Multiculturalism in Southeast Asia

Multiculturalism in Southeast Asia
Muhamad Ali, Jakarta | Fri, 12/09/2011 10:25 AM
A | A | A |

The condition of being culturally diverse is neither uniquely modern nor Western, but as an approach, multiculturalism is quite a modern concept (born in mid-20th century). In Southeast Asia, multiculturalism has become constructed and contested in state and society.

Some refer to the pre-colonial time when cities were a pluralistic melting point of peoples from all over Southeast Asia, depicting the archipelago as one of the crossroads of world civilizations. During the colonial time, British scholar, J.S. Furnivall used “plural societies” to describe Southeast Asian societies, “two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit”.

The colonial policies of assimilation, segregation, transmigration, ethnic categorization, adat-recht (customary law) codification, politics of Islam and regulations have impacted on post-colonial multiculturalism. But networks of Islamic reformism, Hinduization, Buddhist Mahayani and later Theravada propagation, Christianization, Chinese migration and assimilation and other processes have shaped the way in which multiculturalism has taken different forms.

Some of the post-colonial legacies include the category of pribumi (indigenous) and non-pribumi (particularly, Chinese peranakan and totok). The indigenous peoples became masyarakat adat (cultural society), and their religions became “kepercayaan” (belief). Organizational plurality (Sarekat Islam, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and so forth) emerged in response to global Islam (including Wahhabism), but also to colonial politics and domestic conditions in Muslim societies.

Throughout the Old Order and the New Order, ideological and cultural rivalries developed. Pancasila, Bhineka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity), the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and the 1945 Constitution have become ties that bind Indonesian citizens across the multicultural spectrum. In terms of language, the use of the Indonesian national language and ethnic languages take turns in terms of priority and usage among some 300 ethnic groups.

In contemporary times, ethno-religious conflicts, religious radicalism and extremism, gender discrimination, globalized theories of clash of civilizations and Westernized assumptions of multiculturalism have become factors for thinking of multiculturalism as a problem, an approach or a solution. In Indonesia, the Free Aceh Movement and its colonial and New Order histories, made Aceh an autonomous region, along with its aspiration for the implementation of Islamic law of its own.

At the same time, regional autonomy gives rise to Islamic bylaws supported by few Islamist parties and secular politicians wanting people’s votes. The problem of Ahmadiyah didn’t exist until there was an Islamic revival involving the established ulema council (MUI) who sought to maintain orthodoxy in response to both internal and external threats, along with secularism, pluralism and liberalism.

The notion of heresy became popularized. The status of lesbians and homosexuals has become controversial too. Multiculturalism became an approach to address attitudes and policies deemed intolerant, discriminatory and unjust to the “marginalized”.

In Malaysia, multiculturalism as an approach and policy is also shaped by pre-colonial and colonial experiences. Ethnicity and religions are mixed (a Malay is one who professes Islam and behaves like a Malay). Islam is the state’s religion while ambiguously allowing religious freedom.

Political parties were constructed along ethnic lines. In response to the Malay-Chinese riots of 1969, The National Front conducted affirmative action through NEP (National Economic Plan) to equalize “backward Malays” so that they could catch up with the Chinese and other educated classes. Malays enjoy constitutional advantages over non-
Malay citizens.

At the same time, Islam remains revivalist, but the UMNO seeks to modernize its character (as in Islam Hadhari). Now the government is promoting OneMalaysia, but tensions remain between ethnicity, religion and citizenship. Progressive movements, such as Sisters in Islam, attempt to be critical of both UMNO and PAS Islamization projects. Others are critical of multiculturalism in the state. In Malaysia, multiculturalism is almost always framed along ethnic lines, with class, gender and religion sometimes present to complicate things.

In Singapore, multiculturalism is defined and promoted in the city-state through a decidedly secular constitution, although religious and communal factors have become increasingly realized by the predominantly Chinese ruling party. Languages (Malay, Chinese, Tamil, English) constitute the primary marker of multicultural policy. The state’s housing policy aims to mix all ethnic groups, but all these are brought into a wider “national, Singaporean culture”. The question “Chinese First” or “Singaporean First” comes to the fore.

The People Action’s Party (PAP)’s ruling prefers “ideological consensus” to boost economic pragmatism, through such policies as “the Religious Harmony Act” (1990), forbidding the use of religion for political ends with penalties for “extremism”, and later through the promotion of basic “Religious Knowledge” (RK) allowing citizens to choose (from seven religions).

These religious policies had the goal of creating interracial harmony. In later developments, realizing the unintended consequences of religious differences in the public sphere, the National Ideology Committee created “shared values”: nation above society, society above self.

Some argue that the shared values are Asian/Eastern values, in opposition to Western values, although such values remain capitalistic. The question remains a tension between individualism and communalism, between West and East, and between multiculturalism and national cohesion.

Thus, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are highly diverse nations, ethnically, linguistically, religiously, culturally, socially, and politically, but they are diverse in different ways and cope with diversity in different ways.

Multiculturalism is a new way of understanding culture. Culture is not static, so multiculturalism should not imply those diverse cultures are fixed. “Multiculturalism”, as William Connoly states, “embodies within itself a quarrel between the national protection of diverse cultural minorities in the same territory and the pluralization of multiple possibilities of being within and across states.”

There is tension between multiculturalism and universal humanism, between what Charles Taylor calls “Politics of Recognition”, emphasizing the unique identity of an individual or a group (against assimilation), and “Politics of Universalism”, emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens (no first-class no second-class citizens).

Does the belief that all human beings have dignity necessarily mean that particular cultural identities are suppressed or negated? Can people reconcile between shared values and particular values?

Empirical studies could be important to assess if multicultural discourses and practices are based on solid social premises, not faulty ones. Does support for ethnic diversity foster individual well-being and inter-ethnic cohesion or does it foster tension and conflict? Is multiculturalism understood as the imposition of some cultures on others? Can different peoples have a shared goal of multiculturalism? Is it for the sake of recognition of the diverse values and expressions for their own sake or for the enhancement of the quality of life and learning among all? Does multiculturalism reinforce racial superiority, religious supremacy, and ethno-triumphalism?

Strategies, structural and cultural, can be formulated in each country and they could learn from each other to see the best practices of multiculturalism, considering both commonalities and differences. Multiculturalism operates in both private and public spheres (family, the state, civil society, including NGOs, media and learning institutions).

Multiculturalism concerns how the self relates to others, real or imagined. As an approach, multiculturalism implies willingness to accept possible ways of being and becoming, regardless of ethnicity, race, sexuality, gender and religion, in efforts at creating respectful and critical societies.

