yang mengajarkan meditasi berdasarkan teks Lotus Sutra.[17] Secara umum, penganut agama Buddha terdiri dari aliran-aliran: Pure Land, Nichiren, Zen, dan Tibet; masing-masing memiliki doktrin dan metode yang berbeda, meskipun sama-sama mempercayai kebesaran Buddha.

Umat Islam adalah penganut agama yang paling cepat pertumbuhannya di AS, mengalahkan pertumbuhan agama-agama lain, dan terbesar kedua setelah Kristen. Pertumbuhan ini disebabkan pesatnya immigrasi orang-orang Islam dari Timur Tengah, Asia, dan Afrika. Selain itu, angka kelahiran orang-orang Islam relatif tinggi di AS. Pada tahun 1990, jumlah umat Islam sekitar 4,6 juta, dan di tahun 1992 mencapai antara 5-8 juta. Secara etnik, penganut Muslim beretnik African American (Amerika kulit hitam) sebanyak 42 persen, Asia Selatan sebanyak 24,4 persen, Arab 12,4 persen, Afrika 6,2 persen, Iran 3.6 persen, Asia Tenggara 2 persen, dan European American (Amerika kulit putih) sekitar 1,6 persen, dan lain-lain 6,5 persen. Mereka ada yang Sunny dan ada yang Syiah, Ahmadiyah, dan Druze. Organisasi Islam yang terkenal adalah the Nation of Islam yang dipimpin oleh Elijah Muhammad, dan kini oleh Louis Farrakhan, yang diikuti terutama African American. Islam sangat efektif dalam mempersatukan bangsa kulit hitam Afrika dalam melawan rasisme dan masalah-masalah social-politik di AS. Perkembangan mutakhir menunjukkan semakin aktifnya penganut Muslim dalam kehidupan agama, budaya, social dan politik di AS. Beberapa organisasi Islam antara lain the Federations of Islamic Associations (FIA), the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). Ada pula the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) yang berpusat di Washington D.C.

Setelah mengikuti pertumbungan dan perkembangan agama-agama di AS, kita dapat mengambil kesimpulan bahwa secara garis besar kehidupan beragama di AS cukup rukun, oleh karena secara formal Negara Federal dan Negara-negara bagian di AS tidak memaksakan satu agama. Para penganut agama mayoritas jelas sangat berpengaruh dalam kehidupan publik baik budaya, ekonomi, maupun politik. Namun demikian, penganut agama-agama minoritas dalam menjalankan sebagian besar ajaran-ajaran kebaktian mereka, meskipun tentu saja setelah mengalami proses adaptasi yang dinamis dan terus menerus. Masing-masing penganut agama Katolik, Protestan, Yahudi, Islam, dan lainnya hidup dalam konteks ruang dan waktu. Warga Negara Amerika secara umum, baik memeluk ataupun tidak memeluk agama memiliki, memiliki hak dan kewajiban yang sama di depan Konstitusi, meskipun dalam kenyataannya masih terjadi berbagai masalah seperti prasangka, mispersepsi, permusuhan, dan diskriminasi.

Muhamad Ali

[1] Ini berarti bahwa bangsa Yahudi tidak semua atau tidak selalu menjalankan agama Yahudi. Jadi ada perbedaan antara Yahudi sebagai bangsa (nation) dan Yahudi sebagai agama (religion). Lebih jauh perlu dibedakan antara Yahudi dan Negara Israel. Tidak setiap orang Yahud mendukung pembentukan Negara Israel, meskipun pembentukannya juga menggunakan rujukan agama, selain politik dan ekonomi. Untuk sejarah konflik Israel dan Palestina lihat misalnya Charles D.Smith, Palestine and the Arab Israeli Conflict (Boston & New York: Bedford/St.Martin’s, 2001), Norman G.Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict (London & New York: Verso, 2003)
[2] Jacob Neusner (ed.), World Religions in America: An Introduction (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), hal.2
[3] Konstitusi AS menjamin kebebasan agama dan ras. Ini tidak berarti tidak ada masalah sama sekali, seperti kita akan lihat nanti. Sejauh mana AS menjami kebebasan adalah topik yang kontroversial dan memerlukan ruang tersendiri.
[4] Jacob Neusner (ed.), op.cit., hal.11-25
[5] ibid., hal..26-30.
[6] Andrew M.Greeley, “The Catholics in the World and in America”, di Jacob Neusner (ed.), World Religions in America, op.cit. hal. 93-95.
[7] Jaroslav Pelikan, “Orthodox Christianity in the World and in America”, di Jacob Neusner (ed.), World Religions in America, op.cit, hal.131-147.
[8] Martin E.Marty, “Protestant Christianity in the World and in America”, di Jacob Neusner (ed.), World Religions in America, op.cit., hal.37-44.
[9] Martin, ibid.,47.
[10] Ibid., hal.50-53.
[11] Pendapat Weber ini hingga saat ini masih mengundang perdebatan hubungan agama dan kapitalisme. Lihat bukunya, ‘Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus’ dalam Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologies, Tubingen, 3 volume, 1922-23, pertama kali diterbitkan di Archic fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 1904-5. Diterjemahkan kedalam bahasa Inggris oleh Talcott Parsons dengan judul The Protestant Ethics and The Spirit of Capitalism, London, 1930. Untuk diskusi tesis Weber dan kaitannya dengan Islam lihat antara lain, Bryan S.Turner, Weber and Islam: A Critical Study (London & Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).
[12] Martin Marty, op.cit., hal.60-4.
[13] Peter J. Paris, “African American Religion”, di Jacob Neusner (ed.), World Religions in America, op.cit.,hal. 69-77.
[14] ibid., hal.81.
[15] Jacob Neusner, “Judaism in the World and in America”, in Jacob Neusner, op.cit., hal.151-174.
[16] Gerald James Larson, “Hinduism in India and in America”, ibid., pp.177-200.
[17] Malcolm David Eckel, “Buddhism in the World and in America”, hal.203-214.

Interfaith Dialogue at Campus

2008-05-06T19:23:00.000-07:00

I was invited to talk about interfaith issues by the Muslim Students Association of UCR, inviting Jewish, Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu students at 5:00 - 7 pm, May 6, 2008. First I gave a lecture about why we need to promote interfaith understanding, dialogue, and cooperation in the U.S. and elsewhere. I reasoned that differences have not been appreciated by different religious peoples and commonalities have been surpressed. Differences have been stressed by many leaders and preachers to promote the self at the expense of the others. Thus, politics of identity became strengthened for the sake of self-identity, while the ultimate reality and substantive values such as peace, justice, equality, the well-being, getting job, being healthy, becoming educated and so forth have been ignored. Also, religion has been used for good and evil, but its positive and constructive roles have been undermined by the action of a handful of people of religious individuals and groups. Religion has been the important element in creating and perpetuating mutual mistrust, sectarian pride, racism, and chauvinism. Finally, I argued that global, regional, and national politics have overshadowed the serious learning and studying and teaching of various belief systems in history and today.

I came up with some suggestion about how we can do interfaith dialogue. First, scriptures have to be understood contextually, comparatively, and morally. Every single religious community has the ultimate claim about their sacred scriptures; therefore, there must be some truth on all claims. Secondly, religious communities have to emphasize partnership and competition in good. "O Mankind! We created you from a single pair of male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other. Verily the most honored of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you. God has full knowledge and is well-acquainted." (Al-Hujurat:13). I stressed the idea of "ye may know each other", and the idea of pluralism as God's plan. I also talked about how among God's signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the plurality of languages and colors (Qur'an: 30:22). Ethnic identity, national identity, religious identity are important for many, but universal brotherhood is no less important without necessary contradictions.

The students came up with very interesting questions, such as the meaning of prayer, the idea of tolerance despite the idea of mission in all religions (I discussed the verse on the da'wa: call to the way of God through wisdom, good lessons, and best dialogue), the idea of prophets before and after Muhammad, the concept of Trinity, the idea of forgiveness, the attitude of Islam toward Jesus as the savior of the world, the attitude of Islam toward non-theistic religions such as Buddhism, and the comment by a participant about how Islam is a great religion if it stresses humanistic values as exemplified in the Quran and Muhammad examples. I stressed that commonalities are numerous, and it is not human's task to judge other faiths based on his or her religious scripture. The differences in particular aspects of belief is to be judged by God alone because He is the only one who knows best. The task of humankind, of any faith, including of the disbeliever, is to strive in goodness.

I truly enjoyed the discussion, as some in the room said to me that they enjoyed this too.

Indonesia Without Violence and Discrimination: Commemorating The Tragedy of May 1998

2008-05-04T17:51:00.000-07:00

Seminar and Vigil
Toward New Indonesia without Violence and Discrimination
10th Commemoration of May 1998 Humanity Tragedy in Indonesia

When May 1998 Humanity Tragedy occurred,
where were you? Do you remember it?
What have the world and Indonesian government done to bring justice?
Let's prevent such things from happening again in the future
by creating new Indonesia without violence and discrimination.
Come and attend the seminar, vigil, pictures display, and short movie.

Saturday, May 10, 2008 at 06:00 PM
4561 American River Dr.
Sacramento, CA 95864

Speakers:
Dr. Muhamad Ali
(Religious Studies Department, University of California Riverside)
Mutiara Andalas, SJ
(Author of "Kesucian Politik: Agama dan Politik di Tengah Krisis Kemanusiaan")
Rev. Agustinus Tiwa, M.Div.
Mediator:
Rev. Dr. Aart van Beek

AND

Sunday, 5:15 PM
Minggu, 11 Mei 2008
550 W Estudillo AveSan Leandro, CA 94577
(St. Leander Church's Auditorium

Pembicara
Drs. Eddie Lembong (Ketua Yayasan Nation Building/NABIL, Indonesia)
H. Yudhistiranto Sungadi (Konsul Jenderal Republik Indonesia di San Francisco)
Dr. Muhamad Ali (Religious Studies Department, University of California Riverside)
Mutiara Andalas, SJ (Penulis buku "Kesucian Politik: Agama dan Politik di Tengah Krisis Kemanusiaan")

For further information, please contact:
Herning Grissom, bhbmgrissom@yahoo.com, (916) 485 1215
Laura Lumenta, lumentab@yahoo.com, (916) 718 2718
Surya Sitanggang, kutimaikam@yahoo.com, (916) 813 8518
Mutiara Andalas, SJ, mutiaraandalas@yahoo.com, 510 665 4067
Dr. Beni Bevly, benibevly@yahoo.com, 650 255 0383
www.OverseasThinkTankforIndonesia.com – http://www.peacefulindonesia.com/

Host and Co-Host:
Bolaang Mongondow - Sangihe Talaud - Minahasa (BOSAMI), Tony Lolong
Overseas Think Tank for Indonesia (OTTI), Dr. Beni Bevly
Indonesia Media, Arnold Lukito dan Dr. Irawan
Indonesian Chinese American Network (ICANet), Peter Phwan
Chinese Community of San Leandro (CCSL), Hendy Wijaya
Jakarta Butuh Revolusi Budaya (JBRB), Tasa Nugraza Barley, MBA

Bernard Lewis tentang "Studying the Other"

2008-05-02T20:24:00.001-07:00

Ceramah mutakhir Prof. emeritus Bernard Lewis (Princeton University), mungkin bermanfaat bagi yang tertarik isu-isu Orientalisme dan "Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies".

http://www.asmeascholars.org/ASMEAConferenceHighlights/tabid/820/Default.aspx

Beberapa komentar singkat dari ceramah singkatnya itu,

1). Orang Arab/Islam/Turki tidak tertarik dengan peradaban lain, berbeda dengan para Orientalist Eropa. Sepanjang sejarahnya, bangsa Arab (Turki termasuk) tidak melakukan kajian-kajian luar Peradaban (kecuali penerjamahan filsafat Greek yang kemudian sangat membantu transmisi), dan juga tidak tertarik belajar tentang bahasa dan peradaban yang mereka kuasai (Afrika, Eropa, Asia).

2). Bahasa Arab berkembang semata-mata sebagai bahasa klasikal dan skriptural, seperti halnya Hebrew dan Aramaic, bukan sebagai 'bahasa modern", sehingga perkembangannya terbatas, tidak melampaui sebagai bahasa klasik dan skriptural, dan tidak mempengaruhi ilmu pengetahuan modern.

3). Menurut Lewis, ada beberapa hambatan terhadap perkembangan Studi Timur Tengah antara lain: a. postmodernism b. political correctness dan imposed orthodoxies, sehingga kajian Islam yang obyektif tidak berkembang c. multiculturalism

4). Lewis kembali melakukan kritik balik terhadap "Orientalism" ala Edward Said sebagai semata-mata bermotifkan imperialist. Menurut Lewis,Orientalism justru berperan dalam preservasi pengetahuan bangsa lain, penerjemahan, editing, publishing, dan sebagainya. Ada macam-macam Orientalism: philological, theological (classical Orientalism: ada manfaat dan keterbatasan), polemical (mempertahankan Kristen atas ancaman Islam), indisciplinary approaches (historican, political scientist, etc).

5) Lewis melihat adanya kecenderungan clash of disciplines (historical, political science, theology, etc), padahal mestinya menurut dia harus ada mutual recognition atau (menurut saya "rich fertilization").

6). Namun demikian, saya kira, Lewis masih melihat dikotomi Arab/Islam/Turki Usmani dan Erope/Barat sebagai berbeda secara diametral. Sejarah menunjukan kondisi diametral itu. Ada "karakter" historis bangsa Arab yang menyebabkan perkembangan kajian di dunia Arab tidak maju, berbeda dengan bangsa Eropa dan sekarang AS.

7). Lewis kurang/tidak mengakui kompleksitas dunia Islam di masa modern, dan masih melihatnya sebagai identik dengan the Arab world; Lewis tidak menyentuh perkembangan di luar the Middle East, seperti Asia (termasuk Asia Tenggara). Banyak pengkaji dari Asia Tenggara mulai memberikan perhatian terhadap Middle East, Eropa, dan Amerika, sehingga interaksi peradaban makin berkembang, dan dikotomi Timur-Barat mengalami pengaburan yang cukup berarti dalam tradisi ilmiyah.

8). Pendapat Lewis ini "melengkapi" pendapat postmodernist seperti Edward Said, seperti kita tahu. Ada semacam self-reflection dalam ceramah Lewis mengenai Orientalism dan kritik terhadap pembacaan post-modernist seperti Said yang melihat Orientalism semata-mata berkonotasi dominasi. Namun, tesis inti Lewis masih tetap: antagonisme bangsa dan peradaban Arab (yang identik dengan Islam) dan bangsa/peradaban Eropa (identik dengan Judeo-Christianity)

Tentang "Ekonomi Islam"

2008-05-01T19:43:00.000-07:00

Saya mendukung usaha intelektual untuk membangun "ekonomi Syariah", termasuk obligasi syariah, perbankan syariah, dan sebagainya, namun banyak hal yang masih perlu diteliti secara objektif dan lebih meyakinkan.

1. Ayat-ayat yang digunakan sebagai referensi sering kali ditafsirkan di luar konteks keagamaan dan moral yang menjadi maksud dari ayat-ayat tersebut; Ayat-ayat yang memuat istilah qardh, dharaba, dan sebagainya, yang sudah mengalami transformasi pemaknaan dari murni sekuler di zaman sebelum dan pada masa Qur'an kepada pemaknaan spiritual dan religius ditarik kembali kepada makna asalnya yang sekuler itu. Maksud saya, istilah-istilah perdagangan dan ekonomi yang memang menjadi ciri penting kehidupan sosial ekonomi periode Mekah tercerminkan dalam Al-Quran dan mengalami proses religiusasi term. Misalnya, dari sekedar qardh menjadi qardh hasan: hutang piutang "Kebaikan", yang sebelumnya sekedar hutang piutang saja.

Sementara itu, hadis-hadis Nabi yang lebih spesifik digunakan sebagai pendukung praktek ekonomi tertentu yang konteksnya bisa jadi sangat berbeda dengan zaman modern.

Menariknya, para ulama fiqh klasik dan abad pertengahan memang luar biasa dalam melakukan istinbath hukum dari ayat dan hadis, dan mungkin cocok untuk periode mereka namun kaum cendekiawan kita di zaman modern ini masih secara literal memahami produk fiqih itu dengan mengambilnya seolah-olah masih relevan untuk konteks zaman modern.

2. Label syariah untuk ekonomi, perbankan, obligasi, dan sebagainya (sehingga jadi "ekonomi syariah", obligasi syariah, dan seterusnya) agak problematik karena ternyata basis keilmuannya tetap saja ilmu dan teori ekonomi modern. Syariah masuk karena dimensi normatifnya dan ditambah ayat dan hadis, sementara basis keilmuan dan metodologi yah tetap "Barat". Kelemahan pelabelan syariah terhadap sistem yang sudah terlanjur "barat" mengandaikan seolah-olah penafsiran dan praktek perbankan yang berbeda sebagai "non-Syariah" dan karena itu syubhat atau bahkan haram. Saya belum bisa memahami upaya membedakan mana yang Islami dan mana yang konvensional. Dalam prakteknya, gagasan pembedaan "tanpa bunga" dan "profit sharing" ternyata tidak terlalu berbeda, yaitu mencari keuntungan melalui pemberian dan penerimaan manfaat sesuai dengan resiko dan usaha yang diambil masing-masing pihak.

3. Masalah riba sebagai "interest" atau bunga bank juga adalah reduksi makna riba yang lebih luas, saya kira. Yaitu ekploitasi. Riba dalam ayat-ayat tidak secara langsung dan jelas berarti "bunga". Tapi kebanyakan "pakar ekonomi Islam" selalu menyamakan riba dan bunga. Bukankah ada interpretasi lain untuk riba?

Ini dulu. intinya, problem saya terhadap gagasan dan praktek ekonomi syariah adalah klaim "Islam" terhadap sesuatu yang bersifat duniawi sehingga seolah-olah yang lain dan berbeda menjadi tidak Islami.

Labelisasi terhadap Islam

2008-05-01T19:40:00.000-07:00

Labelisasi dan kategorisasi itu memang ada kelemahan dan kelebihannya. Allah saja juga suka buat label kok di Al-Qur'an (mu'min, kafir, munafiq, fasiq, ahlu kitab, musyrik, dan sebagainya; Nabi Muhammad juga begitu dalam Sunnah-nya ("Muslim adalah orang yang siapapun disekitarnya selamat dari lisan dan tangannya).

Perkembangan bahasa membuat labelisasi baru muncul: istilah moderat, liberal, progresif, dan sebagainya. Bagi mereka yang punya ideologi bahwa Islam adalah satu dan harusnya satu cenderung tidak suka label karena "akan memecah belah umat". Kenyataannya, orang Islam memang macam-macam, sejarahnya, ajaran-ajarannya, prakteknya, penampilannya, dan sebagainya. Mereka yang suka Islam warna warni, menganggap labelisasi memang tidak bisa terhindarkan. Karena kemajemukan adalah positif. Sebagaian lagi melakukan pembatasan label hanya pada label-label Al-Quran di atas, gak mau label-label yang berbahasa asing (Inggris misalnya). Lucunya label-label Al-Quran itu digunakan mereka juga kepada kelompok lain: misalnya, yang merasa "beriman" suka beri label ke orang lain "kafir", "musyrik"; Jadi tugas Allah tergantikan oleh manusia-manusia. Begitu juga label "bid'ah" oleh penganut Wahhabi, dan seterusnya.

Label jenis lain adalah label organisasi, seperti orang NU, orang Muhammadiyah, orang PKS, orang Persis, dan sebagainya. Ini biasanya dianggap lebih "obyektif" ketimbang label "fundamentalis" , "liberal", "moderat", dan sebagainya karena semata-mata istilah Inggris. Tapi toh semuanya yah label juga.

Kategorisasi adalah hal yang natural dalam sejarah sosial umat manusia. Yang penting, adalah sejauh mana label itu dipergunakan secara bertanggung jawab, bukan sebagai tuduhan ideologis tanpa pengkajian. Kebetulan saya sudah nulis soal kategorisasi ini dalam sebuah jurnal internasional di Paris (Moussons, 2007). Judulnya "Categorizing Muslims in Postcolonial Indonesia). Intinya, kategorisasi memang kerjaan manusia, tapi oke-oke saja asal jelas maksudnya. Seperti kata Claude Levi-Strauss: Words are instruments that people are free to adapt to any use, provided they make clear their intentions."

Labelisasi dan kategorisasi juga perlu untuk menyederhanakan realitas sosial yang kompleks. Dengan label, maka ada proses penyederhanaan sehingga komunikasi menjadi efektif antara berbagai kelompok manusia yang berbeda.

Label dan kategori juga tidak fixed, tidak tetap, bisa berubah dan kontekstual. Seperti contoh Santri, Abangan dan Priyayi oleh Geertz itu, kan juga dipakai oleh orang kita juga sejak abad ke-19 di Jawa, tapi harus dipahami bahwa santri, abangan itu berubah, dan tidak selalu jelas batas-batasnya. Ada santri yang suka selamatan dan ziarah kubur minta doa kiyai; ada abangan yang taat solat puasa dan haji.

2008-04-22T20:09:00.000-07:00

Tentang Ahmadiyah, secara pribadi saya tidak sependapat dengan sedikit saja doktrin mereka, tapi saya tidak akan pernah melarang mereka apalagi memaksa mereka untuk berkeyakinan seperti saya. Menurut pemahaman Al-Quran dan Sunnah yang saya pelajari, dan syahadat yang saya ikuti, tidak ada larangan bakal ada reformis kah, Nabi kah, rasul kah, dan sebagainya setelah Nabi Muhammad.Toh Ahmadiyah masih mengikuti Quran dan Sunnah. Mereka juga masih mengikuti mazhab fiqh Sunni. Definisi nabi yang kita pahami adalah konstruksi ulama; begitu juga definisi "wahyu". Pemahaman tentang wahyu, Nabi, bisa berbeda-beda, dan saya menghormati perbedaan penafsiran itu.

Alasan "meresahkan" yang dialamatkan Ahmadiyah sama sekali tidak benar. Itu fitnah luar biasa terhadap mereka. Saya kenal ketuanya, saya kenal banyak anggota Ahmadiyah di Indonesia, di London, dan di beberapa kota lain. Meresahkan itu kan definisi menurut siapa? Ahmadiyah, sudah ada sejak tahun 1920an. Sejarah Ahmadiyah itu luar biasa. Mereka ikut berpartisipasi dalam dakwah Islam. Banyak orang luar Islam tertarik dengan Islam karena Ahmadiyah yang memiliki jaringan yang cukup baik di mana-mana. Menurut kalangan garis keras itu loh, yang sukanya ngamuk, yang suka main Allahu Akbar, yang suka rusak-rusakan, yang suka desak-desak dan maksa pemerintah untuk ini dan untuk itu. Alasan 'meresahkan' itu baru muncul sekarang, dan itu dilakukan kelompok-kelompok yang suka mendesak ini dan itu.

Keyakinan keagamaan itu tidak bisa dipaksakan. Nabi sendiri tidak bisa meminta pamannya untuk "beriman", tapi bukankah pamannya yang justru membela Nabi? Dalam Al-Quran sendiri jelas sekali diberikan kebebasan beriman dan tidak beriman, dan kalo beriman, juga diberikan kemungkinan beda caranya.

Alasan lain kelompok pemusnah Ahmadiyah adalah begini: "Kita akan toleran kalo Ahmadiyah tidak bawa-bawa nama Islam, bikin agama baru saja." Ini pandangan yang sungguh rancu dan parah. Masak mereka mau memaksa suatu kelompok harus keluar dari Islam? Masak mereka mau mengambil hak Allah untuk menentukan siapa Islam dan siapa tidak Islam? Kalo ada perbedaan mengapa tidak diserahkan saja kepada Allah nanti? Bukankah ayat bicara soal ini jelas sekali?

Yang paling penting adalah fastabiqul khairat.... Berlomba-lomba dalam kebaikan, dalam membawa kedamaian, kesejahteraan, bebas dari kemiskinan, kebodohan, keterbelakangan, ketidakadilan, kekerasan. Fastabitul khairat, bukan dengan cara ganjal- sana ganjal sini, bunuh sana bunuh sini. Masak ada ustaz ceramah "bunuh Ahmadiyah!" Ustaz apa an seperti ini?

Terakhir, Indonesia itu negeri yang dari dulu sudah majemuk. Banyak orang/kelompok yang berpartisipasi: mulai dari penganut animis, Budha, Hindu, Islam (dari berbagai jenis), Kristen, Konghucu dan sebagainya. Eh tau-tau ada saja yang mau menjadikan Indonesia seperti Pakistan, atau Saudi Arabia; yang maksa mau menjadikan syariat Islam agama negara, yang maksa Islam jadi agama formal dalam perda, dalam hukum, dan seterusnya? Syariat Islam yang mana? Syariat Islam yang dianut kelompok tertentu tidak berarti akan cocok untuk kelompok-kelompok Islam lainnya.

Dalam pemahaman saya, Islam itu rahmat bagi siapa saja; bagi mereka yang percaya dan tidak percaya. Bagi yang sama dan bagi yang berbeda. Disitulah keindahan Islam. Itulah kenapa saya merasakan nikmatnya berIslam.

Berita
Survei PSIK: Mayoritas Akui Keberadaan Ahmadiyahhttp://www.kompas. com/index. php/read/ xml/2008/ 04/22/15200662/ survei.psik. mayoritas. akui.keberadaan. ahmadiyah
Selasa, 22 April 2008 15:20 WIB
JAKARTA, SELASA - Sebuah survei yang dilakukan Pusat Studi Islam dan Kewarganegaraan (PSIK) Paramadina menunjukan bahwa mayoritas warga menyatakan Ahmadiyah berhak untuk hidup di Indonesia dengan damai. Hasil survei tersebut disampaikan Ketua PSIK Yudi Latif saat diskusi "Perlindungan Hak-Hak Konstitusional Warga Negara" di Indofood Tower, Plaza Senayan, Jakarta, Selasa (22/4).
Survei tersebut dilakukan melalui pembagian dan pengisian kuesioner dalam kurun waktu 9 April 2007 hingga 8 Agustus 2007 lalu yang dilakukan pada 18 kota antara lain Jakarta, Jambi, Banjarmasin, Aceh, Gorontalo, Ambon, Ternate, Samarinda, Palangkaraya, Pontianak, Bogor, Surabaya, dan Makasar.
Total responden yang disurvei 296 orang dengan komposisi laki-laki 183 orang dan perempuan 113 orang. Rentang usia responden berkisar 17 tahun hingga 74 tahun. Pekerjaannya beragam, mulai dari mahasiswa (144 orang), dosen (68 orang), pegawai negeri sipil (35 orang), pekerja sosial (7 orang), peneliti (6 orang), guru (4 orang), pendakwah (3 orang), pengamat, pengarang dan pelajar (masing-masing 2 orang), serta pensiunan pegawai negeri sipil, seniman, rohaniwan, wartawan, dan ibu rumah tangga (masing-masing 1 orang).
Dari satu pertanyaan yang diajukan yakni 'apakah penganut Jamaah Ahmdiyah atau Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI) berhak hidup di Indonesia dengan damai?', sebanyak 24 persen mengatakan tidak berhak, dan 13 persen mengatakan tidak tahu. Mayoritasnya yakni sebanyak 63 persen mengatakan bahwa Ahmadiyah atau IJABI berhak hidup damai di Indonesia.
Negara lakukan pembiaran
Sebelumnya, Yudi Latif mengkritik sikap negara dalam menangani Ahmadiyah, berkait dengan tindakan dan tuntutan sejumlah lembaga dan komunitas lain yang untuk membubarkan Ahmadiyah. Menurut Yudi, komunitas agama harus memahami seberapa jauh otoritas keagamaan bisa masuk dalam urusan kenegaraan. Jangan meminta negara cepat-cepat ikut campur dalam persoalan komunitas.
"Boleh saja komunitas berpandangan berbeda, misalnya MUI menyatakan Ahmadiyah sebagai aliran sesat, dan Ahmadiyah merasa benar, namun tidak berhak meminta pembubaran yang lain, jika tidak ada pelanggaran konstitusi dan hukum yang dilakukan," ujar Yudi.
Senada dengan Yudi, Ray Rangkuti mengatakan, Bakorpakem yang menggunakan pendekatan destruktif dalam menilai keyakinan masyarakat tidak bisa dibiarkan. Pasalnya, dalam demokrasi yang dikembangkan saat ini, hanya pengadilanlah yang berhak membubarkan suatu lembaga dan paham tertentu."Pengadilan yang berhak pun bukan pengadilan umum, tetapi Mahkamah Konstitusi. Dan dalam konstitusi, pembubaran organisasi itu dikaitkan dengan paham marxisme," ujarnya.

Ahmadiyah

2008-04-21T16:35:00.000-07:00

Mainstream Islam and Ahmadiyah in Indonesia
The Jakarta Post , Jakarta Wed, 09/14/2005 11:57 AM Opinion
Muhamad Ali, Manoa, Hawaii
Tolerance is not always easy for many Muslims because they tend to reinforce differences and boundaries, rather than commonalities.
They have tended to set theological boundaries according to their interpretation of religious texts to maintain their claim of ultimate truth. Muslim groups, as other religious and non-religious peoples, have long disregarded historical and sociological (thus contextual) understanding of the belief systems, including Ahmadiyyah.
The Ahmadiyyah was founded in British India, not in a historical vacuum. As other millenarian movements, the Ahmadiyyah emerged out of social problems facing the Indian Muslim community at that time. They wanted to reform the Muslim community and to attract others by promoting compatibility of religion and modernity, entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency.
Historically in Indonesia, the early leaders of Muhammadiyah (established in 1912) and of the Ahmadiyyah (which arrived in Indonesia in the early 1920s) in Java used to coexist and even were about to collaborate in the educational and social fields, but then came the rupture and hostility between the two since the late 1920s onwards.
As Herman Beck argued in his scholarly article Rupture between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyyah, the initial cordial relationship and mutual tolerance soon shifted into the rupture and disagreement, which was then reinforced by the 1984 national fatwa by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), which stated that the teachings of Ahmadiyyah were deviant.
As Herman Beck suggested, the Muhammadiyah in particular and the Lahore Branch of the Ahmadiyyah initially had cordial relations.
Even after the 1929 rupture, the Muhammadiyah adopted a rather tolerant attitude toward the Lahore branch of the Ahmadiyyah.
The Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyyah felt they shared some similarities: Both wanted to prove that Islam could be compatible with modernity; both introduced modern concepts of education; both shared the defensive comprehension of jihad, and both wanted to check Christian missionary activities at that time. The son of K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of the Muhammadiyah, even became an Ahmadi, while Ahmad Dahlan himself did not demonstrate an aggressive attitude towards Christians. It was only later that Muhammadiyah leaders started having stricter attitudes against the Ahmadiyyah.
Long established in Indonesia, the Ahmadiyyah remains marginal in the country as it is elsewhere in the world. Scholars try to explain why this has been the case. One of the factors was the cooperative attitude of both the Lahore and the Qadiyan Ahmadiyyah towards the Dutch colonial government.
The politics of non-cooperation with the colonial government that the Islamic parties such as Partai Sarekat Islam pursued did not accord with the Ahmadiyyah's policy not to get involved in politics, as Herman Berk argued. Thus, they tended to be quietist and therefore exclusive from the perspective of the others (such as their refusal to perform prayers behind a non-Ahmadi imam, their inter-marriage, and their social and economic activities).
As a result of the exclusive tendency of the Ahmadis, mainstream Muslims have tended to ignore the positive sides of the Ahmadiyyah as a movement: That the Ahmadiyyah helped to develop Islam in the Western world because they wanted to combine Islam, reason and modernity and that their activities are carried out peacefully.
Based on the previous fatwas, the Muhammadiyah (and the Nahdlatul Ulama), Ministry of Religion, the MUI and some other Islamic organizations have expressed an intention to marginalize and outlaw Ahmadiyyah in Indonesia. This shows the Muhammadiyah and these institutions do not believe in freedom of religion as signified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They hold that there should be limits to tolerance, limits which they and only they decide. Here they tend to become ""aggressive"" towards religious organizations, which they regard as deviant, heretical or heterodox.
The fact that Muhammadiyah (and others) have shown antipathy of Ahmadiyyah, also shows their lack of interest in resuming theological dialogs on such matters as the notion of prophethood and Messiah, of the Jesus Christ, of the Koranic interpretation and of the concept of jihad. For them, that there is no prophet (and even a reformer) after the Prophet Muhammad should be believed without any qualifications whatsoever and it is thus final.
More importantly is a serious legal-political matter: Whether or not the government has the authority to ban a religious denomination regarded by a majority to be deviant. The government actually does not have a constitutional basis to intervene into theological disputes. If non-governmental organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and others have to put pressure on the government to ban the Ahmadiyyah in Indonesia, then this would become a pretext for other organizations to put similar pressure against a religious denomination they regard as wrong or deviant.
It is a test of tolerance in Indonesia. The basic principle of tolerance is this: If you do not want to be harmed by others, do not harm them. If you deserve to ban others, then you deserve to be banned as well on a similar basis.
The government (the Ministry of Religion, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Home Affairs) should consider equally the perspective from all parties, rather than listening only to the predominant voices and neglecting what the minority have to say about the issues. If social order and public stability are the criteria in which a decision will be made, many variables and a holistic view should be taken into consideration.
For example, is it true that an organization harms society? If, for example, it is true that in a time and in a particular place one organization has incited hatred or harmed the neighborhood, this cannot be generalized in the organization's behavior in other times and places.
The government needs to make it clear that there are fundamental differences between theological interpretations and public disorder. The government should not just demonstrate objectivity and neutrality. The primary task of the government is to ensure respect and tolerance, rather than to take sides and further incite hostility among groups within civil society.
Therefore, the best possible and rational solution in the matter of the Indonesian Ahmadiyyah Movement is to pursue more serious and genuine dialogs between different religious organizations, facilitated by the government if necessary.
The various religious groups should resume sincere discussions and talks on different theological and ethical matters so that it becomes clear what the similarities and differences are. Theological disputes should be discussed in a theological, rather than political, manner. Tolerance is crucial from mainstream Islam and the government if we are to make Indonesia a better place for diversity and peace.

Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer

2008-04-17T01:25:00.000-07:00

I have planned to write a journal article on Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer's thought of secularism. He visited UCR for a week; I had productive meetings and chats with him. More later.

Teaching about Islam in America

2008-04-04T22:43:00.000-07:00

I have been in the first week now teaching Islam in Southeast Asia and Reading the Qur'an, both being upper-division undergraduate courses with few graduate students, each having about 30 students enrolled. I love education and I find it my world. I designed the syllaby in ways that are hope to be effective and interesting. I asked the students in the first meeting to look at the syllabus and to give them a sense of what to expect. One among other things I emphasized was this course using an academic approach to Islam, as opposed to a normative/theological approach to it; Students are encouraged to ask any questions or make comments that they may have during the lectures and discussions. There are no stupid questions, nor foolish comments. I would appreciate their participations in a variety of ways. Teaching about Islam, rather than teaching Islam, or indoctrinations about certain views or religious belief. The goal is comprehension, and the method is critical.

The first day I had some questions about why I am interested in religion. I explain that religion is complex and not monolithic and it can be viewed and analyzed from various perspectives. These complexity and multiplicity would make religion a never ending subject of inquiry. Religious studies, and Islamic studies included, would develop in ways that are unexpected because of new findings. And so on...

I had some students identifying them as "Muslim", even though I didn't ask any to say about their religion in our introduction. One of them say she was not affiliated with particular religion, but is interested to know religion as a personal and spiritual phenomenon. The students vary in terms of their majors (math, bio, poli science, anthro, religious studies, psychology, business). They talk about their reasons why they are interested in the course.

To be continued...

Hermenetika, Al-Qur'an, dan LGBT

2008-03-10T11:34:00.000-07:00

Kita tahu hermenetika (hermeneutics) tidak statis, dan mengalami perkembangan dan perbedaan internal antara para pemikirnya sendiri. Yang sedang saya kembangkan adalah dialektika dan dialog antara tradisi hermenetika di Barat (Jerman, Perancis, AS) dan tradisi penafsiran dalam Islam yang juga cukup kaya – meskipun tampak stagnan belakangan ini. Ada kecenderungan untuk menekankan salah satunya, karena keterbatasan pendidikan dan bacaan yang wajar, tapi masa depan kesarjanaan terletak pada keterampilan menggabungkan berbagai tradisi intelektual, sebisa mungkin. Paparan Anda terkesan mengutip secara"arbitrary" para pemikir, sekaligus menafikan tradisi-tradisi pemikiran tafsir dan tawil dalam Islam, khususnya ketika melihat teks seperti Al-Quran. Di pihak lain, ada banyak sarjana Islam yang menolak mentah-mentah hermenetika semata-mata karena itu Barat, asing, dan tidak berasal dari tradisi Islam. Saya kira masa depan kajian-kajian ilmu sosial dan kemanusiaan terletak pada bagaimana meramu berbagai tradisi intelektual dimanapun munculnya, terlepas dari seperti apa produk-produk yang akan dihasilkannya nanti.