Recent Publications per September 2011

CURRENT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PUBLICATIONS


A. Book Chapters
1. Ali, M. 2011. The Internet, Cyber-Religion and Authority: The Case of the Indonesian Liberal Islam Network. Islam and Popular Culture in Indonesia and Malaysia. Editors: Andrew Weinstraub, Andrew Weinstraub, Andrew Weinstraub, Andrew Weinstraub, Andrew Weinstraub. Routledge. London. p.101-122. (Refereed, Invited)
2. Ali, M., Murodi , M. 2010. History (of Islam). Pengantar Studi Islam (Introduction to Islamic Studies). Editors: Prof.Mulyadhi Kartanegara, Prof.Mulyadhi Kartanegara, Prof.Mulyadhi Kartanegara. UIN Press. Jakarta. p.1-28. (Partially Refereed, Not Invited)
3. Ali, M. 2009. Kebebasan Beragama (Religious Freedom). Merayakan Kebebasan Beragama (Celebrating Religious Freedom). Editors: Elza Peldi Taher, Elza Peldi Taher, Elza Peldi Taher, Elza Peldi Taher, Elza Peldi Taher. Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace & KOMPAS. Jakarta. p.314-334. (Non-Refereed, Invited)
4. Ali, M. 2008. Islam i Sydostasien (Islam in Southeast Asia). Politikens Bog Om Islam. Editors: Jorgen Baek Simonsen, Jorgen Baek Simonsen, Jorgen Baek Simonsen, Jorgen Baek Simonsen, Jorgen Baek Simonsen. Politikens Forlag. Denmark. p.315-347. (Refereed, Invited)
5. Ali, M. 2007. Makna dan Tujuan Dialog Peradaban (The Meanings and Aims of Intercivilizational Dialogue). Muhammadiyah Progressif: Manifesto Pemikiran Kaum Muda (Progressive Muhammadiyah: The Thought of The Young Generation). Editors: Abdul Rahim al-Ghazali, Abdul Rahim al-Ghazali, Abdul Rahim al-Ghazali, Abdul Rahim al-Ghazali, Abdul Rahim al-Ghazali. Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah & Lembaga Studi Filsafat Islam. Jakarta. p.331-52. (Non-Refereed, Invited)
6. Ali, M. 2006. "Mengapa Membumikan Kemajemukan dan Kebebasan Beragama di Indonesia?” (Why Promoting Religious Pluralism and Freedom in Indonesia?). Bayang-Bayang Fanatisisme: Esai-esai untuk Mengenang Nurcholish Madjid (The Shadows of Fanaticism: Remembering Nurcholish Madjid). Editors: Abd Hakim, Abd Hakim, Yudi Latif, Yudi Latif, Abd Hakim, Abd Hakim, Abd Hakim, Yudi Latif, Yudi Latif, Yudi Latif. Paramadina University. Jakarta. p.244-81. (Non-Refereed, Invited)
7. Ali, M. 2006. "Gerakan Islam Moderat di Indonesia Kontemporer” (Moderate Islamic Movements in Indonesia). Gerakan & Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Kontemporer (The Islamic Movements and Ideas in Contemporary Indonesia). Editors: Rizal Sukma, Rizal Sukma, Clara Joewono, Clara Joewono, Rizal Sukma, Rizal Sukma, Rizal Sukma, Clara Joewono, Clara Joewono, Clara Joewono. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Jakarta. p.202-240. (Non-Refereed, Invited)
7-A. Ali, M. 2007. Moderate Islamic Movements in Contemporary Indonesia. Islamic Thought and Movements in Contemporary Indonesia. Editors: Rizal Sukma, Rizal Sukma, Clara Joewono, Clara Joewono. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Jakarta, Indonesia. p.195-236. (Refereed, Invited)
(Submitted)
1. Ali, M. Islamic Liberalism in Indonesia: A Critical Analysis. Liberal Islam in Indonesia. Editors: Haidar Bagir , Haidar Bagir , Muhammad Deden Ridwan, Muhammad Deden RidwanMizan. Bandung, Indonesia . Submitted to Editors on 09/25/2011. (Submitted 09/15/2011. 30 manuscript pages.) (Refereed, Invited)
2. Ali, M. Far from Mecca: Modern Islam in Southeast Asia. Islam in the Modern World. Editors: Ebrahim Moosa , Ebrahim Moosa , Jeffrey Kenney, Jeffrey KenneyRoutledge. Oxon, U.K. Submitted to Editors on . (Submitted 07/06/2011. 20 manuscript pages.) (Refereed, Invited)
B. Book Reviews
1. Ali, M. Information about the book that was reviewed: Perfection Makes Practice: Learning, Emotion, and the Recited Qur’an in Indonesia. Ed. 2004. Anna M. Gade. University of Hawaii Press: 348p. Information about the book review itself: Perfection Makes Practice: Learning, Emotion, and the Recited Qur'an in Indonesia. Published on 10/07/2006. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences. Vol. 23:3: p.86-91. (Refereed, Not Invited)
2. Ali, M. Information about the book that was reviewed: Jihad in Paradise: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia . Ed. 2004. Mike Millard. M.E. Sharpe, Inc: 155p. Information about the book review itself: Jihad in Paradise: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia. Published on 10/07/2006. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences. Vol. 23:3: p.100-103. (Refereed, Not Invited)
3. Ali, M. Information about the book that was reviewed: Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension. Ed. 2004. Giora Eliraz. Sussex Academic Press: 142p. Information about the book review itself: Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension. Published on 10/07/2005. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences. Vol. 22:3: p.136-139. (Refereed, Not Invited)
4. Ali, M. Information about the book that was reviewed: Malay Muslims: the History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia. Ed. 2002. Robert Day McAmis. William B. Eerdmans Publishing: 173p. Information about the book review itself: Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast Asia. Published on 11/10/2003. Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 62:4: p.1130-1132. (Refereed, Not Invited)
C. Books
1. Ali, M. 2009. Bridging Islam and the West: An Indonesian View. Ushul Press, Faculty of Ushuluddin, the State Islamic University. Jakarta . 190p. (, Not Invited)
2. Ali, M. 2003. Teologi Pluralis-Multikultural: (Multicultural-Pluralist Theology). Penerbit Buku Kompas. Jakarta. 298p. (Refereed, Not Invited)
D. JournalArticles
1. Ali, M. 2011. Eclecticism of Modern Islam: Islam Hadhari in Malaysia. Studia Islamika. Vol. 18: 1 p.1-30. (Refereed, Not Invited)
2. Ali, M. 2010. Religion, Imperialism, and Resistance in the Nineteenth Century's Netherlands Indies and Spanish Philippines. Jurnal Kajian Wilayah (The Indonesian Journal of Area Studies). Vol. No. 1: No. 1 p.119-140. (Refereed, Not Invited)
3. Ali, M. 2010. "They are not All Alike": Indonesian Intellectuals Perception of Judaism and Jews. Indonesia and the Malay World. Vol. 38: 112 p.329-347. (Refereed, Not Invited)
4. Ali, M. 2007. "Categorizing Muslims in Postcolonial Indonesia". Moussons. Vol. 11: 2007 p.33-62. (Refereed, Not Invited)
5. Ali, M. 2007. Confrontation and Reconciliation: Muslim Voices of Maluku Conflict (1999-2002). Journal of Indonesian Islam. Vol. 1/2: 2007 p.379-402. (Refereed, Invited)
6. Ali, M. 2007. "Chinese Muslims in Indonesia: A Post-Diasporic Experience". Explorations. Vol. 7/2: 2007 p.1-22. (Refereed, Not Invited)
7. Ali, M. 2006. "Menengok Barat, Mengembangkan Tradisi Ilmiah di Indonesia" (Learning from the West, Developing Scientific Tradition in Indonesia). Mimbar Agama dan Budaya (Pulpit of Religion and Culture). Vol. 23/1: p.25-41. (Refereed, Not Invited)
8. Ali, M. 2006. "Transmission of Islamic Knowledge in Kelantan". The Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Vol. 79: 2 p.39-58. (Refereed, Not Invited)
9. Ali, M. 2005. "The Rise of the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia". American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences. Vol. 22:1: p.1-27. (Refereed, Not Invited)
10. Ali, M. 2004. "Honoring Religions". Peace & Policy. Vol. 9: p.86-89. (Refereed, Not Invited)
11. Ali, M. 2003. "Dialogue Amongst Civilizations". Resonansi. Vol. 1:2: p.1-7. (Non-Refereed, Invited)
12. Ali, M. 2002. "The Concept of Umma and teh Reality of the Nation-Sate: A Western and Muslim Discourse". Kultur: The Indonesian Journal of Muslim Cultures. Vol. 2/1: p.46-59. (Refereed, Not Invited)
13. Ali, M. 2002. "The Fatwas on Interfaith Marriage in Indonesia". Studia Islamika. Vol. 9:3: p.1-25. (Refereed, Not Invited)
E. Other
1. Ali, M. 2004. Information about the publication that was reviewed: (Working Paper) "Islam and Economic Development in New Order's Indonesia" 1967-1998. East-West Center Working Papers. p. 1-24. Vol. 12. (Non-Refereed, Not Invited)

F. Reference Entries
1. Ali, M. 2004. "Jihad: East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia". Brill Academic Publishers. Leiden. The Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Culture. p.231-234. (Non-Refereed, Not Invited)
(Submitted)
1. Ali, M. Islamic Liberalism in Southeast Asia. Editor(s): Robert Repino. Imtiyaz Yusuf . Oxford University Press. New York. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. (Submission 09/15/2011. 15 manuscript pages.) (Refereed, Electronic, Not Invited)
2. Ali, M. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (the Party of Liberation Indonesia). Editor(s): Henry Schwarz. Blackwell. Blackwell Encyclopedia of Postcolonial Studies. (Submission 05/26/2011. 12 manuscript pages.) (Refereed, Not Invited)
G. Review Essays
1. Ali, M. 2009. . . . Pages reviewed: p. . . p.409-415. (Refereed, Not Invited)
H. Textbooks

(Submitted)
1. Ali, M. Religion: A Clinical Guide to Religion. . Jones & Bartlett. Burlington, MA . (Submitted 08/10/2011. 8 manuscript pages.) (Refereed, Not Invited)


Semitechnical Publications
A. JournalArticles
1. Ali, M. 2005. Religious Pluralism in the United States. Syir'ah. Vol. 1: 2004 15p. (Refereed, Not Invited)
2. Ali, M. 2004. Indonesia's Tradition of Moderation. Elections Today. Vol. 12: 2004 2p. (Refereed, Invited)

Global Islam: between Images and Reality

Global Islam: Between images and reality
Muhamad Ali, Riverside, California | Mon, 12/20/2010 3:03 PM | Review & Outlook
A | A | A |

Globalization has made the world of Islam more heterogeneous than homogeneous. It continues to shape Islam identities and moralities, imagined or real, at both global and local levels. What is conceptually homogenous is Islam itself, but what it means differs.

Globalization in its broadest sense is not new, and early Islam normatively preached trans-racial, trans-ethnic solidarity of the community of the believers, although information technology today has made them even more aware of the world.

Islam emerged as a local path of Prophet Muhammad and his followers, but with the power of the Koran and Arabic, Islam has ever since become increasingly global, crossing non-Arabic Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia and the Americas. From early times, Muslims have been politically divided into the Shiite and the Sunni, the Khawarij, the Murji’a, the Mu’tazila, and so forth, although the efforts to unify them have never ceased.

Of course, Muslims read the Koran, commanding them to be united in the rope of God, not to be divided into sects, but there is neither linear nor teleological history of Islam, as if all Muslims are progressing from the chaos to the orderly.

Elements of the old and the new, the normative and the practical, the just and the unjust, have interacted in ways that vary from people to people and from time to time. There is no one direction of Islam today, as was the case in the past.

The lack of one global leadership of Islam has been felt as a challenge to the unity by some of the believers reviving the caliphate when this same deficiency is cherished by most other Muslims scattered in and working through their nation-states, ethnicities, social or political organizations.

The phrase “the Muslim world” itself is problematic if it means there is real, effective, face-to-face unity among most Muslims in the world today.

Of course, in Islamic sermons and publications, prayers are recited for Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and other conflict areas where Muslims suffer from war.

But when people talk about global or transnational Islam, or Islamic revivalism, they refer to the fundamentalist, “Islamist”, “jihadist”, very little to the progressive, sometimes liberal orientations and expressions that exist.

Being socially and modernly constructed, the labels are felt necessary in people’s attempt at simplifying complex realities, but the perception of Islamic fundamentalism as the main player in global discourse and politics has not become weaker.

Thus, people today are not used to pointing to the Turkish Fethullah Gulan Movement, the Indonesian Muhammadiyah or the Nahdlatul Ulama, progressive Muslim networks, which have become increasingly no less global than hard-liners such as al-Qaeda, Jamaah Islamiyah, or the more diverse Muslim Brotherhood.

At the same time, much ignorance and instant information about Islam and Muslim societies: with so much information and variables available in TV programs, films, novels and the Internet, Muslims and non-Muslims alike do not necessarily have the knowledge to comprehend the complexity. Thus it may be easier to find a claim that Islam is an intolerant religion among the Islamophobic societies or to read another that claims it is a tolerant, peaceful religion among the devout preachers and committed leaders.

With other religious and secular leaders, Muslim leaders from Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey and other countries have been promoting global tolerance, balance of power and peace, searching for a common ground, although still limited to the Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam, albeit still exclusive of other faiths.

Within the global religious markets, Muslim leaders and scholars, often along with non-Muslim counterparts, have thus been more preoccupied with correcting the images or what they call misperceptions about Islam and Muslims, but they generally are not interested in acknowledging the degree of diversity and complexity of Islam and Muslims. There is an obsession with image-correction.

The conspiracy or global makar theory, neo-imperialism, clash of civilizations and cosmic war have remained crucial parts of global public discourse.

But it is more difficult to find individuals and people who seek to understand both the complexity of Islam and the complexity of other religions and faiths, including secularism and liberalism.

Global Islam is the world of diversification, democratization and polarization of religious information and authority; no group represents or has the authority to orient all the Muslims across the globe, toward a real, unified community of believers.

The homogenization of the world of Islam has always been prayed for and preferred by many leaders, driven by both scriptures and real disunity, but problems and issues have endlessly polarized Muslims everywhere, not always as Muslims but as members of particular ethnic, national or political groups. Their immediate concerns are far more urgent for them to be addressed in their localities.

As minorities, some Muslims have just started to debate how to be French Muslims, American Muslims, Australian Muslims and so forth, and as majorities, many Muslims continue to negotiate their place in an increasingly pluralistic society. Even within the nation-states and provinces, Muslims are divided into various factions, political or non-political.

At the national and local levels, it is not so obvious for global citizens to recognize that many Muslim networks and organizations locally have contributed to addressing not so much Islamic problems but shared problems, such as governmental corruption, poverty, illiteracy, injustice, health, environment and violence.