Betul, hermenetika kontemporer digunakan untuk menganalisis ekspresi linguistik dan non-linguistik, meliputi ayat-ayat qualiyah dan kauniyah. Kita tahu ini. Dan sekarang Hermenetika, khususnya setelah Dilthey, Heidegger dan Gadamer, bukan hanya mengenai komunikasi simbolik, tapi mencakup kehidupan dan eksistensi manusia yang lebih fundamental, sehingga teks tertulis hanyalah bagian (part) dari keseluruhan kemanusiaan (the whole). Ada proses universalisasi hermenetika, dari terbatas membahas teks (teks filsafat dan Bible) kepada teks apa saja. Perkembangan ini harus disadari dulu. Memahami hermenetikanya hermenetika penting, seperti pentingnya memahami hermenetika itu sendiri, dan seperti pentingnya memahami ushul al-tafsir, ushul al-tawil, ushul fiqh, ushul al-din, dan seterusnya.Untuk poin hermenetika teks ini, saya tidak mampu melihat Al-Quran melampaui dirinya sebagai teks yang berbahasa dan berbudaya tertentu. Membaca Islam tidak bisa tanpa membaca Al-Quran sebagai teks linguistik. Membaca "semangat Muhammad" tidak bisa tanpa membaca Al-Qur'an, selain sirah dan hadith (terlepas problematika internal). Yang tersisa untuk kita yang hidup zaman sekarang adalah yah teks-teks itu. Dan kita harus terjun didalamnya, apapun pendekatan yang kita gunakan.

Ini bukan untuk menolak hermenetika dalam arti luas, tapi membatasi hermenetika teks (baik tertulis maupun terkatakan) untuk alasan sederhana. Isu yang saya fokuskan adalah apakah Al-Quran bicara mengenai homosexualitas. Kalo isunya adalah hubungan antara filsafat etika dan homesexualitas maka saya akan menggunakan hermenetika dalam arti luas. Juga bukan hubungan antara Tuhan dan homoseksualitas, karena Tuhan dibahas dalam semua agama, sehingga saya harus memasukkan semua teks-teks agama. Artinya, yang sedang kita "engage" adalah teks yang sudah terlanjur terkatakan dan tertulis dan menjadi kitab historis. Mustahil saya membaca Al-Qur'an tanpa bersikap adil terhadapnya sebagai teks tertulis atau terbaca (bukankah Al-Quran itu sendiri artinya Yang Dibaca). Saya tidak bisa menyamakan Al-Qur'an sebagai fenemona non-lingustik semata-mata, bukan karena Al-Quran diyakini sebagai firman Tuhan, tapi karena Al-Qur'an sebagai korpus yang menggunakan bahasa tertentu, Arab. Artinya, diskusi apapun tentang Al-Quran harus melihatnya sebagai teks dalam bahasa Arab yang memiliki grammar dan ciri-cirinya, baik sebagaidirinya maupun sebagai produk interaksi dengan bahasa-bahasa lain.

Karena itulah saya berpendapat tentang keterbatasan teks. Karena teks ada dalam bahasa tertentu, ada dalam konteks sosio-kultural tertentu. Dia tidak bisa ditarik-tarik semau pengguna di semua zaman, dia harus dipahami dalam konteks, terlepas dari motivasi dan tujuan-tujuan pembacanya. Teks dan konteks selalu berinteraksi. Disini pula lah selalu ada ketegangan antara tradisi dan akal, antara Al-Quran sebagai milik komunal dan pengalaman pribadi manusia sepanjang masa, antara tradisionalis dan liberal, dan seterusnya.

Namun keterbatasan teks dinamis, dan dimensi "terbatas" tidaklah terbatas, karena pembacaan terhadap dimensi, dan lingkup keterbatasan,tergantung individu, atau lebih tepatnya, agency: saya, Anda, atau siapapun. Adalah agency yang membuat apa yang tetap (thabit) dan yang berubah (mutahawwil) bisa tetap dan bisa berubah. Di sini faktor agency menjadi penting, sebagai dirinya sendiri, yang berinteraksi dengan teks dan konteks. Jadi ada teks, konteks, dan agency. Namun,sekali lagi, sebagai pembaca, saya selalu melihat ada ketegangan-ketegangan antara teks tertulis (internal contradiction) dan kontradiksi eksternal (antara teks dan kenyataan), dan untuk lebih luas lagi, antara berbagai agency. Baik ayat-ayat yang dibaca dan yang diamati/dialami memiliki keterbatasannya. Horison itu tak terbatas tapi juga terbatas. Horison saya melihat sebuah persoalan bisa kemana-mana, tak terbatas, tapi tetap terbatas. Pembacaan saya, Anda, dan siapa saja, adalah terbatas, meskipun keterbatasan tidak terbatas. Salah satu sebabnya adalah karena dunia itu berisi element-element/partikular-partikular yang majemuk (Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds). Dunia tidak mungkin bisa dilihat oleh manusia sebagai keseluruhan (baik waktu dan cakupan). Penemuan-penemuan ilmiyah tentu saja mengarah pada standardisasi dan homogenisasi dunia. Dalam isu homoseksualitas, kontroversi ilmiyah masih terjadi mengenai"keilmiyahannya". Singkatnya, sebagaimana teks qauliyah terbatas, teks qauniyah juga terbatas.

Terlepas dari keterbatasan-keterbatasan itu, ada manfaatnya mencari rekonsiliasi-rekonsiliasi. Salah satu diskusi dalam hermenetika modern adalah hubungan antara bagian dan keseluruhan.Al-Qur'an sering dilihat sebagai satu paket kitab (sekitar 6236 ayat) sehingga ia bisa dibaca secara keseluruhan, baik berdasarkan sistematika Al-Quran (tahlili) maupun berdasarkan tema tertentu(maudhui), untuk menutupi kelemahan masing-masing. Untuk melihat isu homoseksualitas, pendekatan kronologis/historis dan tematik perlu digunakan. Misalnya, kemungkinan untuk "mensahkan" LGBT sebagai juga`Qurani" bisa dilakukan aktor (yang menyadari agency-nya) untuk menafsirkan konsep "khairat" (apa yang dianggap baik dalam suatumasyarakat). Tafsir ini masih memerlukan ijtihad yang lebih serius. Ijtihad harus terus mendialogkan teks Al-Quran dan ayat dalam artiluas (sign, signifier). Saya kira Islam peduli semua jenis tanda, tapi tidaklah mungkin menggunakan ayat-ayat kauniyah sambil sama sekali mengabaikan pembacaan terhadap ayat-ayat qauliyah.

Aspek lain yang bisa kita dikembangkan adalah penekanan sebagian hermenetika pada karakter alegoris, ketimbang tafsir literal terhadap teks. Nah pada level alegoris inilah kemungkinan tawil terhadap ayat-ayat yang berbicara sifat-sifat manusia dan hubungan jender bisa dilakukan. Aspek lain lagi yang perlu dikembangkan adalah intertekstualitas.Bagaimana teks-teks lain yang sebelum dan sezaman Al-Quran muncul dan bagaimana teks-teks itu bicara soal homoseksualitas dan seterusnya.

Terakhir, soal berpikir sebagai sarjana dan berpihak sebagai aktifis. Membaca dan berpihak memang sering dibedakan, tapi bisa juga dikombinasikan, meskipun tetap selalu ada ketegangan-ketegangan. Adanya kesadaran akan latarbelakang epistimologis seorang aktifis dalam melihat persoalan sudahlah cukup untuk menunjukkan kombinasi ini. Kedua pendekatan "public intellectual" atau "engaged intellectual" dan "pure academic" yang berusaha menjaga jarak (distantiation) dengan obyek kajiannya sama-sama memiliki kelebihan dan kelemahan, tergantung dari mana melihat. Membaca dan menulis adalah salah satu bentuk aksi empati, karena ia bisa dalam banyak bentuk. Disatu sisi, memposisikan diri sebagai akademisi bisa berarti mengambil jarak (distancing) sehingga kemungkinan empati dan kebersetujuan bisa lebih mungkin. Untuk topik LGBT, secara pribadi saya belum melihat pembacaan komprehensif dan meyakinkan secara akademik terhadap teks-teks agama. Tentu saja saya berpihak kepada mereka dalam segala upaya sadar mereka untuk berpikir, berbicara, dan aktif. Aktifisme kalangan LGBT sebagai "minoritas seksual" saya pahami dan saya dukung.Tapi saya masih ingin mengikuti dan membaca pembacaan LGBT terhadap Al-Quran dan kitab-kitab agama-agama lain secara lebih baik (sound interpretation). Untuk isu-isu lain, seperti kesetaraan jender, pluralisme agama, demokrasi dan civil society, saya punya lebih banyak sumber. Untuk LGBT saya masih perlu waktu dan perlu banyak orang seperti Farid yang saya kenal sejak lama dan kawan-kawan lain untuk terus berijtihad. Di Amerika dan di Inggris ada beberapa kelompok LGBT yang saya baca, tapi mereka masih belum meyakinkan dalam hal rekonsiliasi teks dan konteks, rekonsiliasi antara ayat-ayat qauliyah dan ayat-ayat kauniyah, dan dialog antara berbagai tradisi intelektual.

Kajian Islam Indonesia

2008-03-10T11:29:00.000-07:00

Penting melihat perkembangan (atau kemunduran?) studi Islam di Indonesia, dan bagaimana arahnya kedepan. Cak Nur almarhum pernah menulis Islam Indonesia harus bergerak dari pinggiran ke pusat. Cak Nur melihat keunikan dan kompleksitas ciri-ciri Islam Indonesia: Islam dan budaya lokal, Islam dan Sufisme, dan Kebangkitan Islam. Ia berkesimpulan, seperti Hodgson dalam The Venture of Islam-nya, bahwa Islam Indonesia sama sejatinya dengan Islam di dunia lain; ini untuk menolak anggapan bahwa Islam Indonesia inferior dan marjinal dibanding Islam Arab. Supervisor saya di Edinburgh, yang juga supervisor Kak Edy di Columbia, William Roff, melihat Islam Indonesia sebagai industri pengetahun (knowledge industry) yang memiliki masa depan cerah. Roff membagi pendekatan kajian Islam menjadi tekstualis dan kontekstualis - apa yang seharusnya disatu sisi dan praktek budaya di sisi lain, dan sependapat dengan Salvatore dalam Islam and Political Discourse of Modernity yangmembuka hubungan dialektis antara wacana Orientalisme dan wacana otentisitas. Ia berharap banyak kepada lulusan IAIN yang menggabungkan berbagai tradisi pemikiran yang ia sebutkan itu. Saya melihat kesarjanaan Islam di Indonesia masih terus mencari bentuknya, dan saya kira perkembangannya sangat ditentukan oleh semua yang tertarik dan serius mengembangkannya. Pertama, selama ini, kajian-kajian lulusan Timur Tengah masih terfokus pada kajian teks dan kajian normatif. Kajian normatif tekstualis seperti ini sangat penting dalam hal pengembangan Islam sebagai agama anutan mayoritas umat Islam Indonesia. Transmisi ilmu dari Saudi, dari Mesir, Pakistan, cukup mendominasi. Melalui Pakistan, format kajian Islam di Indonesia menjadi lebih pada kajian-kajian negara Islam dan ekonomi Islam. Melalui Saudi, kajian-kajian Islam pada ushuluddin. Sementara Mesir, lebih beragam: tafsir, filsafat, dan seterusnya. Transmisi dari Timur Tengah dan Asia Selatan ini memiliki dampak pada pendekatan dan obyek kajian dan arah kajian Islam di Indonesia khususnya di lembaga-lembaga pendidikan berorientasi da'wa. Posisi IAIN menurut saya lebih unik, karena transmisinya tidak terbatas berasal dari negeri-negeri ini, tapi juga Iran, Afrika (Sudan), Leiden, dan negeri-negeri Barat, plus dari lulusan pasca sarjana IAIN/UIN sendiri. Dengan kata lain, kajianIslam di IAIN/UIN di tingkat S-1 cenderung lebih terbuka dan eklektik, dan salah satu resikonya cenderung generalis. Secara singkat bisa dikatakan, ciri kajian Islam di IAIN/UIN berada pada konteks yang lebih multi-kultural. Untuk topik ini, kolega saya Michael Feener baru menulis artikel tentang sejarah intelektualisme Islam dalam konteks multi-kultural. Saya sependapat dengan Feener, bahwa kajian Islam Indonesia lebih multikultural dibandingkan dengan kajian-kajian Islam di beberapa negara Arab sendiri. Kedua, dari sisi metodologi, kajian Islam di Indonesia, meskipun multikultural diatas, masih jauh dari kedalaman. Artinya, karena prosesnya masih transisional dan masih mencari jati diri keilmuan, sebagian sarjana Muslim Indonesia terlalu "excited", gembira, dengan teori-teori dan metode-metode baru yang muncul, tapi melupakan fokus, dan tidak melanjutkannya untuk penguatan. Misalnya, banyak mahasiswa/sarjana yang tertarik dengan metode sejarah dan hermenetik Arkoun, atau Abu Zaid, atau Hanafi, dan seterusnya, namun basis bahasa dan keseriusan masih kurang optimal. Saya melihat faktor bahasa masih menjadi penghambat. Arab, Inggris, Perancis, Jerman sudah mulai digemari, tapi masih terbatas orang-orangnya, karena kendala praktis dan kendala kesibukan dan tanggung jawab sosial. Kajian antropologi Islam (misalnya pendekatan Islam sebagai discursive tradition Talal Asad) mulai diminati. Sejarah Islam juga melihat banyak aspek sejarah lokal Muslim Indonesia. Kajian perbandingan agama juga cukup menjanjikan: tulisan-tulisan mengenai hubungan antar agama dan seterusnya. Kajian-kajian yang empiris cukup diminati kalangan mahasiswa dan para dosennya. Yang menarik di UIN sekarang adalah penamaan jurusan dengan Ushuluddin dan Filsafat dimaksudkan untuk terjadinya dialog antara agama dan filsafat (Timur, barat), Dakwah dan Komunikasi juga demikian, Tarbiiyya dan Pendidikan, Syariah dan Hukum; Adab dan Sastra, dan seterusnya. Revisi ini semua secara simbolik komitmen untuk senantiasa berdialog antara tradisi keilmuan Islam Arab dan tradisi keilmuan Barat. Saya kira, secara metodologis, UIN mengarah pada sintesis keilmuan yang kreatif, merangkul otentisitas dan modernitas sekaligus, memeluk tradisi dan perkembangan ilmu pengetahuan. Ketiga, dari segi produk, seperti jurnal ilmiyah, dalam 5 tahun terakhir, ada perkembangan yang cukup pesat. Hampir setiap jurusan, jika tidak fakultas di UIN Jakarta, dan UIN-UIN lain, ada jurnal ilmiyah. Kajian-kajiannya juga cukup beragam, dan cukup menjanjikan. Tapi sekali lagi, sumber-sumber teoritis dan metodologis masih kurang. Buku-buku terjemahan memang bermanfaat, tapi sumber-sumber teoritis dan metodologis dari buku-buku terjemahan menyisakan persoalan kredibilitas dan kurangnya kepercayaan diri. Jurnal-jurnal ilmiyah yang ada juga dalam beberapa bahasa Indonesia, Inggris, dan Arab. Jurnal-jurnal ilmiyah yang ada tentu saja melalui proses seleksi (meskipun sebagian besarnya peer-review; untuk Studi Islamika silahkan para editor menanggapi). Dari segi kuantitas cukup menjanjikan; tapi dari segi kualitas, potensi pengembangan kreatif semakin besar. Saya kira pasca-sarjana UIN adalah pusat kajian Islam yang paling strategis. Keempat, saya kira penting membandingkan kajian Islam di Indonesia dan kajian Islam di Barat (khususnya di AS dan di Inggris), meskipun memiliki dinamikanya sendiri, bisa dijadikan kerangka menilai kajian Islam Indonesia. Secara singkat begini. Kajian Islam di Indonesia ternyata lebih multikultural dibandingkan dengan kajian Islam di AS. Maksud saya, banyak sarjana Islam di AS mengabaikan wacana kajian Islam di dunia Islam, baik di Arab, maupun di wilayah lain seperti Asia Tenggara. Banyak sarjana Islam Indonesia lebih fasih mengikuti perkembangan keilmuan di Arab dan di Barat, ketimbang sebaliknya. Di jurusan Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies di Edinburgh misalnya, sarjana Arabicist dan Islamicist cukup banyak merujuk kitab-kitab klasik untuk kajian-kajian tekstual. Sarjana ulum al-Qur'an di sana merujuk banyak kitab-kitab ulum -AlQur'an dan tafsir. Ahli sejarah Islam seperti Carole Hillenbrand merujuk kitab-kitab Arab abad pertengahan, seperti karyanya the Crusadesfrom an Islamic Perspective. Richard Bell and muridnya Montgomery Watt menulis karya-karyanya yang komprehensif berdasarkan kitab-kitab Arab. Karyanya tentang Al-Ghazali, dan teologi Islam misalnya bersumberkan karya-karya Arab. Tapi sarjana-sarjana yunior masih kurang apresiasi terhadap karya-karya luar. Pertama, karya-karya sarjana Islamis dan Arabis kontemporer memang kurang merespons dan kurang berdialog dengan karya-karya kontemporer di dunia Arab. Di AS, setidaknya pada Konferensi American Academy of Religion beberapa waktu lalu, kajian Islam di Asia Tenggara, kurang mendapatkan tempat dibandingkan dengan kajian-kajian Islam kontemporer di Amerika yang lebih terfokus pada topik-topik ras, jender, demokrasi, selain Rumi, Ghazali, Ibn Arabi, Shafii, dan sebagainya. Metodologinya cukup beragam, namun Islam Asia Tenggara, yang penganutnya terbesar di dunia, masih dianggap marginal, karena berbagai faktor (bahasa, budaya, geografi, dst). Di sisi lain kajian Islam di Arabkurang membaca kajian-kajian Islam Barat dan apalagi Indonesia. Dalam percakapan kami tentang studi Islam di AS, ada usulan bahwa karya-karya Islam di Barat diterjemahkan kedalam bahasa Arab, sehingga bisa diakses intelektual Arab sana. Sarjana-sarjana Islam di dunia Arab seharusnya juga mengakses karya-karya Islam di Barat dengan cara memperkuat bahasa Inggris, Perancis, atau Jerman mereka. Jadi, problem kurangnya dialog antar "peradaban" harus terjadi di semua bagian: di Barat dan di Timur pula. Tentu saja kita tahu kategori Timur-Barat ini semata-mata demografik, meskipun ada pula perbedaan2nya. Azyumardi Azra pernah mengingatkan saya untuk terus mengembangkan studi komparatif Timur Tengah dan Asia Tenggara karena memang sangat langka saat ini, baik di TimTeng maupun di Asteng. Di Indonesia saja, meskipun sudah ada ketertarikan, pakar yang memiliki keterampilan komparatif itu dapat dihitung dengan jari.Kedepan, arah kajian Islam di Indonesia khususnya dan dimanapun, harus lebih cross-cultural, cross-continental, cross-linguistic, dan bahkan cross-generational. Yang terakhir ini, cross-generational, juga masih langka, dalam arti debat dan dialog dengan generasi-generasi klasik, pertengahan, dan baru. Mereka yang fokus pada topik-topik kontemporer (Antropologi, political science, sociology, misalnya), tentu saja merasa tidak perlu atau sulit mengakses karya-karya klasik dan pertengahan di dunia Arab, selain bahwa bidang-bidang ini tidak berkembang di dunia Arab. Topik kajian dan periode kajian juga menentukan metodologi apa yang paling pas digunakan, namun dialog metodologis saya kira hal yang penting dan strategis sehingga ilmu pengetahuan bisa lebih "universal", bukan cuma milik dan untuk kampus-kampus atau negeri-negeri tertentu saja.