Such local efforts in dealing with immediate problems with or without collaboration among Muslims, or between Muslims and non-Muslims, strengthen the diversification of Islam, rather than unifying it into a single global management.

There is no global or local, social or political engineering that would be effective enough to homogenize the world of local Muslim societies everywhere. Muslims have long been active participants in localizing their “universal” worldview, thereby pluralizing the world. Perhaps it is God alone who knows best the mystery of human unity and diversity.

The writer, author of Bridging Islam and the West: An Indonesian View (2009), is an assistant professor in religious studies, University of California, Riverside.

Amerika Serikat dan Kebebasan Beragama

AS dan Kebebasan Beragama
Rabu, 15 September 2010 | 04:42 WIB

Muhamad Ali

Kontroversi pembangunan pusat Islam di dekat Ground Zero—tempat serangan teroris 11 September 2001— membuat Presiden Amerika Serikat Barack Obama yang beragama Protestan harus angkat bicara. Wali Kota New York Michael Bloomberg, yang beragama Yahudi, sebelumnya mendukung.

Meski awalnya low profile karena itu ia anggap urusan Kota New York, ikut campurnya Obama menunjukkan isu Islam dan Barat, Islam dan keamerikaan, serta agama dan kebebasan agama belum selesai di Amerika Serikat.

Mereka yang menolak, termasuk Sarah Palin, kandidat wakil presiden dari Partai Republik, dan kaum konservatif agama dan politik, beranggapan bahwa Islam bertanggung jawab terhadap tragedi 11 September. Banyak keluarga korban beranggapan, pendirian pusat Islam mengkhianati para korban. Penolakan juga mencerminkan anggapan Islam sebagai musuh Amerika dan ancaman keamanan.

Sebaliknya, bagi Obama, Bloomberg, dan banyak orang Amerika lain, Islam dan tragedi 11 September harus dibedakan. Islam telah menjadi bagian dari Amerika sejak berabad-abad meski baru berkembang pertengahan awal abad ke-20. Tokoh dan masyarakat Muslim Amerika yang mayoritas usia muda, kelas menengah, dan liberal secara politik terus menyumbang pembangunan dan kemajuan Amerika.

Mayoritas Muslim di Amerika sangat prihatin dengan terorisme dan munculnya ekstremisme keagamaan. Karena itu, makin banyak Muslim yang menyuarakan visi progresif dan inklusif Islam di Amerika.

Obama menekankan, kebebasan beragama tidak boleh tergoyahkan. Islam mengajarkan keadilan, perdamaian, dan toleransi. Sementara Al Qaeda adalah distorsi Islam.

Rencana pembakaran Al Quran dan ungkapan-ungkapan anti-Islam di media massa dan internet menunjukkan sebagian masyarakat memang tidak tahu tentang Al Quran dan Islam.

Fobia Islam

Dukungan Obama terhadap kebebasan agama muncul dalam konteks masih berkembangnya fobia Islam di Amerika di mana sebagian masyarakat masih mencurigai komunitas Muslim setelah 11 September. Oleh karena itu, ketegasan Obama secara terbuka di banyak kesempatan menjaga harapan akan ditepatinya janji- janji dia selama kampanye dan di awal pemerintahannya.

Dukungan Obama terhadap pendirian pusat Islam juga bukti komitmennya pada rasa keadilan Muslim Amerika yang kini mencapai tujuh juta jiwa. Karena sensus Amerika tidak punya afiliasi agama, asal kebangsaan dan bahasa menjadi tanda demografi Muslim. Sebagian besar Muslim di Amerika tetap ingin menjadi Muslim— Sunni, Syiah, Nation of Islam, atau tanpa afiliasi—sekaligus menjadi warga negara yang patuh, terdidik, dan maju.

Menurut survei, lebih dari separuh Muslim Amerika tidak mempertentangkan Islam, demokrasi, dan pluralisme. Banyak organisasi advokasi bekerja sama dengan Gedung Putih dan penegak hukum dalam menciptakan strategi di bidang kebijakan publik, hak-hak sipil, dan isu-isu publik lainnya. Banyak warga Muslim terlibat dalam pemerintahan lokal dan lembaga-lembaga swadaya masyarakat Islam maupun antaragama. Semakin Muslim berpartisipasi dalam kehidupan sosial dan politik, semakin moderat dan selaras pemikiran dan sikap mereka terhadap mainstream publik AS.

Paradigma hegemonik

Terhadap perkembangan Islam di AS, setidaknya ada dua kelompok: kelompok pertama adalah mereka yang ingin mempertahankan akar Protestan bangsa dan melihat imigrasi (termasuk Muslim) yang tanpa batas akan menggerogoti akar itu, seperti terbaca dalam buku Samuel Huntington Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (2004). Sejalan dengan paradigma hegemonik ini, banyak kalangan melihat Islam adalah ancaman bagi nilai-nilai demokratis dan liberal.

Kelompok kedua, seperti ditegaskan Diana Eck dan John L Esposito, adalah mereka yang melihat Amerika semakin pluralistis. Banyak kalangan melihat makin pentingnya peran Muslim sebagai bagian dari warga Amerika yang memiliki hak dan kewajiban sama dengan penganut agama lain dan bahkan non-agama. Islam dan Islam di Amerika menjadi bagian dari kurikulum di sekolah-sekolah dan perguruan tinggi di Amerika.

Pluralisme agama di AS di masa kontemporer–mulai dari toleransi, inklusi, hingga partisipasi, seiring dengan prinsip kebebasan beragama. Meski tidak tanpa perdebatan, kebebasan beragama menjadi komitmen setiap pemimpin Amerika. Konstitusi Amerika secara konsisten menyatakan pemisahan urusan agama dan urusan negara. Agama dan tidak beragama menjadi hak asasi pribadi dan komunitas sejauh tidak melanggar kebebasan orang lain dan ketertiban umum. Kebebasan ber-Islam harus adil dijaga, seperti kebebasan ber-Kristen, ber-Yahudi, ber-Hindu, dan bahkan hidup tanpa afiliasi agama.

Orang bisa berkata, Indonesia beda dari Amerika. Tapi interaksi dan saling belajar antarbangsa di dunia telah terjadi sejak berabad-abad lamanya. Amerika belajar dari sejarah imigrasi Spanyol, Inggris, Irlandia Utara, Afrika, Asia, dan sebagainya. Meski sekarang mayoritas, agama Protestan bukanlah agama asli penduduk AS. Di Indonesia, Islam, dan agama-agama dunia lain yang kini berkembang bukan agama-agama asli, tetapi semua muncul karena mereka terbuka terhadap gagasan- gagasan dari luar, seiring dan beradaptasi dengan tradisi-tradisi lokal, mereka pun berkembang.

Adil dan manusiawi

Kebijakan adanya agama-agama resmi memang tidak ada di AS. Sebaliknya, Indonesia mengakui adanya agama-agama resmi dan negara menjamin kebinekaan dan kebebasan beragama setiap warga. Meski pelaksanaan kebebasan beragama tidak kaku, ia harus selaras dengan prinsip-prinsip keadilan dan kemanusiaan.

Kebijakan pemimpin harus adil terhadap penganut agama dan kepercayaan seperti diatur hukum dan undang-undang. Prinsipnya, menjadi minoritas Muslim di AS seharusnya tidak ada beda dengan menjadi minoritas Muslim yang berbeda aliran dan non-Muslim di Indonesia.

Di AS, kebebasan beragama tidak tanpa batas. Salah kaprah jika beranggapan kebebasan beragama di negeri itu tanpa batas. Hukum dan perundang-undangan jelas membatasi penerapan kebebasan beragama. Maka, pendirian masjid di New York juga harus mengikuti peraturan yang berlaku.

Komitmen kebebasan beragama dan persamaan hak tidak boleh tergoyahkan meski harus bertentangan dengan sebagian orang yang tidak tahu dan tidak peduli. Hak beragama masih harus diperjuangkan secara lebih serius di negeri demokrasi terbesar ketiga di dunia ini.

Muhamad Ali Dosen Studi Islam dan Agama-agama di University of California, Riverside; E-mail: muali@ucr.edu

State, Islamic Law and Minorities in Indonesia

State, Islamic Law and Minorities in Indonesia
The State, the Islamic Law,
and Religious Minorities in Indonesia

Author: Muhamad Ali, Ph.D
An assistant professor, Religious Studies Department,
University of California, Riverside

How did the State and civil society negotiate the Shari’a and the civil law in a modern pluralistic Indonesia? Why is it difficult for a compromise that pleases everyone? The State continues to function as the legitimate power to produce laws in which the Shari’a has to contribute and to adjust itself in a Muslim majority yet, pluralistic nation. The tensions and negotiations between various elements– the government and civil society, result from a long duree of encounters of the Middle East (including the Mediterranean), Europe, and Asia in the Indonesian archipelago. A history of a legal culture and interfaith interaction in a local context reveals the various and changing impact of global forces. Indonesia, being referred to as “the Umma below the winds”, or Jawi by people in Mecca, being part of Southeast Asia after World War II, is today described as the largest Muslim country in the world, although geographically and viewed religiously “peripheral” in relation to the Islamic center, the Middle East.

However, Indonesia has been a crossroads of various religions and cultures originating from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and more recently the United States. Connections and disconnections between continents prevail in this archipelago with more than 17,000 islands and 300 ethnic groups and 6 major religions. As for the Ottoman Empire, it was Acehnese who had the closest, albeit changing relations with the Ottoman, from the 16th century to the 19th century (for example, Aceh’s recognition of the Ottoman caliphate, asking for artillery technology, in exchange of pearls and diamonds, thus commercial, cultural, and religious interaction); Apart from being connected to India, exemplified by the kingdoms of Majapahit and Sriwijaya, the archipelago become gradually Islamized through Mecca and Medina, but more importantly via Egypt. The coming of the colonial powers (Portuguese, British, Dutch, and Japanese) had a lasting impact on the political, administrative, legal, and religious cultures of the population. During the late colonial time, in the early 20th century, world economy and print capitalism led to the emergence of socialist, nationalist, and Islamic organizations. Pan-Arabism, and pan-Islamism (caliphate) tried to penetrate into Indonesian market of ideas through the returning students and teachers and books, but they were not successful. Instead, localized, Java-based organizations were established–with Islam as the spirit and ethics rather than a trans-local political ideology. The MUHAMMADIYAH was a modernist organization adopting and adapting Dutch educational and organizational system, including how to dress and what language to use in mosque sermons. THE NAHDLATUL ULAMA (the Awakening of the Islamic Scholars, NU) emerged as a response to that modernism, trying to conserve traditional ways of mission and education. Muslims under occupation asked the question as to the status of being subject to the infidel (kafir) rulers. Many reasoned by quoting medieval Sunni scholar Al-Ghazzali: “it is better to be under a just infidel than under an unjust believer.” They were certainly various responses to colonialism, but Muslims interpreted the Sha’ria not in a rigid way.