Most Muslims Condemn Terrorism, Seek Religious Democracy

2008-02-27T14:11:00.000-08:00

http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i5ajtNJ0qTTRMBSFpYngMOjrmDbQ
27 Feb 2008
Major survey challenges Western perceptions of Islam

WASHINGTON (AFP) — A huge survey of the world's Muslims releasedTuesday challenges Western notions that equate Islam with radicalismand violence.
The survey, conducted by the Gallup polling agency over six years andthree continents, seeks to dispel the belief held by some in the Westthat Islam itself is the driving force of radicalism.
It shows that the overwhelming majority of Muslims condemned theattacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 and othersubsequent terrorist attacks, the authors of the study said in Washington.
"Samuel Harris said in the Washington Times (in 2004): 'It is time weadmitted that we are not at war with terrorism. We are at war withIslam'," Dalia Mogahed, co-author of the book "Who Speaks for Islam"which grew out of the study, told a news conference here.
"The argument Mr Harris makes is that religion in the primary driver"of radicalism and violence, she said.
"Religion is an important part of life for the overwhelming majorityof Muslims, and if it were indeed the driver for radicalisation, thiswould be a serious issue."
But the study, which Gallup says surveyed a sample equivalent to 90percent of the world's Muslims, showed that widespread religiosity"does not translate into widespread support for terrorism," saidMogahed, director of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies.
About 93 percent of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims are moderates andonly seven percent are politically radical, according to the poll,based on more than 50,000 interviews.
In majority Muslim countries, overwhelming majorities said religionwas a very important part of their lives -- 99 percent in Indonesia,98 percent in Egypt, 95 percent in Pakistan.
But only seven percent of the billion Muslims surveyed -- the radicals-- condoned the attacks on the United States in 2001, the poll showed.
Moderate Muslims interviewed for the poll condemned the 9/11 attackson New York and Washington because innocent lives were lost andcivilians killed.
"Some actually cited religious justifications for why they wereagainst 9/11, going as far as to quote from the Koran -- for example,the verse that says taking one innocent life is like killing allhumanity," she said.
Meanwhile, radical Muslims gave political, not religious, reasons forcondoning the attacks, the poll showed.
The survey shows radicals to be neither more religious than theirmoderate counterparts, nor products of abject poverty or refugee camps.
"The radicals are better educated, have better jobs, and are morehopeful with regard to the future than mainstream Muslims," JohnEsposito, who co-authored "Who Speaks for Islam", said.
"Ironically, they believe in democracy even more than many of themainstream moderates do, but they're more cynical about whetherthey'll ever get it," said Esposito, a professor of Islamic studies atGeorgetown University in Washington.
Gallup launched the study following 9/11, after which US PresidentGeorge W. Bush asked in a speech, which is quoted in the book: "Why dothey hate us?"
"They hate... a democratically elected government," Bush offered as areason.
"They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom ofspeech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other."
But the poll, which gives ordinary Muslims a voice in the globaldebate that they have been drawn into by 9/11, showed that mostMuslims -- including radicals -- admire the West for its democracy,freedoms and technological prowess.
What they do not want is to have Western ways forced on them, it said.
"Muslims want self-determination, but not an American-imposed and-defined democracy. They don't want secularism or theocracy. What themajority wants is democracy with religious values," said Esposito.
The poll has given voice to Islam's silent majority, said Mogahed.
"A billion Muslims should be the ones that we look to, to understandwhat they believe, rather than a vocal minority," she told AFP.
Muslims in 40 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle Eastwere interviewed for the survey, which is part of Gallup's World Pollthat aims to interview 95 percent of the world's population.

Media Source Individual

2008-02-20T15:37:00.001-08:00

http://www.mediasources.ucr.edu/cgi-bin/display.cgi?id=223

Civil and Religious Law in England

2008-02-19T16:39:00.000-08:00

Civil and Religious Law in England: a Religious Perspective

The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams gave the foundation lecture at the Royal Courts of Justice on February 7, 2008.

The title of this series of lectures signals the existence of what is very widely felt to be a growing challenge in our society – that is, the presence of communities which, while no less 'law-abiding' than the rest of the population, relate to something other than the British legal system alone. But, as I hope to suggest, the issues that arise around what level of public or legal recognition, if any, might be allowed to the legal provisions of a religious group, are not peculiar to Islam: we might recall that, while the law of the Church of England is the law of the land, its daily operation is in the hands of authorities to whom considerable independence is granted. And beyond the specific issues that arise in relation to the practicalities of recognition or delegation, there are large questions in the background about what we understand by and expect from the law, questions that are more sharply focused than ever in a largely secular social environment. I shall therefore be concentrating on certain issues around Islamic law to begin with, in order to open up some of these wider matters.

Among the manifold anxieties that haunt the discussion of the place of Muslims in British society, one of the strongest, reinforced from time to time by the sensational reporting of opinion polls, is that Muslim communities in this country seek the freedom to live under sharia law. And what most people think they know of sharia is that it is repressive towards women and wedded to archaic and brutal physical punishments; just a few days ago, it was reported that a 'forced marriage' involving a young woman with learning difficulties had been 'sanctioned under sharia law' – the kind of story that, in its assumption that we all 'really' know what is involved in the practice of sharia, powerfully reinforces the image of – at best – a pre-modern system in which human rights have no role. The problem is freely admitted by Muslim scholars. 'In the West', writes Tariq Ramadan in his groundbreaking Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 'the idea of Sharia calls up all the darkest images of Islam...It has reached the extent that many Muslim intellectuals do not dare even to refer to the concept for fear of frightening people or arousing suspicion of all their work by the mere mention of the word' (p.31). Even when some of the more dramatic fears are set aside, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about what degree of accommodation the law of the land can and should give to minority communities with their own strongly entrenched legal and moral codes. As such, this is not only an issue about Islam but about other faith groups, including Orthodox Judaism; and indeed it spills over into some of the questions which have surfaced sharply in the last twelve months about the right of religious believers in general to opt out of certain legal provisions – as in the problems around Roman Catholic adoption agencies which emerged in relation to the Sexual Orientation Regulations last spring.

This lecture will not attempt a detailed discussion of the nature of sharia, which would be far beyond my competence; my aim is only, as I have said, to tease out some of the broader issues around the rights of religious groups within a secular state, with a few thought about what might be entailed in crafting a just and constructive relationship between Islamic law and the statutory law of the United Kingdom. But it is important to begin by dispelling one or two myths about sharia; so far from being a monolithic system of detailed enactments, sharia designates primarily – to quote Ramadan again – 'the expression of the universal principles of Islam [and] the framework and the thinking that makes for their actualization in human history' (32). Universal principles: as any Muslim commentator will insist, what is in view is the eternal and absolute will of God for the universe and for its human inhabitants in particular; but also something that has to be 'actualized', not a ready-made system. If shar' designates the essence of the revealed Law, sharia is the practice of actualizing and applying it; while certain elements of the sharia are specified fairly exactly in the Qur'an and Sunna and in the hadith recognised as authoritative in this respect, there is no single code that can be identified as 'the' sharia. And when certain states impose what they refer to as sharia or when certain Muslim activists demand its recognition alongside secular jurisdictions, they are usually referring not to a universal and fixed code established once for all but to some particular concretisation of it at the hands of a tradition of jurists. In the hands of contemporary legal traditionalists, this means simply that the application of sharia must be governed by the judgements of representatives of the classical schools of legal interpretation. But there are a good many voices arguing for an extension of the liberty of ijtihad – basically reasoning from first principles rather than simply the collation of traditional judgements (see for example Louis Gardet, 'Un prealable aux questions soulevees par les droits de l'homme: l'actualisation de la Loi religieuse musulmane aujourd'hui', Islamochristiana 9, 1983, 1-12, and Abdullah Saeed, 'Trends in Contemporary Islam: a Preliminary Attempt at a Classification', The Muslim World, 97:3, 2007, 395-404, esp. 401-2).

Thus, in contrast to what is sometimes assumed, we do not simply have a standoff between two rival legal systems when we discuss Islamic and British law. On the one hand, sharia depends for its legitimacy not on any human decision, not on votes or preferences, but on the conviction that it represents the mind of God; on the other, it is to some extent unfinished business so far as codified and precise provisions are concerned. To recognise sharia is to recognise a method of jurisprudence governed by revealed texts rather than a single system. In a discussion based on a paper from Mona Siddiqui at a conference last year at Al Akhawayn University in Morocco, the point was made by one or two Muslim scholars that an excessively narrow understanding sharia as simply codified rules can have the effect of actually undermining the universal claims of the Qur'an.

But while such universal claims are not open for renegotiation, they also assume the voluntary consent or submission of the believer, the free decision to be and to continue a member of the ummaSharia is not, in that sense, intrinsically to do with any demand for Muslim dominance over non-Muslims. Both historically and in the contemporary context, Muslim states have acknowledged that membership of the umma is not coterminous with membership in a particular political society: in modern times, the clearest articulation of this was in the foundation of the Pakistani state under Jinnah; but other examples (Morocco, Jordan) could be cited of societies where there is a concept of citizenship that is not identical with belonging to the umma. Such societies, while not compromising or weakening the possibility of unqualified belief in the authority and universality of sharia, or even the privileged status of Islam in a nation, recognise that there can be no guarantee that the state is religiously homogeneous and that the relationships in which the individual stands and which define him or her are not exclusively with other Muslims. There has therefore to be some concept of common good that is not prescribed solely in terms of revealed Law, however provisional or imperfect such a situation is thought to be. And this implies in turn that the Muslim, even in a predominantly Muslim state, has something of a dual identity, as citizen and as believer within the community of the faithful.
It is true that this account would be hotly contested by some committed Islamic primitivists, by followers of Sayyid Qutb and similar polemicists; but it is fair to say that the great body of serious jurists in the Islamic world would recognise this degree of political plurality as consistent with Muslim integrity. In this sense, while (as I have said) we are not talking about two rival systems on the same level, there is some community of understanding between Islamic social thinking and the categories we might turn to in the non-Muslim world for the understanding of law in the most general context. There is a recognition that our social identities are not constituted by one exclusive set of relations or mode of belonging – even if one of those sets is regarded as relating to the most fundamental and non-negotiable level of reality, as established by a 'covenant' between the divine and the human (as in Jewish and Christian thinking; once again, we are not talking about an exclusively Muslim problem). The danger arises not only when there is an assumption on the religious side that membership of the community (belonging to the umma or the Church or whatever) is the only significant category, so that participation in other kinds of socio-political arrangement is a kind of betrayal. It also occurs when secular government assumes a monopoly in terms of defining public and political identity. There is a position – not at all unfamiliar in contemporary discussion – which says that to be a citizen is essentially and simply to be under the rule of the uniform law of a sovereign state, in such a way that any other relations, commitments or protocols of behaviour belong exclusively to the realm of the private and of individual choice. As I have maintained in several other contexts, this is a very unsatisfactory account of political reality in modern societies; but it is also a problematic basis for thinking of the legal category of citizenship and the nature of human interdependence. Maleiha Malik, following Alasdair MacIntyre, argues in an essay on 'Faith and the State of Jurisprudence' (Faith in Law: Essays in Legal Theory, ed. Peter Oliver, Sionaidh Douglas Scott and Victor Tadros, 2000, pp.129-49) that there is a risk of assuming that 'mainstreram' jurisprudence should routinely and unquestioningly bypass the variety of ways in which actions are as a matter of fact understood by agents in the light of the diverse sorts of communal belonging they are involved in. If that is the assumption, 'the appropriate temporal unit for analysis tends to be the basic action. Instead of concentrating on the history of the individual or the origins of the social practice which provides the context within which the act is performed, conduct tends to be studied as an isolated and one-off act' (139-40). And another essay in the same collection, Anthony Bradney's 'Faced by Faith' (89-105) offers some examples of legal rulings which have disregarded the account offered by religious believers of the motives for their own decisions, on the grounds that the court alone is competent to assess the coherence or even sincerity of their claims. And when courts attempt to do this on the grounds of what is 'generally acceptable' behaviour in a society, they are open, Bradney claims (102-3) to the accusation of undermining the principle of liberal pluralism by denying someone the right to speak in their own voice. The distinguished ecclesiastical lawyer, Chancellor Mark Hill, has also underlined in a number of recent papers the degree of confusion that has bedevilled recent essays in adjudicating disputes with a religious element, stressing the need for better definition of the kind of protection for religious conscience that the law intends (see particularly his essay with Russell Sandberg, 'Is Nothing Sacred? Clashing Symbols in a Secular World', Public Law 3, 2007, pp.488-506).

I have argued recently in a discussion of the moral background to legislation about incitement to religious hatred that any crime involving religious offence has to be thought about in terms of its tendency to create or reinforce a position in which a religious person or group could be gravely disadvantaged in regard to access to speaking in public in their own right: offence needs to be connected to issues of power and status, so that a powerful individual or group making derogatory or defamatory statements about a disadvantaged minority might be thought to be increasing that disadvantage. The point I am making here is similar. If the law of the land takes no account of what might be for certain agents a proper rationale for behaviour – for protest against certain unforeseen professional requirements, for instance, which would compromise religious discipline or belief – it fails in a significant way to communicate with someone involved in the legal process (or indeed to receive their communication), and so, on at least one kind of legal theory (expounded recently, for example, by R.A. Duff), fails in one of its purposes.
The implications are twofold. There is a plain procedural question – and neither Bradney nor Malik goes much beyond this – about how existing courts function and what weight is properly give to the issues we have been discussing. But there is a larger theoretical and practical issue about what it is to live under more than one jurisdiction., which takes us back to the question we began with – the role of sharia (or indeed Orthodox Jewish practice) in relation to the routine jurisdiction of the British courts. In general, when there is a robust affirmation that the law of the land should protect individuals on the grounds of their corporate religious identity and secure their freedom to fulfil religious duties, a number of queries are regularly raised. I want to look at three such difficulties briefly. They relate both to the question of whether there should be a higher level of attention to religious identity and communal rights in the practice of the law, and to the larger issue I mentioned of something like a delegation of certain legal functions to the religious courts of a community; and this latter question, it should be remembered, is relevant not only to Islamic law but also to areas of Orthodox Jewish practice.

The first objection to a higher level of public legal regard being paid to communal identity is that it leaves legal process (including ordinary disciplinary process within organisations) at the mercy of what might be called vexatious appeals to religious scruple. A recent example might be the reported refusal of a Muslim woman employed by Marks and Spencer to handle a book of Bible stories. Or we might think of the rather more serious cluster of questions around forced marriages, where again it is crucial to distinguish between cultural and strictly religious dimensions. While Bradney rightly cautions against the simple dismissal of alleged scruple by judicial authorities who have made no attempt to understand its workings in the construction of people's social identities, it should be clear also that any recognition of the need for such sensitivity must also have a recognised means of deciding the relative seriousness of conscience-related claims, a way of distinguishing purely cultural habits from seriously-rooted matters of faith and discipline, and distinguishing uninformed prejudice from religious prescription. There needs to be access to recognised authority acting for a religious group: there is already, of course, an Islamic Shari'a Council, much in demand for rulings on marital questions in the UK; and if we were to see more latitude given in law to rights and scruples rooted in religious identity, we should need a much enhanced and quite sophisticated version of such a body, with increased resource and a high degree of community recognition, so that 'vexatious' claims could be summarily dealt with. The secular lawyer needs to know where the potential conflict is real, legally and religiously serious, and where it is grounded in either nuisance or ignorance. There can be no blank cheques given to unexamined scruples.

The second issue, a very serious one, is that recognition of 'supplementary jurisdiction' in some areas, especially family law, could have the effect of reinforcing in minority communities some of the most repressive or retrograde elements in them, with particularly serious consequences for the role and liberties of women. The 'forced marriage' question is the one most often referred to here, and it is at the moment undoubtedly a very serious and scandalous one; but precisely because it has to do with custom and culture rather than directly binding enactments by religious authority, I shall refer to another issue. It is argued that the provision for the inheritance of widows under a strict application of sharia has the effect of disadvantaging them in what the majority community might regard as unacceptable ways. A legal (in fact Qur'anic) provision which in its time served very clearly to secure a widow's position at a time when this was practically unknown in the culture becomes, if taken absolutely literally, a generator of relative insecurity in a new context (see, for example, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights. Tradition and Politics, 1999, p.111). The problem here is that recognising the authority of a communal religious court to decide finally and authoritatively about such a question would in effect not merely allow an additional layer of legal routes for resolving conflicts and ordering behaviour but would actually deprive members of the minority community of rights and liberties that they were entitled to enjoy as citizens; and while a legal system might properly admit structures or protocols that embody the diversity of moral reasoning in a plural society by allowing scope for a minority group to administer its affairs according to its own convictions, it can hardly admit or 'license' protocols that effectively take away the rights it acknowledges as generally valid.

To put the question like that is already to see where an answer might lie, though it is not an answer that will remove the possibility of some conflict. If any kind of plural jurisdiction is recognised, it would presumably have to be under the rubric that no 'supplementary' jurisdiction could have the power to deny access to the rights granted to other citizens or to punish its members for claiming those rights. This is in effect to mirror what a minority might themselves be requesting – that the situation should not arise where membership of one group restricted the freedom to live also as a member of an overlapping group, that (in this case) citizenship in a secular society should not necessitate the abandoning of religious discipline, any more than religious discipline should deprive one of access to liberties secured by the law of the land, to the common benefits of secular citizenship – or, better, to recognise that citizenship itself is a complex phenomenon not bound up with any one level of communal belonging but involving them all.

But this does not guarantee an absence of conflict. In the particular case we have mentioned, the inheritance rights of widows, it is already true that some Islamic societies have themselves proved flexible (Malaysia is a case in point). But let us take a more neuralgic matter still: what about the historic Islamic prohibition against apostasy, and the draconian penalties entailed? In a society where freedom of religion is secured by law, it is obviously impossible for any group to claim that conversion to another faith is simply disallowed or to claim the right to inflict punishment on a convert. We touch here on one of the most sensitive areas not only in thinking about legal practice but also in interfaith relations. A significant number of contemporary Islamic jurists and scholars would say that the Qur'anic pronouncements on apostasy which have been regarded as the ground for extreme penalties reflect a situation in which abandoning Islam was equivalent to adopting an active stance of violent hostility to the community, so that extreme penalties could be compared to provisions in other jurisdictions for punishing spies or traitors in wartime; but that this cannot be regarded as bearing on the conditions now existing in the world. Of course such a reading is wholly unacceptable to 'primitivists' in Islam, for whom this would be an example of a rationalising strategy, a style of interpretation (ijtihad) uncontrolled by proper traditional norms. But, to use again the terminology suggested a moment ago, as soon as it is granted that – even in a dominantly Islamic society – citizens have more than one set of defining relationships under the law of the state, it becomes hard to justify enactments that take it for granted that the only mode of contact between these sets of relationships is open enmity; in which case, the appropriateness of extreme penalties for conversion is not obvious even within a fairly strict Muslim frame of reference. Conversely, where the dominant legal culture is non-Islamic, but there is a level of serious recognition of the corporate reality and rights of the umma, there can be no assumption that outside the umma the goal of any other jurisdiction is its destruction. Once again, there has to be a recognition that difference of conviction is not automatically a lethal threat.

As I have said, this is a delicate and complex matter involving what is mostly a fairly muted but nonetheless real debate among Muslim scholars in various contexts. I mention it partly because of its gravity as an issue in interfaith relations and in discussions of human rights and the treatment of minorities, partly to illustrate how the recognition of what I have been calling membership in different but overlapping sets of social relationship (what others have called 'multiple affiliations') can provide a framework for thinking about these neuralgic questions of the status of women and converts. Recognising a supplementary jurisdiction cannot mean recognising a liberty to exert a sort of local monopoly in some areas. The Jewish legal theorist Ayelet Shachar, in a highly original and significant monograph on Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights (2001), explores the risks of any model that ends up 'franchising' a non-state jurisdiction so as to reinforce its most problematic features and further disadvantage its weakest members: 'we must be alert', she writes, 'to the potentially injurious effects of well-meaning external protections upon different categories of group members here – effects which may unwittingly exacerbate preexisting internal power hierarchies' (113). She argues that if we are serious in trying to move away from a model that treats one jurisdiction as having a monopoly of socially defining roles and relations, we do not solve any problems by a purely uncritical endorsement of a communal legal structure which can only be avoided by deciding to leave the community altogether. We need, according to Shachar, to 'work to overcome the ultimatum of "either your culture or your rights"' (114).

So the second objection to an increased legal recognition of communal religious identities can be met if we are prepared to think about the basic ground rules that might organise the relationship between jurisdictions, making sure that we do not collude with unexamined systems that have oppressive effect or allow shared public liberties to be decisively taken away by a supplementary jurisdiction. Once again, there are no blank cheques. I shall return to some of the details of Shachar's positive proposal; but I want to move on to the third objection, which grows precisely out of the complexities of clarifying the relations between jurisdictions. Is it not both theoretically and practically mistaken to qualify our commitment to legal monopoly? So much of our thinking in the modern world, dominated by European assumptions about universal rights, rests, surely, on the basis that the law is the law; that everyone stands before the public tribunal on exactly equal terms, so that recognition of corporate identities or, more seriously, of supplementary jurisdictions is simply incoherent if we want to preserve the great political and social advances of Western legality.

There is a bit of a risk here in the way we sometimes talk about the universal vision of post-Enlightenment politics. The great protest of the Enlightenment was against authority that appealed only to tradition and refused to justify itself by other criteria – by open reasoned argument or by standards of successful provision of goods and liberties for the greatest number. Its claim to override traditional forms of governance and custom by looking towards a universal tribunal was entirely intelligible against the background of despotism and uncritical inherited privilege which prevailed in so much of early modern Europe. The most positive aspect of this moment in our cultural history was its focus on equal levels of accountability for all and equal levels of access for all to legal process. In this respect, it was in fact largely the foregrounding and confirming of what was already encoded in longstanding legal tradition, Roman and mediaeval, which had consistently affirmed the universality and primacy of law (even over the person of the monarch). But this set of considerations alone is not adequate to deal with the realities of complex societies: it is not enough to say that citizenship as an abstract form of equal access and equal accountability is either the basis or the entirety of social identity and personal motivation. Where this has been enforced, it has proved a weak vehicle for the life of a society and has often brought violent injustice in its wake (think of the various attempts to reduce citizenship to rational equality in the France of the 1790's or the China of the 1970's). Societies that are in fact ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse are societies in which identity is formed, as we have noted by different modes and contexts of belonging, 'multiple affiliation'. The danger is in acting as if the authority that managed the abstract level of equal citizenship represented a sovereign order which then allowed other levels to exist. But if the reality of society is plural – as many political theorists have pointed out – this is a damagingly inadequate account of common life, in which certain kinds of affiliation are marginalised or privatised to the extent that what is produced is a ghettoised pattern of social life, in which particular sorts of interest and of reasoning are tolerated as private matters but never granted legitimacy in public as part of a continuing debate about shared goods and priorities.

But this means that we have to think a little harder about the role and rule of law in a plural society of overlapping identities. Perhaps it helps to see the universalist vision of law as guaranteeing equal accountability and access primarily in a negative rather than a positive sense – that is, to see it as a mechanism whereby any human participant in a society is protected against the loss of certain elementary liberties of self-determination and guaranteed the freedom to demand reasons for any actions on the part of others for actions and policies that infringe self-determination. This is a slightly more gentle or tactful way of expressing what some legal theorists will describe as the 'monopoly of legitimate violence' by the law of a state, the absolute restriction of powers of forcible restraint to those who administer statutory law. This is not to reduce society itself primarily to an uneasy alliance of self-determining individuals arguing about the degree to which their freedom is limited by one another and needing forcible restraint in a war of all against all – though that is increasingly the model which a narrowly rights-based culture fosters, producing a manically litigious atmosphere and a conviction of the inadequacy of customary ethical restraints and traditions – of what was once called 'civility'. The picture will not be unfamiliar, and there is a modern legal culture which loves to have it so. But the point of defining legal universalism as a negative thing is that it allows us to assume, as I think we should, that the important springs of moral vision in a society will be in those areas which a systematic abstract universalism regards as 'private' – in religion above all, but also in custom and habit. The role of 'secular' law is not the dissolution of these things in the name of universalism but the monitoring of such affiliations to prevent the creation of mutually isolated communities in which human liberties are seen in incompatible ways and individual persons are subjected to restraints or injustices for which there is no public redress.

The rule of law is thus not the enshrining of priority for the universal/abstract dimension of social existence but the establishing of a space accessible to everyone in which it is possible to affirm and defend a commitment to human dignity as such, independent of membership in any specific human community or tradition, so that when specific communities or traditions are in danger of claiming finality for their own boundaries of practice and understanding, they are reminded that they have to come to terms with the actuality of human diversity - and that the only way of doing this is to acknowledge the category of 'human dignity as such' – a non-negotiable assumption that each agent (with his or her historical and social affiliations) could be expected to have a voice in the shaping of some common project for the well-being and order of a human group. It is not to claim that specific community understandings are 'superseded' by this universal principle, rather to claim that they all need to be undergirded by it. The rule of law is – and this may sound rather counterintuitive – a way of honouring what in the human constitution is not captured by any one form of corporate belonging or any particular history, even though the human constitution never exists without those other determinations. Our need, as Raymond Plant has well expressed it, is for the construction of 'a moral framework which could expand outside the boundaries of particular narratives while, at the same time, respecting the narratives as the cultural contexts in which the language [of common dignity and mutually intelligible commitments to work for certain common moral priorities] is learned and taught' (Politics, Theology and History, 2001, pp.357-8).

I'd add in passing that this is arguably a place where more reflection is needed about the theology of law; if my analysis is right, the sort of foundation I have sketched for a universal principle of legal right requires both a certain valuation of the human as such and a conviction that the human subject is always endowed with some degree of freedom over against any and every actual system of human social life; both of these things are historically rooted in Christian theology, even when they have acquired a life of their own in isolation from that theology. It never does any harm to be reminded that without certain themes consistently and strongly emphasised by the 'Abrahamic' faiths, themes to do with the unconditional possibility for every human subject to live in conscious relation with God and in free and constructive collaboration with others, there is no guarantee that a 'universalist' account of human dignity would ever have seemed plausible or even emerged with clarity. Slave societies and assumptions about innate racial superiority are as widespread a feature as any in human history (and they have persistently infected even Abrahamic communities, which is perhaps why the Enlightenment was a necessary wake-up call to religion...).

But to return to our main theme: I have been arguing that a defence of an unqualified secular legal monopoly in terms of the need for a universalist doctrine of human right or dignity is to misunderstand the circumstances in which that doctrine emerged, and that the essential liberating (and religiously informed) vision it represents is not imperilled by a loosening of the monopolistic framework. At the moment, as I mentioned at the beginning of this lecture, one of the most frequently noted problems in the law in this area is the reluctance of a dominant rights-based philosophy to acknowledge the liberty of conscientious opting-out from collaboration in procedures or practices that are in tension with the demands of particular religious groups: the assumption, in rather misleading shorthand, that if a right or liberty is granted there is a corresponding duty upon every individual to 'activate' this whenever called upon. Earlier on, I proposed that the criterion for recognising and collaborating with communal religious discipline should be connected with whether a communal jurisdiction actively interfered with liberties guaranteed by the wider society in such a way as definitively to block access to the exercise of those liberties; clearly the refusal of a religious believer to act upon the legal recognition of a right is not, given the plural character of society, a denial to anyone inside or outside the community of access to that right. The point has been granted in respect of medical professionals who may be asked to perform or co-operate in performing abortions – a perfectly reasonable example of the law doing what I earlier defined as its job, securing space for those aspects of human motivation and behaviour that cannot be finally determined by any corporate or social system. It is difficult to see quite why the principle cannot be extended in other areas. But it is undeniable that there is pressure from some quarters to insist that conscientious disagreement should always be overruled by a monopolistic understanding of jurisdiction.
I labour the point because what at first seems to be a somewhat narrow point about how Islamic law and Islamic identity should or might be regarded in our legal system in fact opens up a very wide range of current issues, and requires some general thinking about the character of law. It would be a pity if the immense advances in the recognition of human rights led, because of a misconception about legal universality, to a situation where a person was defined primarily as the possessor of a set of abstract liberties and the law's function was accordingly seen as nothing but the securing of those liberties irrespective of the custom and conscience of those groups which concretely compose a plural modern society. Certainly, no-one is likely to suppose that a scheme allowing for supplementary jurisdiction will be simple, and the history of experiments in this direction amply illustrates the problems. But if one approaches it along the lines sketched by Shachar in the monograph quoted earlier, it might be possible to think in terms of what she calls 'transformative accommodation': a scheme in which individuals retain the liberty to choose the jurisdiction under which they will seek to resolve certain carefully specified matters, so that 'power-holders are forced to compete for the loyalty of their shared constituents' (122). This may include aspects of marital law, the regulation of financial transactions and authorised structures of mediation and conflict resolution – the main areas that have been in question where supplementary jurisdictions have been tried, with native American communities in Canada as well as with religious groups like Islamic minority communities in certain contexts. In such schemes, both jurisdictional stakeholders may need to examine the way they operate; a communal/religious nomos, to borrow Shachar's vocabulary, has to think through the risks of alienating its people by inflexible or over-restrictive applications of traditional law, and a universalist Enlightenment system has to weigh the possible consequences of ghettoising and effectively disenfranchising a minority, at real cost to overall social cohesion and creativity. Hence 'transformative accommodation': both jurisdictional parties may be changed by their encounter over time, and we avoid the sterility of mutually exclusive monopolies.
It is uncomfortably true that this introduces into our thinking about law what some would see as a 'market' element, a competition for loyalty as Shachar admits. But if what we want socially is a pattern of relations in which a plurality of divers and overlapping affiliations work for a common good, and in which groups of serious and profound conviction are not systematically faced with the stark alternatives of cultural loyalty or state loyalty, it seems unavoidable. In other settings, I have spoken about the idea of 'interactive pluralism' as a political desideratum; this seems to be one manifestation of such an ideal, comparable to the arrangements that allow for shared responsibility in education: the best argument for faith schools from the point of view of any aspiration towards social harmony and understanding is that they bring communal loyalties into direct relation with the wider society and inevitably lead to mutual questioning and sometimes mutual influence towards change, without compromising the distinctiveness of the essential elements of those communal loyalties.

In conclusion, it seems that if we are to think intelligently about the relations between Islam and British law, we need a fair amount of 'deconstruction' of crude oppositions and mythologies, whether of the nature of sharia or the nature of the Enlightenment. But as I have hinted, I do not believe this can be done without some thinking also about the very nature of law. It is always easy to take refuge in some form of positivism; and what I have called legal universalism, when divorced from a serious theoretical (and, I would argue, religious) underpinning, can turn into a positivism as sterile as any other variety. If the paradoxical idea which I have sketched is true – that universal law and universal right are a way of recognising what is least fathomable and controllable in the human subject – theology still waits for us around the corner of these debates, however hard our culture may try to keep it out. And, as you can imagine, I am not going to complain about that.

Kontroversi Seputar H.M. Soeharto

2008-01-26T23:45:00.000-08:00

Sekitar 20 tahun, sejak lahir sampai saya menyelesaikan S-1, saya hidup dibawah kepimpinan nasional Pak Harto. Karena waktu kecil dan SD Islam, saya hobby melukis, saya pernah melukis wajah pak Harto (mirip seperti gambar disamping). Seperti juga beberapa tokoh-tokoh pahlawan bangsa lainnya. Saya juga pernah mendapat beasiswa Supersemar waktu S-1 melalui kompetisi. Sebelum krisis ekonomi Asia 1997, saya ingat, mayoritas bangsa Indonesia bangga dengan presidennya, termasuk populernya gelar "bapak pembangunan". Memang naiknya Pak Harto jadi presiden RI, peristiwa G/30/S PKI, Papua, Timur Timur, Aceh, dan bisnis konglomerasinya, KKN, buruknya birokrasi, dan sebagainya, meninggalkan sejarah negeri yang kelam. Waktu mahasiswa S-1, saya termasuk sering mengeritik KKN, golkarisasi kampus, dan kebijakan-kebijakan homogenisasi makna Pancasila lewat P4. Saya ingat waktu di gedung DPR/MPR, sebagai mahasiswa, saya mendambakan lengsernya Pak Harto. Setelah lengsernya tahun 1998, semua orang, termasuk saya, tidak ingin kembali ke era otoritarian Orde Baru itu. Orde Baru menjadi lama, usang, dan momok. Tapi sayangnya, status hukum Pak Harto sengaja atau tak berdaya dibuat mengambang oleh para penerusnya. Status 'mengantung' bisa baik dan buruk buat Pak Harto. Secara hukum positif, karena belum diadili, Pak Harto belum dibuktikan bersalah. Adalah waktu yang membuat status hukum Pak Harto tidak menentu. Lebih-lebih lagi, kondisi tuanya dan sakitnya, membuat banyak orang, termasuk mereka yang sangat kritikal sekalipun, tidak tega untuk tidak memaafkannya, meskipun banyak yang tetap menuntutnya dan tidak memaafkannya, baik atas nama orang lain, atau atas nama keluarga dan kenalan yang mati atau sengsara akibat kebijakan dan perbuatannya sebagai orang nomor satu di RI. Saya pun mengalami kesulitan untuk sepenuh hati memaafkan atau memaklumi situasi bangsa ini yang sebagiannya diciptakan Pak Harto dan kroni-kroninya di masa Orde Baru. Alas, the fall of Soeharto was not a happy ending; his too-long period of ruling was not a success story for most Indonesians. It remains to be seen how objective or subjective history will be in recording and reconstructing Soeharto's life. Lengsernya Pak Harto tidak seperti selesainya masa jabatan Bill Clinton, George Bush, James Carter, dan presiden-presiden AS lain.

Terlepas dari kontroversi itu, dan saya yakin kontroversi itu tidak akan berakhir, dan akan tetap dicatat dalam sejarah bangsa ini, saya ingin menekankan bahwa tidak akan ada Negara Republik Indonesia tanpa keberadaan pemimpinnya, dan secara de facto dan de jure pemimpin itu adalah Pak Harto. Adanya pemimpin lebih baik daripada tidakadanya, apalagi di negeri yang sungguh majemuk dan besar ini.