In 1928, the conference of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Java issued their fatwas in response to various questions concerning other religions and the practices deemed as foreign influences. One of the questions was: “What is the opinion of the NU regarding wearing trousers, ties, shoes, and hats?” The NU general conference replied in the following manner, which then became its fatwa: “If one wears these with the intention to imitate and to follow the path of the unbelievers (kafir) and to promote their unbelief, then the person becomes kafir. If he or she does not have an intention at all to imitate the kafir (simply wearing this or that) and to follow their path, then the act is not forbidden. Nevertheless, it is considered undesirable (makruh).” This shows how they construct which foreign ideas and symbols are okay and which are not okay.

The Independent Republic of Indonesia adopted and adapted centuries of such different types of influences in making laws. The governments and the people’s representatives continued to regulate difference based on various and changing identity communal markers, particularly ethnicity, class, and religion. Thus the law that has survived today is pluralistic, drawing from various sources, pre-colonial (generally called customary, ADAT), colonial, and Islamic (especially as pertaining to Muslims) as a result of a long history of interactions. With the end of the Caliphate system in 1924, Muslims and non-Muslim minorities endorsed the modern nation-state. The earliest debate was about whether or not ISLAM would become the Constitution. Thus, the controversy of the Jakarta Charter emerged about whether or not the Constitution includes the obligation of Muslims in following the Shari’a. In any case, Indonesians see law as both principle and mechanism to managing pluralism and ensuring order, but at the same time, law becomes a site of contentious discourse involving the governments and civil society. Law and order are closely intertwined, but disorder and sometimes violence have become related to legal discourse and struggle.

In the post-colonial time, Indonesian’s legal pluralism is manifested primarily in the eclectic procedures: The Roman Dutch colonial law (although the Dutch later subscribed to a French civil law), the oral law culture (ADAT, customary law), and Islam– primarily Sunni and Shafi’i. Because Islam or the Shari’a does not provide detailed legal procedures, the Dutch derived civil law has become the main source for such procedures. The Shari’a deals primarily with some domestic matters, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Gradually the Shari’a minded Muslims seek to include more, including the Shari’a court (apart from the civil court), the zakat collection and distribution, pilgrimage management, and interest-free banking. More recently, decentralization– after 32 years of centralization, has lead some regencies to enact Islam-based laws, concerning dressing, gambling, drugs, and moral issues.

The Marriage Law of 1974, for example, is to be implemented for Muslims through the Islamic Court and for non-Muslims through the Civil Court. The Law states the minimum age of groom (19 years old) and of bride (16 years old). The Ministry of Religious Affairs register Muslims, and the Civil Registration Office non-Muslims. The principle is monogamy, but polygamy is not forbidden with agreement of previous wives or the court with some requirements (financial and just treatment). Divorce is by the court’s decision. The Law does not allow interfaith marriage, and this and others have become controversial. The debates on the formalization of Islamic law at the national and local levels, are a reflection of an ever increasing influences of global ideas, including with the Iranian revolution, the global movement of caliphate, global Islamic movement for anti-neo-imperialism and neo-liberalism, and more recently the global sentiments of anti-American colonialism in the Middle East. However, the manifestation of such global ideas remains within the local and national constraints.

In the autonomous province of ACEH, for example, due to its unique history, the central government allowed it to pursue the formalization of Islamic Law. They have regional law (Peraturan Daerah) dealing with various aspects of private and public lives of Muslims, excluding non-Muslims. There is the council of the Shari’a and morality police controlling people’s prayers, fasting, sexual relations, gambling, and the like. The codification of the local law (QANUN) dealing with the Islamic court (marriage, inheritance, endowment, charity, economic transactions) includes the kind of punishment of prison or fines (ta’zir, diyat, not directly based on the Qur’an and the Sunna). The Qanun stipulates that non-Muslims, although not subject to the Islamic law, shall respect the implementation of the Islamic Law in Aceh.. The Acehness local rules dealing with heresies, blasphemy, and apostasy (MURTAD) indicate the increased influence of the religious authority in controlling the faith of the people, in the hope of religious conservatism and social order, but without necessarily considering the rights of minorities and the Indonesian Constitution. For many Indonesians outside Aceh, the formalization of Islamic law is not necessarily an Islamic, nor designed on the basis of a pluralistic Pancasila. For many, it is a politization of religion for the sake of identity and power.

Indonesia has been also a site and marketplace of global Islamic Movements emphasizing Islamic struggle (JIHAD) or Islamic call (DA’WA), such as Hizbut Tahrir (of Indonesia) of Palestinian origin, and Jama’at Tabligh of Indian origin, Wahhabism of Saudi origin, to name the most popular one, albeit their numbers are relatively small but vocal. Among the so many political discourses in Indonesia, Darul Harb versus Darul Islam are today no longer used; Indonesia has been seen by many if not most Muslims as either Darul Islam or Darul al-Sulh (Abode of Peace). The classical and medieval concept of the Dhimmitude is revived by some, but the idea and application seems not clear and not realistic. There are some Islamic movements who see the Constitution of Medina as the model for a pluralistic, tolerant State, but the histories of Muhammad and Indonesian Muslims are different. Others point to Muslim Spain (Convivencia) when talking about coexistence of Muslims, Christians, and Jews, but the still unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflicts overshadow the spirit of harmony, and instead often filled with tensions and prejudices.

Global and Islamic ideas and issues become localized, thanks to communication technology; and few Indonesians actually become involved in traveling to other countries. When they study or travel abroad, most tend to go home. However, despite the small number of Indonesian diasporas, Indonesian Muslims do not find any significant contradiction between Islamic solidarity (UMMA), national solidarity (WATAN), and international, humanistic solidarity (BASYAR). There is a movement toward nationalization of the Shari’a, which means different things to different peoples, but demonstrates how Islamization, globalization, and nationalism are perceived as not contradictory and instead reinforcing each other. In other words, broadly speaking, Indonesians experience multiple and multifaceted processes: Localization, Arabization, and Westernization. The persistence of the State Ideology of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution until today show how world ideologies (monotheism, humanism, nationalism, democracy, and socialism) have their strengths and relevance to the nation building. The Constitution which guarantees religious freedom (but its definition and limits have been contested) provides Indonesians with basis for justifying their actions toward one another. In the courts, political speeches, scholarly statements, leaders and people try a balancing act: Indonesia being neither an Islamic state, nor a purely Western type secular state; but instead the State of Pancasila, which guarantees freedom of religion, but supports religious development of the population. According to the official statements, Indonesia is not a theocratic State in the sense that the State Constitution is not based upon or derives its source from a specific religious law. By the same token, it is not a secular state in the sense that the government is neutral toward the development and the prompting of religious life of the people. Indonesian State does not recognize communism and atheism. At the semi-governmental level, there are councils for religious leaders: Islamic, Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian. The Council of Islamic Scholars, for example, have issued their Fatwas concerning “minorities”, fatwas which are not legally binding but are often heard by many. For example, the Council issued fatwas condemning religious pluralism, liberalism, and secularism in their definition (pluralism is to believe all religions are equal, liberalism is to use reason over revelation, and secularism is to separate the worldly from the religious).

They also condemned the Ahmadiyya of Qadiani (India) as heretical and the tensions and violence against its followers erupted in different parts of Indonesia. Contemporary Indonesia have witnessed various Interfaith Debates: Religious Mission (Christianization versus Islamization), the place of Chinese Minorities, Marriage Law (inter-religious marriage), National Education Law (religious education in public schools), Joint Celebration of Christmas, and the building of religious houses. The most recent rejection by the Constitution Court of some liberal groups to revoking the Blasphemy Law of 1965, banning a religious interpretation that is not in accordance with the mainstream, a complex story in itself, reveals how the majority mentality (fearing religious difference to cause social disorder) still prevails. Religious interpretations are subject to Law, but the Law that ensures a sense of security (based on perceived or real threats posed by far and near enemies). Different responses by other Muslims and non-Muslims toward the formalization of Islamic Law and the Blasphemy Law have emerged: Some say, Indonesia is not an Arab country (thus, tensions between outright Arabization versus Indonesianization); other say the formalization of the Islamic law is against the secular Pancasila and religious freedom guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution; still others argue that the Qur’an has no details about the kind of governance and that what is crucial is the substance and spirit– such as the objectives of protecting faith, reason, spirit, family, and property. Others suggest that the categorization of Muslims as majority and others as minority do not do justice to diversity among the majority themselves– such as in the cases of Muslims criticizing the formalization of Islamic law in Aceh and in parts of Indonesia, and the preservation of the Blasphemy Law this year.

In conclusion, the negotiation of the Shari’a and civil law in Indonesia is linked to multiple, long and short forces and processes, allowing tensions and coexistence of identities and cultures. The State’s management of difference cannot be well understood without investigating the strengths and limits of global and local ideas and networks in particular local contexts. What the Indonesian case can contribute to our world history perspective of encounters is that with the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate, and after world war II, religion and nationalism, or Islam and citizenship, interacted with tensions and integration depending on socio-political agency and contexts, in ways that Prophet Muhammad himself and Muslim caliphs never anticipated.

(This paper was presented at a panel “Confessional Communities and Legal Cultures in the Mediterranean and Beyond”, the World History Conference, University of California Riverside, 14-15 May, 2010)

Gus Dur as a Defender of Pluralism, Religious Freedom

Gus Dur as a defender of pluralism, religious freedom

Muhammad Ali , Riverside, CA | Wed, 01/06/2010 9:31 AM | Opinion

Pluralism has always been a contentious issue, but Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid worked beyond passive tolerance. He advocated the creation of a public space for communication, dialogue and cooperation between the mainstream and the marginalized.

Raised in a pesantren (Islamic boarding school) and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) tradition, but also in Western and Eastern traditions, Gus Dur became the advocate of a reform rooted in the traditions.

He received awards and honorary positions from Shimon Peres, Temple University, for his con-tinued advocacy for the rights of minorities in Indonesia, and many others.

He was the president of the Non-Violence and Peace Movement, a board member of the International Strategic Dialogue Center in Israel, Interreligious for Reconciliation and Reconstruction in London, and one of the founders and board members of the Shimon Perez Center for Peace in Israel. He has been regarded by many in the world as a true defender of pluralism.

Christian scholar Th. Sumartana calls Gus Dur a consistent interpreter and giver of meaning to pluralism as both reality and norm.

He underwent a religious and intellectual evolution from being an “extremist”, who viewed Islam as an alternative to the West, to being an “eclectic cosmopolitan”, who saw Islam as a way of life that learned from nonreligious and other religious ideas.

For him, religious pluralism was a new concept nonexistent in the writings of classical and medieval Muslim scholars, but the absence of the term did not mean Islam was not pluralistic.

For him, pluralism was both descriptive and prescriptive. It meant awareness that Muslims were diverse and people were religiously diverse, believers and nonbelievers.

Pluralism awareness could only come from a nation without a formalized religious system. He reasoned that because the Koran guaranteed religious freedom and no compulsion in faith, the state should not engage in making any one religious interpretation superior over others.

He asked, rhetorically, “Isn’t it that God and his messenger promote a universal brotherhood [persaudaraan manusia]?”

For Gus Dur, pluralism also meant accepting that everyone had the right to be exclusive as well as inclusive.

Muslims’ claim of truth is not unique, as the Second Vatican Council stated they respected everyone’s right to reach their truths, but they believed the truth was in the Roman Catholic Church. Competing truth claims are normal. Gus Dur said, “That is clear.

“And Islam is also clear. We will not be shaken in our tauhid concept, but we respect other faiths. Our founding fathers, although mostly Muslims, were able to accept other concepts of God, and worked out to agree on the basic concept of One God for Indonesia.”

In 1995, Gus Dur said, “Essentially all religions are the same as they are revealed by God in order that human beings from different origins, cultures and trajectories may love each other and in order that they may uphold morality, mercy and solidarity.”

He emphasized Islamic universalism in different aspects (belief, law and ethics), addressing humanness (insaniyya), including human equality and human rights.

At the same time, Islam is open to different cultural manifestations and intellectual insights from other civilizations.

This creative Islamic cosmopolitanism, in his view, had been achieved at its peak when there was a balance between Muslims’ normative orientations and freedom of thought given to all peoples, including non-Muslims.

For Gus Dur, a kafir was not just one who denied God’s truth, but also one who could be a believer but denied God’s blessing. “Kafir doesn’t necessarily mean non-Muslim,” Gus Dur said, but rather unbelievers who attacked Islam, in that context nonbelievers in Mecca. There was a difference, he went on, between non-Muslims and the offensive kafir, the categorical kafir.

To Gus Dur, the Koran was clear in affirming religious freedom. Concerning apostasy or irtidad, he was aware of the traditional view that it be punishable by death, but warned one should not compromise the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Indonesian contexts.

He wrote, “If capital punishment were to be applied in Indonesia, there would be more than 20 million people killed because of their conversion from Islam to Christianity since 1965.” Therefore, he urged reform in Islamic law in accordance with time and place.

Gus Dur also promoted the idea of localization (pribumisasi) of Islam, rather than “Arabization”,
although he was well versed in Arabic. By the Indonesianization of Islam he meant the blending of
Islamic beliefs and values with local culture.

“The source of Islam is revelation, which bears its own norms. Due to its normative character, it tends to be permanent. Culture, on the other hand, is a creation of human beings and therefore develops in accordance with social changes.

This, however, does not prevent the manifestation of religious life in the form of culture,” he said.

Islamic ecumenism, borrowed from historian Arnold Toynbee, Islamic universalism or cosmopolitanism, was for Gus Dur based on the five objectives of Islamic law (of al-Shatibi): protection of life, protection of belief, protection of family and future generations, protection of property and protection of mind. The rule of law and certainty must guarantee fair and just treatment for all citizens, without exception.

He believed that through free and open dialogue, truths could be reached by those participants who had “healthy and common reason”.

In dialogues, one must be sincere in seeking and keeping truth and in thinking and expressing views.

Intolerance comes from religious illiteracy and narrow-mindedness. For instance, one who likes to mock the deities of others is religiously illiterate.

Gus Dur quoted the Koran: “You should not mock the gods of others because when you mock them then it means you mock your own god.”

Gus Dur was a consistent defender of the Pancasila, and saw the Religious Affairs Ministry as a political compromise between the Islamic state and the purely secular state. Muslims do not have the obligation to establish an Islamic state.

His progressive thinking, advocating democracy, religious tolerance and human rights, have become influential among younger, progressive NU and non-NU activists, liberal intellectuals, NGOs, Christians and Chinese, Ahmadiyah sect leaders, businesspeople and more. Rest in peace, Gus Dur!


The writer wrote a master’s thesis on Gus Dur’s religio-political thought. He is now an assistant professor at the Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Riverside.

Learning Salaam, Making Peace on Earth

Learning universal `Salaam', making peace on Earth

Muhamad Ali , California | Wed, 09/23/2009 12:19 PM | Opinion

If one walks along the Ganges River in Benares, India, one keeps hearing the phrase "Shanti, shanti, shanti", meaning "peace, peace, peace", and when used in English, one understands it as "farewell", or "Rest in Peace", or in Hawaii, Aloha. When one sees Jews greeting each other, one hears, "Shalom", and from Muslims, one hears "Salam" or "Al-salaam mu *alaikum: "Peace be upon you." Salaam has many meanings: safety, welfare, prosperity, security, fortune, friendliness, and peace.

There is no religion, faith, or spiritualism that does not preach peace, yet one or some religious traditions are singled out as "a religion of the sword", "a religion of violence or terrorism", whereas others as "religion of peace", religion of pacifists, and so on.

It is often forgotten that religions and ideologies have to face occasions when tensions, conflicts, violence, and sometimes wars become inevitable for complicated different reasons: Political, economic, cultural, as well as religious.

Peace is sometimes understood as an absence of aggression, war, violence, or hostility. Peace is when there are healthy interpersonal, inter-group, inter-family, inter-church, international relationships. The causes for the absence or lack of peace can be insecurity, social injustice, economic inequality, ignorance, religious fanaticism, or chauvinist nationalism.

Indeed, some Muslim groups use the sword either in defending or expanding their universalizing faith. But Islam, like any other religion and ideology, can be used for that expansionist zeal as well as for protecting, supporting, and making a difference to make a world a better place to live.

A violent leader is more likely to see the texts such as the Koran as justifying his violent acts against the others he sees as "the enemy".

A peaceful, tolerant leader will see the Koran in an entirely different way. For him and many others the Koran is an inspiration for love of others, coexistence, and peace. They cultivate the ethos of tolerance and non-violence.

Therefore, for us, it is a time to choose whether we act as a loving, peaceful personality or otherwise. As a rabbi Jonathan Sacks in his book "the Dignity of Difference", says, "if religion, or faith, cannot be part of a solution, it will certainly be part of the problem."

Islam shares such common values as love, compassion, freedom, responsibility, and interconnectedness. A Muslim is anyone who loves his or her brothers and sisters and does not kill nor incite killings of self or others. A Muslim is someone whose heart fluctuates but remains controllable and peaceful.

Peace is not a state where there is no noise, trouble or hard work: peace is in the midst of those things and still to be calm in our heart.

Islam also endorses "no coercion in matters of faith", because a coerced faith is neither genuine nor sincere. Islam emphasizes that mankind is made up of brothers and sisters, regardless of religion, race, gender, politics, and economic standing.

Global brotherhood and sisterhood manifests themselves in very local, very personal lives. "And the people of God are those who walk on the earth in humility, and when the ignorant address them, they say, "peace"(Guidance: 63) . "Had not God checked one group of people, there would surely have been destroyed monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of God is much remembered." (Pilgrimage: 40)

Faith-based communities, local or global, were born out of concern about surrounding social problems. Faiths operate to make a difference. It is therefore necessary for faiths to listen to each other, to understand what the others are working on, to seek common concerns and work in co-existence, while symbolic and ritualistic differences are simply respected and valued.

A basic understanding of humanness and human kindness (that everyone has equal dignity as human before being Christian, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist, atheist, straight, gay, and so forth). If people believe in God, but they use different terms for God, then they share that humility before God. If some believe and others do not believe in God, they still share that human kindness. The Koran uses the term "children of Adam".

Peace can only last when there is such basic understanding of equality of every single being. German religion scholar Hans Kung, for instance, says, "no peace among the nations without peace among the religions, no peace among the religions without dialogue between the religions, and no dialogue between the religions without investigation of the foundation of the religions." I would add that there is no sound investigation of the religions without the understanding that every human being has inherent dignity.

What is sometimes missing in many peace efforts has been "an affirmation of the convergent spiritual and cultural bases for peace". There are Muslims who view God as scary, a punishing judge; but there are other Muslims who view God as a primarily loving, compassionate, forgiving power. There are Muslims who thinks that others do not deserve religious freedom, but there are other Muslims who struggle to uphold religious freedom.

There are Muslims who emphasize a Koranic passage "There is no coercion in religion" (2:256), but others stress "fight against infidels". There are Muslim women who wear headscarves, but others who do not; and so on. Among Muslims you have people who judge other Muslims as *less Islamic', not part of the Islamic community. Healthy and unhealthy relationships have started since the rise of humankind and continue today.

Why not embrace diversity when diversity is more beautiful and meaningful than homogeneity? How else would one understand a Koranic verse that says "Had your Lord so willed, He would have made humankind one community, but He made them different in order to try you with that which He had given you." (5:48)?

Peace in the heart would make it easier to accept and to cherish peace in society. A genuine, comprehensive and lasting peace will only be possible if it is based on peace within the hearts of each participating individual (fi qalbun salim). If our heart-mind is peaceful, our relationships with each other will be peaceful. If one's mind is in a mess, then our actions will be a mess.

Before anything else, we need to have "inner peace": by valuing the life we are in, realizing weaknesses we are attached to, hoping that a better one is possible. That inner peace can be realized at the very individual level as a mom, dad, daughter, son, partner, teacher, student, neighbor, citizen, immigrant, black, white, brown, purple, yellow, green, and so on.

Inner peace does not depend on symbols, cloths, flags we wear. It is deeply inside our own hearts. The Prophet Muhammad once reminded his followers, "Arabs are no better than non-Arabs, what defines them is their piety", "it is not about what you wear, nor about your body appearance, it is what is in your hearts." In other times, when asked to make decisions, he would reply, "consult your heart".

The idea of Islam as being "submission to the divine and the spiritual" is not to make human beings puppets, incapable, powerless, submissive, inactive, reactive, violent, unjust, discriminatory. A Muslim is someone whose words and actions are not harmful to anyone else and to anything, including plants, animals, and the natural environment.

On compassion and mercy or rahma, the Koran says, "We have not sent you except as a mercy for all beings." (21:107) Prophet Muhammad said "Have mercy on people so you may receive mercy; forgive people so you may be forgiven"

Islam states that God is love (hub) and there is no realm of existence where love does not manifest itself in some way. An Iranian-American scholar Hossein Nasr says, "metaphysically speaking, the gravitational attraction of physical bodies for each other is a particular instance of the universal principle of love operating on the level of physical reality." A woman Sufi of Bashra (in today's Iraq), Rabi'ah al-Adawiyyah, describes her love of God in her poem, "Two ways I love Three: selfishly, And next, as worthy is of Thee, Tis selfish love that I do naught, Save think on Thee with every thought."