Sebagai sesama Muslim, saya ingin mengatakan, Innalillahi wainna ilaihi rajiun. Kita milik Allah dan kepada-Nya kita kembali. Saya ingin termasuk bagian bangsa ini yang turut berduka cita atas wafatnya Pak Harto, dan semoga keluarga dan kerabat yang ditinggalkan tabah menghadapinya. Saya tidak ingin menjadi anak negeri yang terus mengalami dilema moral sehingga lupa dan enggan menghargai jasa-jasa baik salah satu pemimpin politiknya.

Selamat jalan, Pak Harto. Dan semoga saya dan kawan-kawan mau belajar dari sejarah hidup Pak Harto yang memang tidak selamanya putih. Keadilan yang sejati mungkin terbukti nanti, bukan di dunia ini. Dan karena Pak Harto sudah tiada di dunia ini, siapapun tidak bisa menggantikan fungsi Tuhan Yang Maha Adil.

Riverside, AS, 27 January 2008/Indonesia, 28 Januari 2008.

Understanding A Complex Reality on Iraq, Muslims, and the West

2008-01-25T11:41:00.000-08:00

Dear readers,

Personally, my views would depend on what Bush and American peoples view on things and act in particular time and place. The issues you mentioned are complex, not simple, and thus should be explained from various perspectives. I like to see things from different sides, rather than only one side. I can see why and how the lobbists and Bush administration have had an economic, political, and religious interest in the Middle East. What I see is that Bush and his advisers' decision to invade Iraq was conditioned by various factors: first by their ignorance of the historical and contemporary realities of Iraqis and the Middle East; second, by their political-economic interest in the region. I don't see that Bush intentionally attempted to mislead Americans about Iraq, but his simple naivite and ignorance about facts became the major factors of the invasion and war and subsequent problems arising from such invasion. It is true that Iraqis had been divisive even before American invasion, but it is also true that American presence has proved to make things worse rather than better than the previous times. It is true that Saddam was an authoritarian leader, killing those who according to him were dangerous for his dominance and security, but it is also true that American troops have killed even more civilians and environment in Iraq, not simply combatants. The Iraqi combatans and the so-called terrorists in Iraq would not exist without the presence of American soldiers. In their diverse views, their struggle were not "terrorism"; theirs was anti-colonial. Bush' war on terror has failed in the large part, because it has created more problems than solved them. Bush's leadership was and is not a succesful in Iraq and the Muslim World at large, because of his strong yet indifferent decision to wage the war when other countries disagreed. Now that the war has started and Saddam has gone, and the Iraqis had been even more divisive and violent, the way out becomes difficult. People find it a dillemma: whether to leave Iraq in this current situation, to stay for a while until the Iraqis are relatively stable, or to stay forever without limit of time. This current dilemma is caused by the very nature of war: no one can predict its consequences. The war in Iraq has been a waste of lives, money, energy, and everything. This is when violent way of solving differences becomes the mindset of military leaders. There should be a non-violent way of solving problems: diplomacy, dialogue, etc. The media like CNN, Fox, al-Jazirah, all try to pursue their interests within "political correctness". We don't have the news about fatalities of Iraqi civilians and destruction of buildings of mosques, temples, churches, synagoues in Iraq at CCN, Fox, etc. Nationalistic chauvinism influences media in one way or another. It is difficult to find a balanced picture of the war and conflict in Iraq. Most Indonesians disapprove the Bush' way in handling Iraq from the start until now, but they know that not all Americans are like Bush and his allies. The so-called anti-Americanism is only strong among some Indonesian fundamentalists, but not the majority of Indonesians; as they love freedom, science and technology, democracy that have developed in the U.S. There are many cooperations and dialogues among Indonesians and Americans, bridging the widening perception gaps.

I often talk American culture and politics in the Middle East. I have been seen sometimes as the Voice of America, but sometimes as the voice of moderation, depending on whom I talk to. The fundamentalists see me and my writings as pro-Western, liberal, etc, because I see and appreciate American ways of life such as democracy, human rights, and especially education and technology. When I talk about Arab-Israeli conflict, many wanted me to defend Palestinian cause, and blame Israel, but I have tried to see the issue as complex and not black and white. Most in Indonesia see the Middle East issue as a religious issue, but I have tried to convince them that it is not simply religious, but political, economic, cultural, etc. Of course not many people are interested to see things as complex; most people tend to think in simple ways, not so much different from what happens when many people in the U.S. see one-sidedly about Islam and Muslims. In Indonesia, leaders such as Gus Dur are still heard among modern, liberal Muslim and non-Muslims in Indonesia, but many people don't listen to him. Within NU, there is diversity too. With regard to Israel, informal relationship between Indonesians and Israelis has been going on, although there is not yet a formal recognition of the state until the birth of the state of Palestine. Indonesian government see the issue as the occupier-occupied issue, although religious sentiment is still strong. I personally believe that coexistence is the realistic solution, despite disagreement within each party. No solution in the Middle East please everyone, but the best solution in my view is a peaceful non-violent solution.

Peace,
M.Ali
January 24, 2008

Leaving 2007, Welcoming 2008

2007-12-31T23:00:00.000-08:00

Approaching 2008, I am busy working on my syllabus design for the next year (Asian Religions, Islam in Southeast Asia, and Reading the Qur'an). I am working on my book proposal to submit to US publishers, a Toyota grant for my dissertation translation and publication in Indonesia, on research proposals for 2008, on my programs as a faculty in residence, for journal articles, on op-ed opinions invited, on interviews, and not least on being a best company for my wife visiting me here in Riverside.

All the best to my future goals and programs for 2008; and all the best to you too the readers,
Glen Mor, December 31, 2007

Ummy (My Mother)

2007-11-23T12:52:00.000-08:00

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vu6Yfq5fOK4&feature=related

I love my mother. I miss her so much. I am nothing without her. I learn so much from her. I love my mother always as she always does. I am very lucky to have her. She's now busy teaching sincerely without expecting any income and is at the same time doing all the household at home, but she keeps praying for me and her children. I should write more about my mother and about how she has influenced my life.
Humbly from your son,
MA

Zaujati (My Wife)

2007-11-23T12:46:00.000-08:00

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUEcOK5yplY

I love my wife so much. She is my other half. Everything becomes always beautiful with her.

RASUL KEREN DARI BETAWI

2007-11-08T19:41:00.000-08:00

TEMPO Edisi. 37/XXXVI/05 - 11 November 2007

Laporan Utama
Rasul Keren dari Betawi

Kehidupan beragama di Indonesia tampaknya tak pernah sepi dari amuk massa. Setelah gerakan Ahmadiyah diserang tahun lalu, kini massa merusak dan membakar sebagian rumah pendiri aliran Al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah. Pengikut Ahmad Mushaddeq yang mengaku sebagai rasul dari Betawi itu kini terus diburu. Majelis Ulama Indonesia menyatakan aliran ini sesat. Benarkah keyakinan bisa dihakimi? Mengapa aliran-aliran baru yang belakangan bermunculan itu justru meraup pengikut dari kalangan muda?

IA tampak letih dan kusut. Satu-satunya yang tak berbeda, dan ini membuat polisi geleng kepala, ia tak pernah berhenti menjelaskan aliran yang diproklamasikannya sejak 2001 itu. ”Ia kelihatan pintar. Kalau ditanya, nyerocos panjang-lebar,” kata Kepala Kesatuan Keamanan Negara Polda Metro Jakarta, AKBP Tornagogo Sihombing.
Dialah Ahmad Mushaddeq alias Abdul Salam, yang mengaku sebagai rasul baru. Ia, bersama enam pengikutnya, memilih mendatangi Markas Kepolisian Daerah Metro Jakarta ketimbang diburu polisi atau digelandang massa. Dua tangannya pun diborgol ke belakang pada Rabu dua pekan lalu.
Sang ”rasul” yang menggegerkan itu akhirnya menyerah ke polisi. Tak tampak lagi penampilannya yang parlente dengan jas dan dasi seperti dalam pertemuan akbar 267 jemaah Al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah di lantai 11 Graha BIP, Jalan Gatot Subroto, Jakarta Selatan, sepekan sebelumnya.
Inilah drama mutakhir Al-Qiyadah setelah dinyatakan sebagai aliran sesat oleh Majelis Ulama Indonesia. Tiga pengikutnya di Bantul, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, digropyok massa pada September lalu. Sebulan berikutnya, giliran jemaah di Padang digerebek warga.
Nasib Mushaddeq, 63 tahun, ini mirip yang dialami Lia Aminudin, pendiri Salamullah atau Komunitas Eden. Persis pula dengan nasib Yusman Roy, yang ditangkap setelah menggagas salat dalam dua bahasa—Arab dan Indonesia—melalui jemaah Ngaji Lelaku di Malang, Jawa Timur. Rumah Lia diobrak-abrik massa. Ia harus mendekam di penjara satu setengah tahun.
Sedangkan Yusman Roy, bekas petinju itu, juga dihukum penjara dua tahun, Agustus lalu. Namun ia tak terbukti melakukan ”penodaan agama” sebagaimana dakwaan primer jaksa. Tapi ia tetap saja divonis merujuk dakwaan subsider, yakni menyiarkan dan melakukan penghinaan terhadap segolongan penduduk Indonesia. Yusman sampai bikin Bupati Malang meneken surat keputusan agar ajarannya dihentikan.
Nasib Mushaddeq idem ditto. Sebagian bangunan Vila Lakapura miliknya di kawasan Gunung Bunder, Bogor, Jawa Barat, sudah dibakar oleh kelompok yang menamakan diri Majelis Ulama Islam, Selasa malam pekan lalu.
Aksi ”rusak dan bakar” itu adalah jilid kesekian dalam praktek kekerasan kehidupan beragama di Indonesia. Perusakan pertama yang tercatat terjadi pada 1974, ketika Ali Taetang Laikabu menahbiskan diri sebagai nabi baru di Sulawesi Selatan. Yang paling ramai dan mengundang perhatian publik yang luas tentu saja adalah perusakan aset Ahmadiyah di berbagai kota tahun lalu.
Al-Qiyadah juga melengkapi daftar 250 kepercayaan sesat yang dikeluarkan oleh Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat (Pakem) dari 1980 hingga 2006. Pakem beranggotakan Departemen Dalam Negeri, Departemen Agama, dan Kejaksaan Agung. MUI sendiri telah mengeluarkan 86 fatwa sejak berdiri pada 1975. Sepuluh dari fatwa itu menyangkut ajaran sesat (lihat infografik).
l l l
Kisah ”rasul Gunung Bunder” itu bermula dari Vila Lakapura yang terletak sekitar 20 kilometer dari Bogor ke arah Sukabumi tersebut. Mushaddeq bertapa selama 40 hari 40 malam di salah satu sudut vila yang ia sebut gua. Pada malam ke-37, tepatnya pada 23 Juli tahun lalu, ia mengaku mendapat perintah Tuhan untuk menyatakan sebagai rasul kepada seluruh umat manusia. Ia menyebut dirinya Almasih Almaw’ud, almasih yang dijanjikan. ”Tugas saya memurnikan ajaran Musa, Isa, dan Muhammad,” ucapnya.
Sejak ”turun wahyu” itu, Mushaddeq pun mengembangkan ajarannya. Dakwah yang semula hanya terbatas pada lingkungan terdekat kini bergerak ke luar. Ia mengumpulkan 12 sahabat, mirip 12 murid Isa, dan masing-masing diminta mencari 12 pengikut. Dengan sistem jaringan ala multilevel marketing ini, pengikutnya berbiak cepat.
Pemimpin Al-Qiyadah ini juga muncul di televisi dan mengundang wartawan untuk meliput kegiatan binayah roin atau pembinaan calon pemimpin, yang sebelumnya tertutup. Mushaddeq rajin berkeliling dari satu kota ke kota lain. Pagi hari ada di Jakarta, sorenya ia sudah terbang ke Surabaya. Ia punya pengikut di Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Padang, Makassar, bahkan hingga pelosok seperti Tabalong, Kalimantan Selatan. Di Jakarta saja, kata Kepala Polda Metro Irjen Polisi Adang Firman, ada 8.000-an pengikut. Sebagian besar orang muda.
Jika tak sedang tausiyah ke luar kota, pensiunan pegawai Dinas Olahraga DKI Jakarta ini lebih memilih berdiam di rumahnya yang luas di bilangan Tanah Baru, Depok. Ia bertanam singkong atau sayur-sayuran lain di tanahnya yang seluas 2.300 meter persegi. Di lain waktu, kesenangannya adalah memperbaiki jip bekas. Salah satu jip dibelinya sepuluh tahun lalu di Madura, Jawa Timur. Awalnya hanya bangkai yang kemudian ia sulap menjadi mobil hijau khas tentara. Satu lagi berwarna oranye. ”Itu mobilnya Rasulullah,” kata Muthmainah, istri Mushaddeq.
Bila sedang berceramah, para pengikutnya tampak terbuai ucapan Mushaddeq yang nyerocos abis. Mereka manggut-manggut atau tertawa terbahak, meski tak genah benar logika berpikirnya. Dalam pertemuan akbar di BIP, misalnya, Mushaddeq menyebut, setelah Muhammad, rasul yang tampil di muka bumi bukan dari keturunan Bani Israel, Yahudi, atau Arab, tapi dari suku yang sama sekali tak terduga: Betawi. ”Keren kan orang Betawi jadi rasul?” ucapnya, yang disambut gelak tawa jemaahnya.
Coba dengar khotbahnya ini. Keberadaan suku Betawi yang menghuni tanah Jakarta, katanya, sudah menjadi strategi Allah. Sebagai ibu kota negara RI, Jakarta atau tanah Betawi menjadi tempat berkumpulnya suku-suku lain. Ia sendiri lahir di kampung Betawi di kawasan Kemang. ”Jadi, cocok dengan lagunya Rhoma Irama yang berjudul 135 Juta Penduduk Indonesia,” ujarnya ngakak. Entah apa hubungan sang raja dangdut itu dengan strategi Tuhan.
Kendati logika ucapannya terpeleset sana-sini, toh pengikutnya pasrah bongkokan pada sang rasul. Bonaji, 38 tahun, warga Balaraja, Banten, malah menyebut pengajaran Mushaddeq masuk akal. ”Setelah menjadi jemaah Qiyadah, saya tahu makna isi Al-Quran melalui penjelasan Rasul yang sangat masuk akal,” kata karyawan perusahaan kontraktor PT Pembangunan Perumahan itu.
Pria asal Jember, Jawa Timur, ini pun berani meninggalkan masjid dan salat lima waktu, setelah sang Rasul menjelaskan bahwa periode kenabiannya saat ini masih dalam periode Mekah atau Makkiyah, sama seperti periode Muhammad sebelum mendapat perintah menjalankan salat. Kewajiban menjalankan rukun Islam baru dilaksanakan setelah mendapat perintah untuk hijrah. Ini masuk akal bagi Bonaji.
Argumen periode Makkiyah ini segera ditampik Ketua MUI Ma’ruf Amin. ”Kalau orang salat dikejar-kejar, itu mungkin bisa disamakan dengan periode Mekah. Tapi di Indonesia kan orang salat tidak dihalangi,” katanya.
Al-Qiyadah tak mewajibkan pengikutnya melaksanakan rukun Islam seperti salat, zakat, puasa, dan berhaji. Jemaah hanya diwajibkan salat malam dan membaca Al-Quran. Syahadat aliran ini juga lain, yaitu dengan menyebut Almasih Almaw’ud sebagai rasul Allah.
Jemaah pun tak menampakkan penampilan tertentu seperti memelihara jenggot, celana cingkrang, atau kerudung untuk wanita. Mereka menganggap semua yang di luar Al-Qiyadah adalah musyrik, menyekutukan Tuhan. Itu pula sebabnya, mereka tak mau menyantap daging hasil sembelihan orang di luar alirannya.
Lalu apanya yang sesat? Menurut Ma’ruf Amin, minimal ada tiga hal yang membuat aliran ini dipandang sesat, yaitu menciptakan syahadat baru, ada rasul baru, dan menyatakan salat serta rukun Islam lain tak wajib. ”Itu sudah jelas bertentangan dengan Al-Quran dan Hadis,” katanya.
Tak cuma MUI dan Front Pembela Islam yang tersundut. NU dan Muhammadiyah pun mengecap Al-Qiyadah sebagai aliran sesat. ”Jika ingin membuat ajaran baru, jangan mengaitkan dengan agama yang sudah mempunyai tatanan yang baku. Akibatnya, pengikut agama yang sudah baku akan bereaksi dan berkeberatan terhadap ajaran itu,” kata Din Syamsuddin, Ketua Umum Muhammadiyah.
Reaksi ini dikritik oleh Ketua Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) Ulil Abshar Abdalla. ”NU dan Muhammadiyah gagal menerapkan prinsip toleransi, sebagaimana dikehendaki konstitusi kita,” katanya. Dalam prinsip kebebasan beragama, katanya, seseorang tak bisa dipaksa memeluk suatu keyakinan dan agama yang tak sesuai dengan kata hati.
Berbeda dengan JIL, Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia mendukung langkah polisi menangkap pemimpin Al-Qiyadah. Alasannya, pemerintah punya hak mengintervensi penyebaran ajaran yang dinilai telah menodai suatu agama. Namun, kata Ketua Komnas HAM Ifdhal Kasim, pemerintah tak bisa mengintervensi akidah atau keyakinannya.
Hanya, vonis sesat dari MUI dan sejumlah ormas Islam itu tak urung telah menggerakkan masyarakat di beberapa daerah melakukan aksi ”pembersihan”. Dedi Priyadi, pemimpin Al-Qiyadah di Padang, dan keluarganya, misalnya, kini harus hidup nomaden sejak rumahnya di daerah Simpang Haru, Padang, digerebek warga pada awal Oktober lalu. Mereka hidup menumpang di rumah saudara dan kenalan.
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Fenomena rasul atau nabi baru itu sebenarnya bukanlah barang baru. Alkisah, sejak zaman Muhammad telah ada yang mengaku nabi baru. Musailamah al-Kadzab adalah yang pertama terang-terangan mendeklarasikan sebagai nabi baru. Ia berkuasa di daerah Yamamah, kini salah satu distrik di Arab Saudi. Ia menikahi seorang wanita yang juga mengaku nabi.
Musailamah dikenal berani. Ia mengirim surat kepada Muhammad berisi ajakan untuk membagi kekuasaan bumi menjadi dua. Satu untuk Muhammad dan satunya untuk nabi baru: dia. Muhammad tak mengirim pasukan untuk menyerang Musailamah. Ia memilih mengungkapkan kedustaan Musailamah. Baru pada zaman khalifah Abu Bakar pasukan dikirim untuk memerangi Musailamah.
Nabi yang lain muncul di Pakistan. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad mendirikan Ahmadiyah pada 1889 dan mengaku sebagai nabi. Ahmadiyah masuk ke Indonesia sejak 1924. Pada masa awal perkembangan Islam di Jawa, muncul ajaran Manunggaling Kawula Gusti, yang diperkenalkan Syekh Siti Jenar pada abad ke-13. Di sini Syekh Siti Jenar tak bicara tentang kenabian, tapi lebih tinggi lagi, yaitu tentang konsep wahdatul wujud, menyatunya Tuhan ke dalam diri.
Nabi made in Indonesia asli baru ramai dibicarakan pada awal Orde Baru. Ali Taetang Laikabu adalah ”nabi Makassar” yang mengawali masa ini. Namun ajaran Ali bersifat lokal dan sekarang sudah tak terdengar. Pada 1986, rasul lain muncul. Kali ini gemanya lebih luas, lantaran dilontarkan oleh Teguh Esha, penulis novel pop Ali Topan Anak Jalanan.
Teguh antara lain mendustakan Hadis, mengubah jumlah rakaat salat dari 17 menjadi 19, dan cukup membaca syahadat dengan ”Tidak ada sesembahan selain Allah”. Salat model Teguh memakai bahasa Indonesia dan jurus-jurus silat dengan tangan, kaki, dan terkadang pantat, bergoyang-goyang (Tempo, 6 Desember 1986).
Teguh kini terbaring lemah di Rumah Sakit Fatmawati karena diabetes. Ia tak mengira puluhan seniman, yang notabene bukan pengikut kerasulannya, justru yang datang menjenguknya dan memindahkan kamarnya dari kelas III ke kelas II. Ia sempat menjadi pasien layanan cuma-cuma Dompet Dhuafa. ”Saya selama ini soliter dan tak menduga kedatangan mereka,” ucapnya. Teguh kini enggan mengingat masa lalu kenabiannya yang suram itu.
Setelah ”Ali Topan Rasul Jalanan”, sejumlah ajaran datang dan pergi. Belakangan, peminat ajaran baru itu justru datang dari anak muda. Puluhan anak muda yang berumur kurang dari 20 tahun di Bandung, misalnya, menjadi pengikut Al-Quran Suci. Sembilan orang di antaranya kini raib dan polisi kelimpungan mencari. Dua mahasiswi yang hilang sempat mengirim surat kepada orang tua dan menyatakan diri baik-baik saja.
Tim Investigasi Aliran Sesat (TIAS) bentukan Forum Ulama Umat Indonesia menemukan catatan ajaran Al-Quran Suci. Di antaranya catatan mengenai doktrin ruhuiyah (aturan), mulqiyah (wilayah/tempat) , uluhiyah (umat atau manusia). Struktur kehidupan digambarkan dengan analogi sebatang pohon yang terdiri dari akar, batang, dan buahnya. Menurut Koordinator TIAS Hedi Muhammad, struktur doktrin aliran yang diduga beroperasi di Bandung, Jakarta, dan Yogyakarta ini mirip dengan KW IX, salah satu sempalan Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). Mereka menerapkan proses rekrutmen tertutup.
Proses rekrutmen tertutup dan misteri NII itu telah mencemaskan Ahmad Buchori Saleh. Pengusaha Jakarta Selatan ini kini lebih memilih mengurung anaknya, Fafa, untuk melepaskannya dari jeratan NII. Mahasiswa tahun pertama Universitas Bina Nusantara, Jakarta, itu ketahuan mengikuti NII setelah minggat dari rumah karena menjual sepeda. Bukan hanya sepeda, uang tabungan Rp 20 juta juga ikut lenyap karena disetorkan ke NII.
Mantan Rektor Universitas Islam Negeri Jakarta Azyumardi Azra menyatakan, lakunya ajaran sesat di kalangan anak muda itu lantaran masyarakat kini mengalami kondisi yang serba tidak menentu. Anak-anak muda tersebut berusaha mencari seorang pemimpin yang dapat dipercaya dan dapat menerima krisis identitas mereka. ”Dalam sosiologi keagamaan ada yang disebut harapan eskatologis. Dalam harapan ini anak muda percaya bahwa pemimpin mereka adalah juru penyelamat, Imam Mahdi, atau apa pun yang akan menyelamatkan mereka,” ujarnya.
Harapan itu terbit karena pemahaman agama mereka belum mempunyai dasar yang kuat. Akibatnya, kata Azyumardi, mereka mengalami misleading dalam pencarian. Faktor berikutnya yang turut berperan: adanya kecenderungan pembiaran umat oleh para pemuka agama sehingga dimanfaatkan penyebar aliran baru. Di sinilah kepiawaian menjual ajaran itu muncul. Mereka dengan intens mendatangi dan menawarkan bimbingan.
Simak pengakuan Budi Tamtomo, pemimpin Al-Qiyadah Yogyakarta. Ia semula jauh dari agama dan menjalani mo limo—lima M (madon atau bermain perempuan, minum, main, madat, maling). Al-Qiyadah terus mendekatinya. Alhasil, dalam tiga bulan, ia pun takluk dan berhasil meninggalkan kebiasaan lamanya. Ia bahkan kini benar-benar jauh dari perempuan, bahkan rela berpisah dari istri yang tak mau mengikuti ajaran yang ia anut.
Aliran ini juga menggelar ritual mohon pengampunan. Kepada setiap pengikut ditawarkan bisa langsung berhadapan dengan rasul untuk pengakuan dosa. Bertemu rasul dan ada kepastian dosa diampuni ini telah membuat hati umatnya benar-benar plong.
Dengan sejumlah nilai jual itu—boleh tidak salat, puasa, zakat, haji, dan diampuni langsung oleh rasul—Al-Qiyadah meraup ribuan pendukung. Apakah dengan demikian mereka layak dihakimi? Rektor Universitas Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Komaruddin Hidayat, mengkritik MUI yang terlalu peka terhadap urusan akidah. Padahal, jelas keyakinan adalah masalah privat. ”Sedangkan kalau ada sabotase rel kereta api, mereka diam saja,” tulisnya melalui pesan pendek.
Komaruddin pun menawarkan cara gampang menghadapi pelbagai aliran yang aneh-aneh itu. ”Diketawain saja, entar kan bubar sendiri,” ucapnya. Seseorang di Markas Polda Metro juga punya cara jitu mengetahui apakah Mushaddeq itu seorang rasul. ”Gampang, konfirmasikan saja kepada Lia Aminudin yang mengaku sebagai Jibril, apakah ia telah menurunkan wahyu kepada Mushaddeq,” ujarnya seraya tertawa. Benar juga. Silakan, Anda boleh terpikat atau malah terbahak-bahak… .
Yos Rizal, Yudono, Elik Susanto, Irfan Budiman, Widi Nugroho, Retno Sari, Ahmad Fikri (Bandung), Febrianti (Padang), Heru C.N. (Yogyakarta) , Kukuh S. Wibowo (Surabaya)
Kenapa Sesat
Berdiri sejak 1975, Majelis Ulama Indonesia telah mengeluarkan lebih dari 86 fatwa. Sepuluh dari fatwa itu menyangkut aliran yang dinilai sesat. Selain MUI pusat, majelis ulama di daerah juga bisa mengeluarkan fatwa sesat.
Kriteria dasar sesat menurut MUI adalah bila aliran itu bertentangan dengan Al-Quran dan tidak mempercayai hadis Nabi Muhammad sebagai sumber hukum syariat. Berikut karakter sejumlah aliran yang telah dan belum mendapat cap fatwa MUI.
Al-Qiyadah al-IslamiyahPemimpin: Ahmad MushaddeqAktif: Sejak 2001Fatwa sesat MUI: 2007
Tidak menjalankan rukun Islam: salat sekali sehari hanya malam hari, tidak wajib puasa, zakat, haji
Menganggap musyrik orang di luar Al-Qiyadah
Punya rasul baru: Ahmad Mushaddeq bergelar Almasih Almaw’ud
Syahadat baru: Ashadu ala Illa Ha Ilallah, Wa asyhadu anna Almasih Almaw’ud Rasulullah
Salamullah (Komunitas Eden)Pemimpin: Lia AminudinAktif: Sejak 1995Fatwa sesat MUI: 1997
Lia mengaku bertemu Jibril, kemudian sebagai Bunda Maria, dan akhirnya sebagai Jibril
Mengangkat anaknya, Ahmad Mukti, sebagai Nabi Isa
Mempunyai kitab suci sendiri
Jemaah Ngaji LelakuPemimpin: Yusman RoyAktif: Sejak 2005Fatwa sesat MUI: 2005
Salat dalam dua bahasa
Negara Islam IndonesiaFatwa sesat MUI: 2003
Mengganti salat wajib dengan mencari anggota baru
Menghalalkan segala cara untuk bisa berinfak ke organisasi
Mengancam anggota yang mundur
Islam JamaahPendiri: Nur Hasan UbaidahAktif: 1970-an
Dilarang pemerintah pada 1971
Aliran ini berubah nama menjadi Lemkari dan Lembaga Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (LDII) pada 1991
Menganggap musyrik umat di luar Islam Jamaah
Pakaian dan tubuh yang tersentuh umat lain harus disucikan
Tidak mau salat bersama umat di luar kelompok
Al-Quran SuciFatwa sesat MUI: belum ada
Tidak mengakui Hadis
Tidak melakukan kewajiban dalam rukun Islam
Memisahkan jemaah dari keluarganya
AhmadiyahPendiri: Mirza Ghulam AhmadAktif: Sejak 1889 di Pakistan, masuk Indonesia 1924Fatwa sesat MUI: 1980 dan 2005
Menganggap Mirza Ghulam Ahmad sebagai nabi
Edisi. 37/XXXVI/05 - 11 November 2007

Laporan Utama
Ahmad Mushaddeq: Kapal Muhammad Sudah Hancur
PENAMPILANNYA tak seperti orang tua lainnya. Dia membungkus tubuh gempalnya dengan polo shirt kuning plus jaket korduroi hitam. Gayanya makin funky saja dengan celana jins bermerek BMW. Hanya uban di balik peci hitamnya yang tak bisa menutupi senja usianya.
Begitulah penampilan Ahmad Mushaddeq, 63 tahun, saat datang ke kantor majalah Tempo tiga pekan silam. Tapi ketegarannya tidak terlihat lagi ketika ia menyerahkan diri ke markas Kepolisian Daerah Metro Jakarta Raya, Rabu pekan lalu.
Laki-laki asli Betawi ini lahir dengan nama Abdul Salam. Setelah lulus dari Sekolah Tinggi Olahraga Jakarta, dia menjadi guru di sebuah sekolah dasar di Menteng, Jakarta Pusat. Menurut Muthmainah, sang istri, Abdul merupakan cucu Ahmad Toha, pendiri ilmu silat. ”Sampai hari ini banyak muridnya yang mencari beliau supaya mengajar, tapi bukan itu maunya,” katanya.
Dia lalu masuk Dinas Olahraga DKI dan menjadi pelatih fisik tim bulu tangkis nasional pada 1979 hingga 1990. Anak didiknya antara lain Icuk Sugiarto. Mantan pemain Christian Hadinata mengenangnya sebagai orang yang mudah bergaul dan religius. Untuk menambah penghasilan, ia berbisnis jual-beli tanah, sehingga dapat menyekolahkan anak-anaknya ke Bandung sampai ke Swiss di Eropa sana.
Berikut petikan wawancara dengan Mushaddeq:
Apa yang membuat Anda yakin telah dipilih Allah sebagai rasul?
Saya bertahanut selama 40 hari 40 malam di vila saya di gunung Bunder, Bogor. Saya bermimpi, pas pukul 12 malam, didatangi seseorang dan dibawa ke pantai. Di sana ada kapal besar terdampar. Ribuan orang sedang mencari jalan keluar tapi tidak ketemu. Saya terjaga. Saya bicara kepada Allah, kalau mimpi ini memang dari Engkau, berilah aku mimpi yang sama. Esoknya, saya mimpi persis sama. Saya minta lagi, dan besoknya mimpi lagi.
Bukankah itu cuma mimpi, bagaimana Anda yakin itu wahyu?
Mimpi tentang kapal itu tamsil, yaitu ada kapal yang akan tenggelam dengan banyak penumpang. Siapa mereka, yaitu kaum agamis yang masih bersyahadat pada Muhammad. Sebenarnya kapal Muhammad ini sudah hancur 700 tahun lalu setelah pasukan dari Mongol mengalahkan Bagdad pada 1280. Nah, untuk menegakkan kekhalifahan Islam kembali, perlu ditunjuk rasul. Tiga hari sebelum malam terakhir, saya bermimpi dilantik oleh Allah: umumkan kepada dunia bahwa kamu adalah rasul. Saat itu tanggal 23 Juli 2006.
Menurut sejumlah hadis, tak ada lagi nabi dan rasul setelah Muhammad.
Pegangan kami Al-Quran. Kami tak akan bergeser seujung rambut pun dari Al-Quran. (Mushaddeq mengutip Quran surat 28:59) Tidaklah Allah menghancurkan suatu negeri, kecuali di ibu kota itu dibangkitkan seorang nabi. Ini menunjukkan masih ada nabi. Untuk apa keberadaan nabi itu? Untuk mengingatkan sebelum Allah menjatuhkan hukuman. Saya adalah rasul dari Betawi.
Al-Qiyadah tak percaya hadis?
Hadis yang ada sekarang disusun 350 tahun setelah Nabi wafat. Dari 500 ribu, terkumpul 500 hadis. Itu pun kata Bukhari harus diperiksa. Buat apa menghabiskan waktu untuk yang tidak pasti, padahal di Quran semua sudah ada.
Kenapa tidak salat lima waktu?
Kami hanya menjalankan kewajiban se-perti dalam surat Al-Muzzammil (salat malam dan baca Quran). Kita masih hidup dalam periode Makkiyah, kami belum bisa mewajibkan salat kepada warga. Makanya hari ini perintahnya berdasarkan akidah. Salat lima waktu belum, zakat dan puasa tidak ada. Tapi nanti pada saatnya akan ada. Menunggu hijrah. Kapan hijrahnya? Belum ada wahyu dari Allah.
Siapa saja pengikut Anda?
Banyak. Jemaah kami biasanya mahasiswa, pelajar, atau orang muda. Karena kami mengajarkan Islam berdasarkan pendekatan akal pikiran yang logis, dijelaskan apa itu Islam, perjalanan sejarah Islam, apa itu Al-Quran.

Yudono, Irfan Budiman, Ig. Widi Nugroho

sedikit cerita sebagai ass professor

2007-10-29T14:14:00.000-07:00

Jawaban untuk akang sealmamater

Salam, Terima kasih atas perhatiannya Kang Faqih. Saya baru dua bulan jadi Ass Professor, masih mempelajari segala aturan main dan program-program yang saya akan kerjakan kedepan. Untuk sementara, saya bisa katakan, lingkungan akademik di kampus tempat saya sekarang sangat baik, dengan dukungan professor senior dan kolega, staf, dan mahasiswa. Kolega-kolega saya pakar di bidang religious studies dan sebagian pakar di bidang area studies Asia Tenggara. Untuk religious studies, masing-masing profesor fokus pada agama tertentu, misalnya Katolik, Buddha, Sikhisme, Konghucu, Yahudi, dan sebagainya, sementara saya satu-satunya prof bidang Islam. Semester depan saya akan mengajar agama-agama di Asia (Hindu, Buddha, Islam, Sikh, Konghucu, Tao, Sinto) dari sisi ajaran, kitab suci, praktek keagamaan, dan kelembagaan. Saya juga akan mengajar Understanding the Qur'an, dan Islam di Asia Tenggara. Akan ada mata kuliah lain yang juga saya akan ajarkan, seperti agama dan politik, pemikiran Islam, dan sebagainya. Ini untuk program S-1, dan juga paskasarjana. Selain mengajar, sebagai professor, saya harus terus lakukan riset, publikasi, dan pengabdian (menjadi panitia, aktif dalam organisasi, dan semacamnya). Posisi assistant professor adalah jenjang pertama; setelah beberapa tahun akan dinilai, baru akan naik ke jenjang kedua, disebut Associate professor, lalu setelah itu, baru full professor. Assistant professor tidak berarti asisten dosen seperti di negeri kita, yaitu dosen yunior yang mengantikan profesor yang lebih senior (yang biasanya jarang hadir). Assistant professor di Barat memiliki otoritas penuh dalam bidang disiplin ilmunya. Sebagai assistant professor saya dibantu beberapa Teaching Assistant yang biasanya mahasiswa paskasarjana. Tugas lain adalah membimbing mahasiswa dalam kegiatan akademik, tesis, disertasi, dan sebagainya. Di Riverside, ada Islamic Center yang cukup besar berjamaah hampir seribuan dan bahkan lebih, umumnya pendatang dari negeri-negeri Muslim tapi sudah jadi orang Amerika. Orang Palestina, Mesir, Irak, Bangladesh, dan sebagainya, menjadi orang Amerika dan betah menjadi orang Amerika ketimbang tinggal di negeri-negeri asal mereka. Salah satu pelajaran penting di sini adalah menjadi Muslim tidaklah sulit di Amerika, dan bahkan kebebasan beragama sangat dijamin, terlepas dari sebagian orang Amerika yang tidak tahu banyak soal Islam. Salah satu acara yang saya ikuti Ramadhan yang baru lalu adalah dialog antaragama yang diadakan ole Islamic Center mengundang tokoh agama-agama di sini. Suasananya sangat akrab. Saya sempatkan tulis artikel soal itu di The Jakarta Post berjudul Ramadhan in America. Saya juga hadiri dialog antaragama yang dirintis masyarakat Muslim asal Turki. Ini dulu ceritanya, Kang Faqih. Nanti bisa disambung. Gimana kabar antum? Salam,