Jalaluddin Rumi, the most widely read poet in America, says that when the pen comes to the question of describing what love is, it breaks in half. There will be no lasting peace without love. There are people who claim that they love God and because they love God and His prophet, they show hatred to others seen as "the enemy", "a threat", "obstacles", or "heretics". How come they love God but do not love His creations? How come people claim they love human beings when they hate Muslims just because they are Muslims? How come people claim they are compassionate when they perpetuate prejudices of other peoples because of their faith? Love cannot be partial. Love cannot be discriminatory. Love cannot be limited to certain beings while harboring hatred against others. "Wish for others whatever you wish for yourself."

Peace is not a state of being without anger. To abstain from anger and hard feelings is plainly impossible. Those qualities are within everyone, a Sufi philosopher Imam al-Ghazzali said "It is to live in this world productively, constructively, peacefully, not in a utopian kingdom. This world can be a paradise, heaven - when we love and bless each other, serve one another, and become the partners for one another's growth, enlightenment, and bliss".

But this world can also be a hell- in which we experience endless pain, loss of love, lack of caring, and wars. It is to compete with one another in good works, in service to the community, to the environment we live in, and to the world. It is to make peace when there are conflicts, to build and to keep peace when there is relative peace.

Jalaluddin Rumi has invited us in his poem:

Come now whoever you are!

Come without any fear of being disliked

Come whether you are a Muslim, a Christian, or a Jew,

Come whoever you are!

Whether you believe or do not believe in God

This door is not a door of fear

This is a door of good wishes

The writer, Ph.D., is an assistant professor, Religious Studies Department, University of California, Riverside.

My article Umma and the Nation State Islamic and Western Discourses

http://www.scribd.com/doc/14831142/Umma-and-the-Nation-State

What I am writing and hoping to publish this year

Terima kasih atas komentar-komentarny a dan sudah membaca sharing saya.Anda semua membuat saya perlu merespons balik. Awalnya, saya tulis daftar judul itu supaya bisa sharing kepada kawan-kawan saja, siapa tahu ada yang sedang menulis topik-topik yang sama, sehingga bisa tukar pikiran dan sumber. Dan siapa tahu diantara kawan-kawan ada yang mau sharing juga topik-topik apa yang mereka, Anda semua sedang riset dan tulis. Saya suka buka-bukaan. ...hihihi, karena saya pikir inilah salah satu fungsi milis ini.

Saya senyum-senyum saja, sunan Sukidi, sampe harus membawa mafia Harvard William Graham dan Eng Sengho, yang sudah professorr dan sangat established. Eh, saya suka sekali artikel Graham "Islamic traditionalism" dan Quran as a spoken word. Tapi pesan Sukidi sampe ke saya, bahwa kualitas itu lebih penting daripada kuantitas. Daftar judul yang saya tulis agak menyesatkan, seolah-olah saya menulis dalam waktu yang bersamaan sekaligus. Saya akan cerita dibawah.

Makasih banyak Sheik Nadirsyah atas kesalutan Syeikh terhadap perjalanan karir yang masih sangat dini ini. Saya apresiasi sekali, bahwa kita saling mendukung satu sama lain. Dalam benak saya, Kak Edy, Anda, Kak Oman, Sukidi, Arskal, dan semua yang pernah menulis artikel dan buku; Saya selalu berusaha mengoleksi karya-karya kawan sendiri. Saya sudah beli buku-buku Anda. Kitalah yang membaca karya-karya artikel dan disertasi kawan lebih dulu.

Masing-masing judul itu sebagian besarnya sudah saya riset dan tulis, karena sejak tahun 2005 ketika saya disertasi dan ketika saya pulang ke Indonesia setiap summer. Sekalian tip buat kawan-kawan, ketika riset disertasi, kita bisa mengumpulkan bahan-bahan yang tidak terbatas untuk disertasi. Ketika saya keliling cari sumber dan wawancara di Indonesia, Malaysia, Eropa, dan bagian-bagian AS.

1.. Pluralism in Madrasah in Indonesia and Malaysia (English and French). Artikel ini saya baru mulai tulis, berdasarkan sumber-sumber yang saya kumpulkan sejak riset 2005 dan akan lanjutkan risetnya Summer ini. Artikel ini saya akan presentasikan di Copenhagen dan di Paris. Selama ini, belum ada yang menulis topik pluralisme dan sekolah agama. Banyak artikel dan beberapa buku yang menulis reform madrasah, tapi belum spesifik tentang toleransi dan pluralisme, isu yang sejak lama saya geluti. Secara metodologis, ini adalah kajian sejarah analitik, dengan teori-teori pluralisme yang berkembang di AS dan di Perancis dan anthropology of knowledgenya Talal Asad. Bagaimanakah pluralisme didefinisikan, dikonstruksikan, dan dikontestasi dalam konteks pendidikan Islam.

2. Moderate Islamism in South Sulawesi (French). Artikel ini untuk saya presentasikan di Paris, dan saya sudah kumpulkan seabreg sumber sejak 2005 dan nanti juga Summer ini.

3. Religious Pluralism in Indonesian: A Theological and Political History (French). Ini sebetulnya artikel awal untuk proyek buku kedua saya. Sumber-sumbernya dah banyak terkumpul, tinggal menulis draftnya dan menambah sumber lain yang diperlukan summer ini. Ini juga untuk Paris.

4. Liberal Islam in Indonesia (French). Saya pernah nulis soal ini sebelumnya, hasil paper kelas waktu S-3, dan baru saja selesai kelanjutannya Online Liberal Islam, untuk konferensi di Pittsburgh beberapa bulan lalu, yang akan dibukukan dalam edited volume.

5. Enemy Within: Contesting Ahmadiyah in Indonesia (English) Ini berdasarkan talk yang sudah saya sampaikan di Hawaii, dan saya akan tulis karena sumber-sumbernya sudah menunggu di meja kerja saya. Perspektif sejarah dan religious studies.

6. Constructing and Contesting Progressive Islam: Islam Hadhari in Malaysia. Ini paper untuk AAR di Montreal, dan sudah saya awali menulis draftnya, tapi saya rencana interview Badawi dan lain-lain di Malaysia summer ini.

7. Diversity of Islamic Reforms in Indonesia and Malaysia. Sudah saya tulis draftnya untuk konferensi AAR tahun lalu, dan masih menunggu untuk dipertajam.

8. Islam and Local Tradition in Java and Sulawesi, ini paper kuliah S-3 saya, dan saya harus teruskan untuk jurnal. Sumber-sumbernya sudah banyak. Perspektif sejarah dan antropologi.

9. Constructing Religious Pluralism: Asghar Ali Engineer and Abdurrahman Wahid. Ini sudah saya tulis draftnya untuk konferensi American Muslim Social Scientists di Harvard tempo lalu. Dan saya mau kirim ke jurnal.

10. Jews in Madrasah in Indonesia. Ini saya tulis karena diundang workshop ARI, NUS, Juni ini, awalnya sebagai keynote speaker tapi karena keterbatasan waktu quarter ini, saya decline, saya hanya sebagai discussant saja. Summer ini mau cari sumber yang lebih memadai untuk topik ini.

Ada beberapa artikel lagi yang saya ingin kirim ke jurnal, berasal dari disertasi saya, yang saya akan pertajam, tentang 1. Japanese occupation dan Islam di Malaya dan Indonesia; tentang 2. bureaucratizing Islam: Dutch and British policies and Islam. 3. Constructing Boundaries: fatwa, khutba, and speeches.

Walhasil, tulisan-tulisan tidak ujuk-ujuk sekaligus, karena ngak kuaaat juga daah....asyiknya, saya bisa nulis ini disela-sela mengajar, membimbing mahasiswa, dan campus dan public service yang semuanya wajib untuk terus naik. Seperti diceritakan syeikh Nadir. Saya mau buka-bukaan juga soal situasi saya sekarang. Posisi sekarang kan assistant professor, dan sudah direview tahun pertama oleh jurusan, fakultas, dan tingkat universitas, dengan sangat memuaskan. Ada kolega saya, orang Amerika, yang tidak lolos proses review tahun awal ini karena kurang riset/publikasi. Saya lolos dan memuaskan. Ini semakin menjadi cambuk buat saya. Visa Amrik saya akan habis tahun depan; kalo saya mau lanjut, saya wajib daftar visa namanya "Outstanding Scholar", dan syaratnya, riset dan publikasi, dan sekitar 10 letters of support yang menunjukkan saya layak bekerja di AS. Semua ini membuat saya nervous dan wajib tetap produktik. Dalam dua terakhir, istri saya kuliah S-2 di Hawaii, jadi bolak balik Hawaii, dan belum dikarunia putra/putri, makanya saya punya banyak cukup waktu untuk riset dan nulis, dan bisa sering kerja di kantor sampe tengah malam. Saya satu-satunya di kampus kayaknya yang masih di office sampe tengah malam.

Persoalan positioning keilmuan, saya adalah sejarawan, tapi bukan sejarawan ala konvensional. Saya belajar Tafsir-hadith, lalu di Divinity waktu di Edinburgh, Islamic and Middle Eastern, dan sejarah (Eropa, Timteng, Dunia, Asteng), tapi saya memposisikan diri lebih sebagai new historian, yang menulis topik-topik kontemporer dalam perspektif sejarah dan teori ilmu-ilmu sosial. Saya at home sekali dengan ini. Antara disiplin ilmu dan area studies, Asia Tenggara khususnya. Di AS dan di Eropa, scholar Islam in Southeat Asia sangat sedikit, dan saya ingin terus memperkuat positioning ini. Tulisan-tulisan dan riset saya sejauh ini masih berada pada "Islam di Asia Tenggara" ini, meskipun meneliti aspek-aspek pengaruh Timteng, AS, dan Eropa di Asia Tenggara. Jadi, saya sulit menulis artikel dari pendekatan ilmu politik (Ali Munhanif, Saiful Muzani, dst), atau filologi (Kak Oman pakarnya); kalo pun menulis tentang politik, sejauh relasinya dengan Islam, dan kasusnya di Asia Tenggara.