In Pursuit of Happiness

2007-10-29T00:13:00.000-07:00

In pursuit of happiness

Happiness is a warm gun, sang the Beatles, and happiness is a long cold drink, an old beer advertisement heralds, and happiness is the happy and smiling faces of children.
But happiness is not always about self-gratification -- it can be about giving.
A Chinese proverb says if you want happiness for an hour, take a nap; if you want happiness for a day, go fishing; if you want happiness for a year, inherit a fortune; if you want happiness for a lifetime, help somebody.
And the Dalai Lama said, "If you want others to be happy, practice compassion".
Happiness is probably something everybody pursues in life, but happiness means different things to different people.
And to most, happiness means different things at different times.
Although material wealth, or at least well-being, is certainly an important element, happiness is not always associated with money or wealth.
Poor but happy people are forever in our midst -- and it is too easy to find wealthy miserable people.
And it's probably easier to find the latter group than the first in Indonesia, or in other places for that matter.
It is therefore courageous for anyone or any institution to try to rate and then aggregate the happiness of a nation, or of a people in a city.
The Frontier Consulting Group Indonesia last week released a study called the Indonesian Happiness Index 2007.
The study is based on a survey involving 1,800 respondents, 300 each in the six cities selected including Jakarta, Medan, Bandung, Semarang, Semarang, Surabaya and Makassar.
It finds the Indonesian Happiness Index (IHI) at 47.96 (presumably out of a possible score of 100), which put Indonesia below the average (meaning an index of 50).
The study did not say where Indonesia stood in relation to other countries.
The survey included questions related to the age, gender, income, education, job/position and religious devotion of the respondents, and came out with some interesting results.
People in Semarang and Makassar are said to be among the happiest in Indonesia, with those in Jakarta and Medan are among the most miserable, with their city ranking fifth and sixth respectively.
Speculation around why Semarang is the happiest city to live in remains however, as does the reason behind the study's findings that men are generally happier than women. No explanation was provided.
In terms of age, those in the 41-50 year-old category were happiest and those in 21-30 years old were most miserable, probably because those in the first group tend to be more established in their jobs and life, while those in the second group are just embarking on adulthood.
The rest of the survey's results are somewhat predictable. Those with a higher education and a good income (the two are usually related anyway) are happiest.
The more religious among us are said to be happier (probably because we think God is always with us).
Perhaps we should also thank religion, and religious leaders, for helping the nation through some of the most difficult times in the last 10 years.
In most other countries, the hardship the nation endured would have led to social upheaval.
In terms of profession, one result shows those in middle management were happier than those in top management.
So, those craving for the top job may want to think again -- and weigh-up the lucrative perks versus the responsibility that comes with being number one in the company.
If the Frontier Consulting Group put Indonesia below average (because it ranked below 50 in the index), a study published in 2006 by the New Economics Foundation actually put Indonesia among the happiest lot in the world in a survey of 178 countries.
The Happy Planet Index, issued to challenge the use of the gross domestic product (GDP) and the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI) in measuring the welfare of a nation, found material wealth did define the happiness (or the fulfillment of a happy life) of a nation.
Vanuatu heads the happy index which includes Vietnam, Sri Lanka and the Philippines in the top 20. Indonesia came at a decent 23rd. The United States ranked 150th and Zimbabwe bottom of the list at 178th.
The Happy Planet Index, and the more recent Frontier Consulting Group measurement of Indonesians, reminders that while we keep to the adage that "men don't live on bread alone", material well-being is still important in our pursuit of happiness.
Granted, it is not the most important measurement of happiness, but it is an important component nevertheless.
And the pursuit of happiness, while not clearly stated as a right in our constitution, is an inalienable right for every citizen in this county, just as life and liberty are. (Editorial, The Jakarta Post, October 29, 2007)

Media and Cultural Pluralization in Iran

2007-10-16T22:37:00.000-07:00

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/world/middleeast/16tehran.html

The news in Iran as read above indicates how media, including movies and TV programs, could play an important role as a social critic which in turn allows greater democractization and pluralization of religious views. With a creative, constructive, free and responsible media, the public space becomes pluralized and civilized.

Ali

Tibeten Dalai Lama, U.S. and China

2007-10-16T13:09:00.000-07:00

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/16/world/asia/17tibet.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin

China Warns U.S. on Dalai Lama Trip

By JOSEPH KAHN
Published: October 16, 2007
BEIJING, Oct. 16 — Chinese officials warned the United States on Tuesday not to honor the Dalai Lama, saying a planned award ceremony in Washington for the Tibetan spiritual leader would have “an extremely serious impact” on relations between the countries.

Stephen Crowley/The New York Times
The Dalai Lama arrived at his hotel in Washington on Tuesday before a meeting with President Bush.

Speaking at a Foreign Ministry briefing and on the sidelines of the Communist Party’s 17th National Congress, the officials condemned the Dalai Lama as a resolute separatist and said foreign leaders must stop encouraging his “splittist” mission.
“Such a person who basely splits his motherland and doesn’t even love his motherland has been welcomed by some countries and has even been receiving this or that award,” Tibet’s Communist Party boss, Zhang Qingli, told reporters during the congress.
“We are furious,” Mr. Zhang said. “If the Dalai Lama can receive such an award, there must be no justice or good people in the world.”
The Dalai Lama, a Nobel laureate, has lived in exile since the Chinese army crushed an uprising in his homeland in 1959 and is revered as the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists. He is scheduled to receive the Congressional Gold Medal on Wednesday.
President Bush met with the Dalai Lama at the White House on Tuesday.
The meeting was clearly a matter of great sensitivity at the White House, which did not release a photograph of the Dalai Lama and the president, as it has in the past. “We in no way want to stir the pot and make China feel that we are poking a stick in their eye,” said Dana Perino, the chief White House spokeswoman. “We understand that the Chinese have very strong feelings about this.”
In fact, the Bush administration’s attempts to soothe Chinese feelings began more than a month ago in Sydney, when Mr. Bush accepted an invitation from President Hu Jintao to attend the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing.
Mr. Bush told Mr. Hu at the time that he would attend the ceremony at which the Dalai Lama will receive a Congressional Gold Medal. And the White House emphasized Tuesday that Mr. Bush has always gone to the medal ceremonies, and that by protocol he will speak for about three minutes.
The visit comes as the United States has been either seeking or relying on Chinese cooperation on an array of difficult issues: the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, the mass killings in Darfur and the recent crackdown on protesters in Myanmar.
China has pressed the United States to cancel the award event for months. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao said today that Beijing was “strong dissatisfied” and warned of an “extremely serious impact” if the events are held as scheduled. But he did not say what steps China planned to take.
This week, Beijing pulled out of a meeting at which leading world powers are to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. Chinese officials cited “technical reasons” for not participating, but they left the clear impression that they might downgrade support for international efforts to stop Iran’s nuclear program if foreign powers interfere in China’s internal affairs.
China also recently canceled its annual human rights dialogue with Germany to protest the September meeting between Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Dalai Lama.
But Beijing often uses strong language when warning other countries about interfering in its internal affairs without taking strong action. Giving an award to the Dalai Lama is highly unlikely to seriously disrupt relations with the United States, which has often sought to protect Chinese dissidents and has maintained close ties to Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province.
Both Washington and Beijing say relations between the two countries have been warm, especially after they worked together to bring about an agreement to end North Korea’s nuclear program.
In recent months, China has stepped up its attacks on the Dalai Lama even though Chinese officials and envoys from the Tibetan leader have engaged in a on-and-off dialogue over terms of reconciliation.
While Beijing says it is willing to allow the Dalai Lama to return to China if he promises to respect Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, the Chinese have dismissed his efforts to work for a “middle way” that gives Tibet a higher measure of autonomy under continued Chinese rule.
Tibet’s governor, Qiangba Puncog, said at the party congress that the dialogue with the Dalai Lama had gone poorly.
“He should resolutely abandon his Tibetan independence stance and activities,” Mr. Qiangba Puncog said. “But in my opinion, some of those activities are actually escalating and setting a lot of obstacles for further progress.”
Ethnic tensions have risen in Tibet in recent months, prompting tough police action.
Rights groups said a group of Tibetan boys were detained in the northwestern province of Gansu last month after they were accused of scribbling slogans on walls calling for the Dalai Lama’s return.
Four of the boys, all 15 years old, were still in detention. Police officers used electric prods on them and were demanding payment for their release, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch say.
Brian Knowlton contributed reporting from Washington

Henna Art Marks Muslim Festivities

2007-10-14T12:35:00.000-07:00

http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/PE_News_Local_D_henna12.3e8af92.html

A Common Word

2007-10-13T18:58:00.000-07:00

Call for a Common Word between Muslims and Christians

http://www.acommonword.com/

http://www.acommonword.com/lib/downloads/CW-Total-Final-v-12g-Eng-9-10-07.pdf

Rasa Sayange

2007-10-09T07:19:00.000-07:00

The Feeling of Love which (could) Undermine a True Love

The current debate on the song Rasa Sayang (Feeling of Love) between two Malay neigbors Malaysians and Indonesians is apparently contra-productive to the idea of love the core idea of the matter being debated. Some Indonesian figures claimed that Malaysians had stolen the song they said belongs to Indonesia not Malaysia. Malaysians replied that the song belong not to Indonesians, but to all Malays.

Traditional Malay people did not have the concept of copy-right as this is a new international concept embraced and adopted by them from their interactions with international laws. It would be difficult to claim and counter-claim about who own a song already sung popularly in the Indo-Malay world. As this has for long (not sure for how many decades or centuries) been sung by many without thinking of who authored it and when it was composed, nobody, including the Malaysians, could be ethically and culturally justified to manipulate the song for the sake of economic and political interests without respect of others who share it. If a supposedly shared cultural product is claimed for one party's economic interest, not simply for cultural enrichment and enjoyment of everyone, then there is a problem.

Malaysians are insensitive when they simply adopted that song for their commercial purposes and for their exclusive claims of Malaysia being a true Asia, thus excluding Indonesians, Bruneians, Filipinos, Singaporeans, and others.

Indonesians are also not aware of the historical fact that they and Malaysians are actually one race and once were one before the Dutch and the British colonialized divided them into two separate countries. Although Indonesians are ethnically more diverse (not only Malays as they are Javanese, Sundanese, Buginese, Papuans, etc) than Malaysians, they have all been engaged in regional networks of religion, trade, politics, culture, and society. Their interactions are more intense and closed than they come to realize, especially when issues of political economy awakens their mind and sense of nationalism.

Historically, Malaysians have long won the battle of claiming Malayness of their country, when they only, excluding Indonesians, regard Malacca as their true ancestors. Malaysians also win the struggle over some territorial boundaries. And this time Malaysians is successful in claiming a Malay song to be their own. Malaysian diplomats appear to be smarter than Indonesian diplomats and politicians in manipulating their cultures and natural resources for their national development and international images.

The problem of this debate over the song might be resolved by cultural dialogue and political diplomacy, but the resolution will depend on the intelligent ways in which Indonesians and Malaysians come to terms with their past, present and future. They have to learn more about their own histories, their common histories and their distinct histories. There is certainly no monolithic reading of history, but a politicization of history is often dangerous, subjective, and destructive when exclusions are deliberately intended for the economic and political self-interest of one country at the expense of the feeling of love of other countries which obviously without doubt are their forever brothers and neighbors.

Muhamad Ali, Riverside, October 9, 2007

Ramadhan in America

2007-10-04T23:51:00.000-07:00

Ramadhan in America: A lesson for everyone

Muhamad Ali, Riverside, California

In a secular nation like the United States, observing religious obligations is recognized because religious freedom is implemented seriously. I have had many experiences concerning religious freedom in the country, but the most recent one is worth reflecting on.
Obviously fasting in America is unlike fasting in Indonesia, where almost everyone joins you in your quest. The University of California at Riverside, where I teach, is one of the most diverse campuses in America. People of Hispanic, Asian, African, Middle Eastern and Caucasian origin are all proud to be American.
In the second week of Ramadhan, the Islamic Center of Riverside hosted a public gathering. The event was specifically organized for Muslims to break the fast, but everyone invited also enjoyed the food and drinks provided, including non-Muslims. Everyone who attended, regardless of their religion or identity, conversed in a friendly and respectful manner, despite the fact they had never met.
A Jewish rabbi shared jokes with the crowd and thanked the leaders of the city's Muslim community for the invitation. He said rabbis should not feel uneasy congratulating Muslims during Ramadhan. He said he hoped there would come a time when people greeted people of other religions without even thinking about it.
Symbolic gestures and greetings, however trivial they may seem, are significant in the creation of an inclusive and respectful social environment. A Catholic said he understood the feelings of Muslims, and that in Northern Ireland terror attacks have also occurred, pointing toward the fact terrorism is not associated with a particular religion.
The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attack was a turning point for different religious communities in the U.S., during which they were forced to come to terms with differences and prejudices. In a secular country like the U.S., efforts to foster interfaith dialogue and meetings are taken seriously. Muslims and non-Muslims work together to overcome misunderstandings and misperceptions between them.
In a touching speech, UCR Professor June O'Connor, a Catholic and an expert on comparive religious ethics, emphasized the need to go beyond tolerance. One has to show true willingness to know more about others in order to achieve peace and harmony, she said. She invited the audience to strengthen common ethics shared by conflicting religious beliefs.
Another interesting aspect of the gathering was that the city's Islamic community handed out awards to recognize the contributions certain figures had made to the Islamic community and the general public.
The mayor of the city has been a leader in the areas of inclusivism and multiculturalism. He initiated a forum aimed at building a more inclusive Riverside community. In his speech, he said the inclusive community was a type of social capital that could be seen as a great asset.
Having observed this particular event, I have some lessons to share. First, a religious community has to reach out, to embrace inclusiveness and pluralism. No one should express the idea that one religion is superior over others. One should embrace others, seek common values and set aside differences.
Second, this relationship must not be built in terms of majority-minority because everyone is equal. In the U.S., the value of inclusiveness was developed by a Catholic, John F. Kennedy, who become a president in a predominantly Protestant country. It was also developed by a Muslim who became a senator, and in the future, may be developed by anyone from any ethnic group or religion. Inclusiveness means everyone should be included without exception.
Interfaith meetings are an excellent beginning to reducing racialism, anti-Semitism, anti-Islamism, anti-Christianism and so forth. However, such meetings are not without long processes of engagement. They require moral courage and sincerity in building a cooperative, inclusive and prosperous community.
Third, everyone's contribution to the community must be recognized and acknowledged regardless of their race, gender or religion. Recognition is important and must be given by the state and/or civil society.
Fourth, Muslims can actually live a prosperous, Islamic life in a country where the constitution separates the church from the state. Muslims are proud of being American Muslims and they do not endorse the idea of an Islamic state or the formal implementation of sharia. Muslims in America hope that the current secular constitution will last forever as it benefits rather than harms people in terms of community building.
However, this secular constitution does not mean everyone takes distrust, prejudices and stigmas for granted as if problems do not exist. The secular constitution does not necessarily mean that religious communities and leaders can not speak and stand up to express their religious views. But they speak in terms of their contributions to the larger community and to the state.
Lastly, people should speak their mind without pressure because they are speaking in a civilized and a non-threatening manner. Freedom of speech is guaranteed by the constitution, and is practiced by many local politicians and civil society leaders.
A sheik from al-Azhar University, for example, who clearly has a different viewpoint regarding how society needs to be educated, has continually been invited to give Ramadhan lectures and lead prayers in the mosque as part of his contribution to the community at large.
The secular state allows its citizens to speak their mind as long as what they say does not harm the rights of others. The most important thing is not what is said, but how it is said.
There remain many challenges ahead. Interfaith meetings are important, but not sufficient. Leaders must return to the grassroots level and reach out to the marginalized, oppressed, poor, backward and illiterate.
These people need more than just meetings. They also need interfaith social work and social, economic, cultural and political networks that reflect practical pluralism.
Like in Indonesia where such interfaith meetings are common, the challenge is the same. How can we move further toward the grassroots level?
People of different religions can learn from each other's beliefs and practices. Muslims in particular countries can learn from other cultures about how religious freedom and social inclusivity is upheld.

The writer is an assistant professor at the University of California's Religious Studies Department in Riverside. He can be reached at muhali74@hotmail.com.

religion and politics in America

2007-10-02T07:31:00.000-07:00

The news below indicates how in America the problem of connection between religion and politics is not entirely resolved.

McCain criticized for religious remarks
By LIZ SIDOTI, Associated Press Writer Mon Oct 1, 5:50 PM ET

WASHINGTON - Several Jewish organizations criticized John McCain on Monday after the Republican candidate said he would prefer a Christian president over someone of a different faith.

In an interview with Beliefnet, a multi-denominational Web site that covers religion and spirituality, the White House hopeful was asked if a Muslim candidate could be a good president.
"I just have to say in all candor that since this nation was founded primarily on Christian principles ... personally, I prefer someone who I know who has a solid grounding in my faith," McCain said. "But that doesn't mean that I'm sure that someone who is Muslim would not make a good president."
Later, McCain said, "I would vote for a Muslim if he or she was the candidate best able to lead the country and defend our political values." He added that "the Constitution established the United States of America as a Christian nation."
The interview was published Saturday.
The American Jewish Committee, an international think tank and advocacy organization based in New York, issued a statement criticizing the Arizona senator, arguing that McCain should know that the United States is a democratic society without a religious test for public office.
"To argue that America is a Christian nation, or that persons of a particular faith should by reason of their faith not seek high office, puts the very character of our country at stake," Jeffrey Sinensky, the group's general counsel, said Monday in a statement.
A partisan organization, the National Jewish Democratic Council, also called McCain's comments repugnant.
Amid the criticism, Democrat Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, an Orthodox Jew, came to the defense of his Senate colleague.
"I have known John McCain very well for many years and I know that he does not have a bigoted bone in his body. I know that he is fair and just to all Americans regardless of their faith," Lieberman said.
Over the past few days, McCain has sought to clarify his remarks.
While campaigning in New Hampshire on Sunday, he said that the most qualified person could be president, no matter his or her religion.
"It's almost Talmudic. We are a nation that was based on Judeo-Christian values. That means respect for all of human rights and dignity. That's my principle values and ideas, and that's what I think motivated our founding fathers," McCain said.
Also Sunday, in a statement, his spokeswoman Jill Hazelbaker said: "The senator did not intend to assert that members of one religious faith or another have a greater claim to American citizenship over another."

Among the new Faculty at UC Riverside

2007-10-01T23:58:00.000-07:00

http://chass.ucr.edu/faculty/NewFaculty2007-2008_Web.pdf