Ali

Gaji dan Kinerja Dosen

soal perbandingan antara dosen muda IAIN/UIN, ITB, dan dosen muda di luar negeri. Topik ini bisa jadi artikel di Kompas atau Jakarta Post nih. hehe. tapi di sini aja karena kebetulan disinggung. Di semua tempat itu, ada hubungan antara gaji dan kinerja dosen (tridarma PT dimana-mana sama: ngajar, riset, ngabdi ke publik). Di IAIN Jkt, saya ingat dulu 180 ribu gaji pertama saya, cukup besar pada tahun 1998, tapi memang kurang untuk hidup di Jakarta; nah, "ngamen" menulis, dan undangan sana sini cukup membantu. Lalu dari beasiswa ke beasiswa juga cukup membantu. Tapi ternyata, bukan jumlah uangnya, justru keterampilan lah yang membuat kita survive. Apakah menulis, atau bagi yang ahli ceramah, atau berorganisasi, dan sebagainya. Keterampilan yang terus diasah, otak yang selalu dipakai, hati yang selalu dibersihkan. Di luar negeri, memang nominal gaji itu sangat besar dibanding dengan di Indonesia, tapi pengeluaran/kebutuhan di LN (termasuk pajak ini dan itu, asuransi ini dan itu) sangat besar juga. Di LN, seorang dosen muda, pilihannya juga sewa rumah, atau beli rumah dengan cara mortgage (atawa kredit sampai 30 tahun atau lebih, karena harga rumah yah milyaran lah), nah dosen muda di Indonesia kan sudah banyak yang punya atau beli rumah, tanpa harus ada beban kredit tiap bulan selama 30 tahun. Hal lain, dosen-dosen di LN mandiri dalam banyak hal: nyupir sendiri, kadang masak dan laundry sendiri, laki-laki maupun perempuan, semuanya serba mandiri. Nah di Indonesia kan, banyaklah yang punya supir, pembantu, dan minta tolong orang sana orang sini, karena memang secara kultural dan demografis berbeda. Ada banyak hal lain juga yang menunjukkan bahwa dedikasi, mentalitas, dan keterampilan lah yang menentukan hidup yang produktif, konstruktif dan cerah dan mencerahkan.

Jadi gaji dan kinerja itu relatif dan kontekstual juga. Dedikasi seorang dosen bisa sangat besar terlepas dari gaji yang secara relatif. (Saya jadi ingat guru Muslimah di Belitung seperti dinovelkan/difilmkan Laskar Pelangi). Masa depan cerah dan suram tergantung banyak faktor yang tidak bisa direduksi hanya pada masalah gaji.

Belakangan saya melihat di banyak kampus di Indonesia ada kesadaran dan peningkatan perhatian terhadap masalah gaji ini. Semoga upaya-upaya ini bisa membantu mengangkat kinerja para dosen, meskipun, seperti pengalaman saya, yang paling penting adalah dedikasi dan keterampilan mencipta dan menghasilkan yang bermanfaat. Mentalitas lah yang paling penting. Karena bisa saja nanti meskipun gaji dosen sudah memadai, tapi ngamen sana sini tetap jalan, perhatian terhadap mahasiswa tidak bertambah baik, penelitian tidak juga menjadi kebiasaan, menulis juga tidak meningkat, kebiasaan menonton dan ngomong lebih kuat. Lalu, apa fungsinya gaji naik itu kalo pola pikir dan mentalitas dosen kita tidak mengalami suatu "paradigm shift" (mengutip Thomas Kuhn)?

Islam Yoga Practice and Religious Essentialism

Islam, yoga practice, and religious essentialism
Muhamad Ali , Riverside, CA | Fri, 01/30/2009 1:58 PM | Opinion
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/01/30/islam-yoga-practice-and-religious-essentialism.html


The recent banning through a fatwa by the Ulema Councils in Malaysia and in Indonesia (Majelis Ulama Indonesi, MUI) of a particular form of yoga, the one with “Hindu elements”, poses some questions regarding the relationship between Islam, Hinduism, and other religions, and is filled with unnecessary essentialisms that have preoccupied Muslim scholars and society at large.


Understandably the fatwa was an attempt of some of the ulemas dominating the Council to guard the faith of the Islamic community from “corruption” and “heresies”.


Fatwas, although not legally binding to Muslims, are heard and followed by many Muslims who feel they need practical guidance from religious authorities.


In Indonesia, the MUI has served that purpose from 1975 to date, with much controversy about their existence and their role in the country.


The fatwa on yoga demonstrates that a religion is inherently pure, without any outside influences. It implies that Islam is pure, and its purity should be maintained.


The current discourse and the fatwa on yoga have overlooked the fact that Islam is historically and religiously diverse and complex; and yoga is also a very complex idea and practice.

The banning of a particular form of yoga for Muslims ignores the similarities and interaction between some forms of Sufism and some forms of yoga throughout history.


Yoga has been viewed and practiced in different and changing ways.

In Sanskrit, yoga can mean “to unite” or “to control”. It can be related to action, devotion, or knowledge. As a concept and practice, yoga has become not uniquely Hindu; it prevails in Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and other religions.


And it has become popular among many people today without any religious affiliation. Among Sufi Muslims, there are such yogic-like practices as recitation (zikir), invocation (doa) and exercise (riyadha) as part of their methods (suluks).


There is some ambivalence among those ulemas who tend to see purification as their major concern.


They ignore the fact that many ideas from the Koran and prophet Muhammad have influenced those who are not institutionally part of the Muslim community.


For example, Sufi Jalaluddin Rumi has been influential in the US, Europe and Australia; the so-called “non-Muslims” have learned much from Rumi without necessarily being “Muslim” if this term refers to a person who follows Muhammad as the main model.


Many of the verses that Rumi uses in his poems are Koranic and derived from Muhammad’s sayings and traditions, but “non-Muslims” do not necessarily consider these as corrupting their religious beliefs or unbelief (Catholic, Jewish, Hindus, Buddhist, etc).

It is theologically unfair to appreciate one’s tradition influencing others while not appreciating other traditions influencing yours.


On the other hand, there is a curious question regarding the Council’s differentiation between what is religious and what is not religious. The ban was directed at yoga which involves Hindu chanting and ritual.


Yoga aimed at physical health and mental discipline is permissible. Here we see how religion has been defined as exclusively ritualistic. Physical health is not considered religious.

This is very interesting because the ulemas are used to defining Islam as a complete way of life, which includes the maintenance of physical health. They must be aware that the Koran and Muhammad’s traditions talk about maintaining physical health and mental discipline by various means.

It seems that the ulemas of the Council believe that the means of keeping a Muslim healthy can be anything, including yoga, but the one without other “religious” elements.


By allowing physical discipline and banning mental and spiritual discipline, the ulemas seem to distinguish belief from practice, mind from body movement. They usually do not want to make distinctions between belief and practice, mind and body movement.


A more fundamental issue, I think, is the scholarly and popularly held view about the contradiction between Islam and Hinduism. Islam has been believed to be monotheistic, whereas Hinduism polytheistic, and therefore both are inherently antagonistic.


This is a simplification of the long and complex history of what we label Islam and Hinduism.

There were Muslims, either Sufis, philosophers, scholars, or lay people, who practiced the traditions of India – later called “Hinduism” – without seeing contradictions.


Abu Rayhan Al-Biruni, a Persian philosopher and scientist of the 11th century, for example, in his Kitab al-Hind, studied the Ramayana and the Mahabharata and appreciated the Hindu philosophical and spiritual system. Based on Hindu texts, Al-Biruni regarded Hinduism as monotheistic because not all Hindus worship multiple gods.


For example, many Hindus regard God is one, eternal, without beginning and end, acting by freewill, almighty, all-wise, living, giving life, ruling, preserving, unique, and so forth. These are some of the divine qualities not unlike the beautiful 99 attributes of God (asma al-husna) as described in the Koran.


In India, there were some Arab rulers, such as Muhammad Ibn Qasim, who saw Hindus as ahl al-kitab (people of the books) because they had scriptures – from the Vedas, Upanishads, and Bhagavad Ghita, among others. Thus, it is a gross simplification of belief among most Muslims – and most monotheists – to view Hinduism as of polytheism and idolatry.


There are many Hindus who only worship and give reverence to one supreme power – either Vishnu or Shiva – or their manifestations avatar or Brahman (in the Upanishad). Muslims also discuss some ideas of karma and reincarnation.


There are Sufis who do not see Hindus as necessarily kafir, usually defined as “non-believers”, because Hindus believe in God and have divine scriptures.


Indonesian Muslims are actually well-known for their long history of religious and cultural accommodation with animistic, Hindu, and Buddhist ideas – including stories of the Ramayana and Mahabharata.


And this has become one of the major factors that facilitate the transmission and localization of Islam in many parts of the archipelago. Religious diversity and interpenetration between ideas and practices need be seen as a strength rather than weakness.


When relating to other religions, the ulemas have a responsibility to understand the complex and different and shared aspects of religions and not be satisfied with unnecessary oversimplifications and essentialism.

There is today a greater responsibility for those who claim themselves as ulemas to reform themselves by broadening their perspectives. In fact, the Koran defines the ulemas as those who are learned in various different disciplines, not simply the so-called traditional revealed knowledge.


The Council’s fatwas are one among many voices of Islamic interpretation in Indonesia.


In fact, religious authority has become increasingly diverse and dispersed; and more and more people are being educated through the increasing means of learning and communication.

These fatwas, like others, should remain voices in the public sphere, and hopefully will not be linked to any political or legal institution that would enforce them.


The writer teaches Islam and Asian religions. He is currently an assistant professor at the University of California, Riverside.

Barack Obama and Revival of American Values

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/01/21/barack-obama-and-revival-american-values.html

Barack Obama and revival of American values
Muhamad Ali , Riverside, CA | Wed, 01/21/2009 10:58 AM | Opinion

Barack Obama’s rise to the presidency of the United States of America is a historic moment for Indonesians as much as for Americans and others around the world. Barack Obama has been shaped by history and is making history.


To me, Barack Obama is the second person I become proud of whom I can personally and intellectually relate to after Muhammad Ali, a Muslim African-American boxer.


As an Indonesian, born and raised in Indonesia and who studied abroad for a doctoral degree at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and as an assistant professor at the University of California, Riverside, I have become increasingly in love with America as much as with Indonesia. America has its shared values. And so does Indonesia.


The greater challenge for America and Indonesia is how to revive those values and who can lead the nation in the right direction.


During my five-year residence while studying in Hawaii I found the people incredibly diverse and hospitable. I volunteered in the international student’s organization as well as in the Indonesian community. I learned that bridging differences was the key to resolving miscommunication, prejudice, and hatred between people.


I enjoyed teaching a workshop on Islam to teachers at the Punahou School, which Obama attended, because we learned so much from each other’s cultures.


I have become more aware that when we emphasize the common values, problems and issues will be easier to handle.


I knew his half sister Maya Soetoro Ng before I knew her brother as a senator. Maya Soetoro is a humble, straightforward and intelligent friend, before and even after her brother’s candidacy.


She is very proud of her Indonesian heritage, loves Indonesian food and is always excited to talk about Indonesia. Barack Obama sometimes speaks a few Indonesian words with her.
Making jokes about names was fun when Arabic names became an issue, especially after 9/11.

In interviews, Barack Hussein Obama admitted that his name had become a liability after 9/11 and the Bush administration’s war on terror, as many associate Obama with Arabs and Islam.

Obama often jokes with his friends about his name, as I often do with friends and others.


Obama’s spiritual faith is even more revealing. In his autobiography Dreams from My Father, he saw his Kenyan father as being a Muslim “thinking religion to be so much superstition”, and this influences one of his spiritual life stages.


On his Indonesian step-father, Lolo Soetoro, Barack Obama wrote, “like many Indonesians, Lolo followed a brand of Islam that could make room for the remnants of more ancient animist and Hindu faiths…” His memory of his Indonesian stepfather was that of accommodative Islam and tolerant religiosity shaped by Indonesian syncretism.

Obama felt his mother’s “secularism”, but his mother for him was “the most spiritually awakened person” he had ever known, having instincts of kindness, charity, love, discipline, empathy and hard work. Obama recalled his time in schools in Indonesia.


“In Indonesia, I had spent two years at a Muslim school, two years at a Catholic school. In the Muslim school, the teacher wrote to tell my mother that I made faces during Koranic studies. My mother wasn’t overtly concerned.


“Be respectful,’ she’d said.” His spiritual journey did not end there. He became a member of Trinity United Church of Christ in Chicago which has since transformed his spiritualism and faith.


As an American, with a diverse religious, cultural, national and racial background, Obama believes in what others would call a civil religion. Obama said that Americans should acknowledge the power of faith and its diversity in the lives of Americans.


“Whatever we once were, we are no longer just a Christian nation; we are also a Jewish nation, a Muslim nation, a Buddhist nation, a Hindu nation, and a nation of nonbelievers,” wrote Obama in his The Audacity of Hope. In speeches he delivers, he would end with “May God bless America.”


More importantly, Obama advocates an active and authentic faith to turn American back to its core values inherited from the founding fathers and shaped by influential figures.


He recognizes faith not for faith; it is for community empowerment. Obama’s faith has been and continues to be shaped by problems and challenges facing America.


Barack Obama’s journey was that of not only dreams, but of clarity in how to fulfill these dreams: Perseverance, discipline and hard work. Martin Luther King Jr. and Abraham Lincoln in particular have long inspired him as dreamers of their times, and as role models for the struggle toward racial justice, freedom, equality and citizenship rights. King’s speech “I Have a Dream” shapes and echoes Obama’s rise to presidency.


“All men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” King said powerfully. And that was how Obama became inspired.


The challenges Obama’s administration are facing now are greater than the time of King’s and any previous American presidents: Two wars to finish, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to mediate, economic crises to navigate, healthcare and education to improve.

A great lesson to learn however is not so much about his sound judgment of the details of each
problem and challenge, but his repeated attempts to turn to American values.

Barack Obama demonstrates an inspiring intelligence, a calm and cool personality, and great oratory skills. Obama has brought many Americans of common values and common destiny together.


He believes that problems of injustice, the economic crisis, and the diminishing image of Americans in the world require a change of hearts and minds before anything else.


In cultivating American values, Obama puts the emphasis on education. For him, academic success is not enough without proper values and preparation for responsible citizenship.

Obama’s administration, for example, promises to encourage schools and parents to work together to establish expectations for student attendance, behavior, and homework, calling parents to turn off the TV and video games, and expect all students to engage in community service.


Moreover, in facing the challenges, Obama stresses a shared responsibility. “It is not about me, it is about you, all Americans,” he said. When he met the pilot who successfully landed a plane in trouble, he said, “If everyone does his job, we are going to be fine.” Everyone needs to serve the country. Everyone has to take the burden.


For Obama, politics, like science, depends on the ability to persuade one another of common aims based on a common reality. For him, it is to ensure that persuasion rather than violence or intimidation determines the political outcome.


Internationally, Obama has received worldwide support. His first speech during the campaign period in Berlin is perhaps one of the best speeches ever delivered.


“Look at Berlin, where Germans and Americans learned to work together and trust each other less than three years after facing each other on the field of battle,” he said. Trust is perhaps what the key value is but it is often missing in many international relationships.


In Berlin, Obama emphasized common humanity. “Partnership and cooperation among nations is not a choice: It is the only way, to protect our common security and advance our common humanity.” “That is why the greatest danger of all is to allow new walls to divide us from one another.


“The walls between old allies on either side of the Atlantic cannot stand. The walls between the countries with the most and those with the least cannot stand.


“The walls between races and tribes; natives and immigrations; Christian and Muslim and Jew cannot stand. These now are the walls we must tear down.”


If there is a crucial lesson for Indonesians to learn, Barack Obama’s successful rise to presidency shows that it is the people’s minds and hearts that should be transformed before anything else.


It is to revive American shared values in order to move forward. It is to have vision and hope, in turmoil and in peace. It is to have dreams and a clear path to follow.


Congratulations to President Barack H. Obama! And may God bless you (as your name means) and America, Indonesia, and all the people around the world!

The writer is assistant professor, Religious Studies Department, University of California, Riverside.

Obama's Faith

Obama's faith comes to the public square
James A. Donahue

Tuesday, January 20, 2009

Religion - and its role in public life - more often than not gets a bad rap. Those who see religion as divisive may be prone to speculate what may become of the religious right or the religious left in an Obama administration. They may be failing to see the forest for the trees.

Far from religious views that can be used to divide people, Barack Obama's faith may be a powerful offering and an invitation to people in America and around the world to work together on solutions to the dire economic, political and social problems confronting us. A careful reading of Obama's books and his speech on faith at Jim Wallis's 2006 Call to Renewal conference discloses that our president-elect sees his religious beliefs as informing and shaping his values. In turn, his values and ethical outlooks may shape our policies.

During the campaign, as Obama spoke often about his personal faith, his words suggested a commitment greater than a political ploy to woo faith voters. In a speech last summer to a conference of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, he spoke not of what divides us, but of how our common values can lead to constructive policy: "The challenges we face today - war and poverty, joblessness and homelessness, violent streets and crumbling schools - are not simply technical problems in search of a 10-point plan. They are moral problems ... and so the values we believe in - empathy and justice and responsibility to ourselves and our neighbors - these cannot only be expressed in our churches and our synagogues but in our policies and in our laws."

Obama claims that the separation of church and state is important for democracy and for religious practices to thrive. His is a cosmopolitan identity forged from multiple identities, and the view that all of humanity belongs to a single moral community, and deserves justice and basic human rights.

He places a high premium on tolerance. And yet, as a deeply faithful man, he has a low tolerance for religious certainty. In a 2004 interview with Chicago Sun-Times columnist Cathleen Falsani, Obama said, "In my own public policy, I'm very suspicious of religious certainty expressing itself in politics. Now, that's different from a belief that values have to inform our public policy..."

So what might religion in the public square look like in the Obama administration? We get a glimpse of this in who Obama invited to give invocations at his inauguration. Rick Warren, pastor of the powerful Saddleback Church, will give the main invocation today. New Hampshire Episcopal Bishop Gene Robinson, a gay man at the center of the Anglican church's global battle over homosexuality, delivered a prayer for Obama at Sunday's event on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. Rather than showing alliance, Obama is showcasing the value of inclusivity.

Religious values and ethical outlooks point to the worth of each person as an individual, and as part of the larger human family. They can offer unity if there is the willingness to engage in open and honest dialogue, especially with those who believe differently than we do. From that dialogue can emerge new priorities, policies to solve domestic problems and the framework for peacemaking among nations.

Religion gets its bad rap is because it is misused. But if we distinguish between religions as institutions, and the values and ethical outlooks underpinning the world's great faiths, we can see that religion has much to offer beyond being a source of personal solace. As the world waits with great hope for the new administration to begin work, we can be optimistic that our new leader will be led not by narrowly conceived "truths" derived from religious doctrine, and not by culture war issues that divide. He will be guided by "a belief that we're all connected." We should take him up on his invitation to rise above what divides us.

James A. Donahue is president and professor of ethics at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley.

http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/20/ED9115BBEK.DTL

This article appeared on page B - 7 of the San Francisco Chronicle

The Siege of Gaza

The siege of Gaza: Barack Obama's first “test”?

By John L. Esposito

While some had predicted Barack Obama would be "tested" early in his administration by America's enemy Osama, Obama's first major foreign policy "test" has instead come from America's ally, Israel.

Israel's war in Gaza has been calculated and deliberately planned to occur at this time. The Israeli government has taken advantage of a world in which many are distracted by the global economic crisis and the celebration of Christmas and the New Year.

Equally important the bombing of Gaza has been executed on George Bush's "watch" so that Israel can count on a Bush administration whose failure to act as an honest broker was seen most starkly in the U.S. silence and support during the Israeli war in Lebanon.

The Israelis struck during the U.S. presidential transition and before Barack Obama, who could prove less sympathetic, takes office.

The pretense for the bombings and threat to invade Gaza with ground troops is Hamas breaking the ceasefire by shelling Israel. However, Hamas started shelling after the talks to renew it failed.

Israel ignores the fact that during the ceasefire, Israel put up blockades to stop essential goods from getting in. The siege created a humanitarian catastrophe for Gaza's 1.5 million Palestinian residents by restricting the provision of food, fuel, medicine, electricity, and other necessities of life.

The U.S. and Europe were complicit in the blockade of a democratically elected Hamas government, a siege whose primary victims have been Gaza civilians. Hamas fighters vented their anger by firing rockets.

Reports have been circulating for sometime in the Israeli press that the Israeli military was planning for and looking for a pretext or provocation to strike. Despite the fact that the fighters shelling did not kill a single Israeli, Israel acts as if it has been driven to a "fight to the bitter end."

Following a past pattern, most recently in its humiliating defeat in the Israeli-Hezbollah war, the Israeli military engages in an all-out war that ignores moral and international standards of warfare: the bombings and massacre of more than 375 people and injuring of some 700 lacks any sense of proportionality.

Mosques and the Islamic University have been targeted and destroyed as have homes and hospitals. The Bush administration lamely and falsely blames Hamas, holding it alone responsible for the deaths. If Palestinians had slaughtered and injured a similar number of Israelis, the administration would denounce such actions as war crimes and rightly seek to mobilize the international community.

The international community must move swiftly not only to demand an immediate ceasefire as has the UN and EU but also put pressure on the Bush administration, which has in recent years claimed that it wishes to act multi-laterally and not unilaterally as it had in the decision to invade Iraq.

While the shelling by Hamas' fighters cannot be condoned, Israel's unbridled military response must also be condemned. Until the Israeli government gets a message that the international community will hold Israel to the same standards as it does other nations and the Palestinians, there can be no hope for peace negotiations to work.

President-elect Barack Obama cannot remain silent. While he is right to acknowledge that until January 20th George Bush is in charge of American foreign policy, for him to remain silent now will be seen as simply condoning Israel's devastation of Gaza and undermine his promise of a new international vision and a new approach to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. He will be brush-stroked by the failed policies of the Bush administration in the Middle East and lose his credibility before he even comes to office with an Arab and Muslim world that sees his election as one of hope and promise.

-- John L. Esposito is University Professor and Professor of Religion & International Affairs, Georgetown University and co-author of Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think.

Source: Middle East Online